The Islamic State in the North Caucasus: An Explainer

The emergence of the Islamic State (IS) in the North Caucasus marked an important but ultimately short-lived chapter in the history of the North Caucasus insurgency. By late 2014, IS had begun attracting significant support on the ground and, by July 2015 — when IS proclaimed the region a province of its “caliphate,” under the name Caucasus Wilayah (IS/CW) — it was already the main insurgent group. The rapid rise of IS/CW was driven by two key factors: the domestic struggles of the Caucasus Emirate (IK), the movement it ultimately supplanted, and the conflict in Syria and Iraq, which drew large numbers of North Caucasians into IS. However, IS/CW struggled with many of the same challenges that plagued the IK and, by late 2016, it had effectively ceased to function as a coherent organisation. From 2017 onwards, violence in the North Caucasus associated with IS was largely carried out by individuals inspired by its ideology but lacking formal organisational ties or support.

This article examines the formation, ideology, structure, and operations of IS/CW, its impact on the North Caucasus, and the factors that led to its collapse.

Overview

• What was the Islamic State’s Caucasus Wilayah?
• Historical background and formation
• The structure and leadership of IS/CW
• Key operations and activities
• The demise of the Caucasus Wilayah
• What to read next

What was the Islamic State’s Caucasus Wilayah?

The Islamic State’s Caucasus Wilayah (IS/CW) was a jihadist organisation officially established as a regional affiliate of IS in July 2015. It overtook the Caucasus Emirate (IK), which had previously been the dominant insurgent movement in the region. It aimed to establish sharia law across the entire North Caucasus region as part of the broader “caliphate” project, which sought to unify Muslim lands under a single Islamic state.

IS/CW grew rapidly but it faced the same challenges that plagued the IK, including strong counterinsurgency efforts and limited local support. By the end of 2016, it had effectively collapsed under intense pressure from Russian security services. While attacks in the region were still carried out in the name of IS after 2016, these were mostly carried out by individuals inspired by IS ideology but lacking organisational ties or support.

Historical background and formation

The Islamic State’s advance into the North Caucasus

The rise of IS in the North Caucasus was shaped by the Syrian conflict and the divisions within the global jihadist movement that it produced. From 2012 onwards, North Caucasians participated in the war in Syria, affiliating with various groups. However, many ultimately joined IS, where they often occupied leadership roles — enhancing the influence of North Caucasians within the global jihadist community.

These fighters appealed to their compatriots in the North Caucasus, urging them to support IS. Their calls gained traction due to the battlefield successes of IS, the emotional resonance of the caliphate project, and the challenges faced by insurgency in the North Caucasus. Members of the IK’s regional leadership lobbied their emir to join IS; when he refused, they defected. The first major defection occurred in December 2014, when Rustam Asilderov, the emir of the IK’s Dagestan Vilayyat, pledged allegiance to IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. This catalysed a wave of similar pledges, allowing IS to rapidly eclipse the IK as the dominant insurgent group in the region.

The proclamation of the Caucasus Wilayah

In July 2015, IS formally declared the North Caucasus a province of its caliphate, naming it the Caucasus Wilayah. The announcement, made by IS spokesman Muhammad al-Adnani, marked a key moment in the history of the North Caucasus insurgency, consolidating its victory over the IK.

The core leadership of IS/CW was based in Dagestan, with Asilderov appointed emir and tasked with consolidating the group’s presence and coordinating operations. The leadership hoped to rejuvenate the North Caucasus insurgency by harnessing the emotional appeal of the caliphate and attracting resources from the central IS organisation. However, entrenched challenges — particularly intense counterinsurgency pressure from Russia security forces — proved insurmountable.

The structure and leadership of IS/CW

The leadership of IS/CW did not implement significant structural changes to the organisational framework inherited from the IK (see here). For the most part, groups defected collectively and continued operating as they had before, maintaining an organisational hierarchy that was, on paper, strictly hierarchical.

However, IS/CW’s leadership encountered many of the same challenges that had plagued the IK. Security pressures made it difficult for leaders to convene and coordinate activities, as large meetings posed substantial risks of exposure and elimination. As a result, local leaders continued to operate with significant autonomy, often adapting strategies to their immediate circumstances. High turnover among IS/CW’s leadership further weakened the group. The intense targeting of its senior figures by Russian counterinsurgency operations ensured that newly appointed leaders often lacked the experience or time to establish cohesive strategies. This instability at the top eroded IS/CW’s operational capacity and its ability to sustain a unified insurgency.

Key operations and activities

IS/CW operations were characterised by limited capacity and decentralised tactics. The group lacked the resources and cohesion required to conduct large-scale, high-profile attacks, with patterns of violence in the North Caucasus largely mirroring those under the IK. Most IS-claimed attacks in Russia during IS/CW’s existence occurred in Dagestan, although other republics also experienced violence. Operations often involved rudimentary weapons used to attack members of the security services and seize their firearms, underscoring IS/CW’s limited capacity. Moreover, security forces remained the primary driver of violence in the region, conducting numerous counterterrorism and special operations that decimated IS/CW’s already fragile leadership. Few fighters returned from Syria to bolster the North Caucasus insurgency.

Two factors complicate assessments of IS/CW’s impact, especially outside the North Caucasus. First, IS-inspired attacks occurred across Russia, many of which were unrelated to IS/CW. For example, radicalisation among Central Asian communities presented a growing security concern. Second, IS was not the only jihadist organisation mobilising supporters in Russia. A comprehensive account of terrorism during this period must consider the broader jihadist landscape, in contrast to earlier years when most major attacks were linked to the IK.

The demise of the Caucasus Wilayah

The creation of IS/CW did not alter the challenging operating environment faced by insurgents in the North Caucasus. Following the elimination of the remaining leaders of the iK, Russian security forces turned their focus to IS/CW. A decisive blow came in December 2016, when Asilderov was killed in a special operation. While the last recognised IS/CW leader, Aslan Byutukayev, remained at large in Chechnya until January 2021, his inactivity in later years underscored how IS/CW had largely ceased functioning as a coherent organisation after Asilderov’s death.

From 2017 onwards, there was no organised insurgency left in the North Caucasus. Violence attributed to and claimed by IS continued but was perpetrated primarily by isolated individuals or small, self-starter groups. These lacked organisational ties and relied on rudimentary tactics, such as attacking security forces to seize weapons. Although jihadism remained a persistent threat, it was largely disconnected from any wider institutional structure. IS retained an influence through its ideology, but its practical capacity to mobilise or sustain insurgent activity in the North Caucasus was negligible. This enabled Russia to claim victory in its war on terrorism, even as it failed to address the root causes that had fuelled the insurgency and continued to fight North Caucasians abroad.

What to read next

• If you want a more detailed understanding of North Caucasian involvement in the Syrian conflict, check out ‘Russian-Speaking’ Fighters in Syria, Iraq, and at Home: Consequences and Context, a policy brief coauthored with Dr Cerwyn Moore for the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST).

• If you want an overarching history of insurgency in the North Caucasus, read 🖊️A brief history of the North Caucasus insurgency.

• If you want to understand more about the structure, ideology, and operations of the Caucasus Emirate, check out 🖊️The Caucasus Emirate (Imarat Kavkaz): An Explainer.