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The Caucasus Emirate (Imarat Kavkaz): An Explainer

Date published

Dec 6, 2024 12:10 PM

Date last edited

Dec 13, 2024 12:14 PM

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The Caucasus Emirate (Imarat Kavkaz): An Explainer

The Caucasus Emirate (Imarat Kavkaz, IK) was a jihadist organisation that emerged in 2007. Founded by Dokka Umarov, it replaced the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (Chechenskaya Respublika Ichkeria, ChRI) with a broader, regional jihadist movement that aimed to create an Islamic state governed by sharia law. The IK united various insurgent groups across the North Caucasus under a single ideological banner, marking a shift from Chechen nationalism to global jihadism.

At its height, the IK posed the most significant terrorist threat to Russia and was responsible for numerous high-profile attacks. It undermined Moscow's control over the region and was a key target of Russian counterinsurgency efforts. However, from late 2014, the IK began to fragment as a result of security service pressure and defections to the Islamic State (IS). By August 2015, the Caucasus Emirate had largely ceased to exist as a coherent force, though jihadist violence in the North Caucasus persisted.

This article explores the formation, ideology, structure, and decline of the IK, examining its impact on the North Caucasus and its legacy within the broader context of global jihadism.

The main flag used by the Caucasus Emirate

Overview

What was the Caucasus Emirate?

The IK was a jihadist organisation established in October 2007 by Dokka Umarov, the then-leader of the Chechen insurgency. It replaced the ChRI, the self-proclaimed state that had fought two wars with Russia. Unlike the ChRI, which was mostly a nationalist-separatist project, the IK sought to create an Islamic state governed by sharia law, encompassing the entirety of Russia’s North Caucasus region.

The IK carried out numerous insurgent and terrorist attacks, both in the North Caucasus and elsewhere in Russia, and it constituted the main domestic security threat facing the country until 2014. However, it never achieved its goal of establishing territorial control or building new state institutions. It ultimately collapsed under intense security service pressure and competition from jihadist insurgencies elsewhere.

Historical background and formation

From the ChRI to the IK

The formation of the IK in 2007 marked the end of the ChRI and the transformation of the North Caucasus insurgency into a regional jihadist movement. By the mid-2000s, the ChRI’s nationalist-separatist project had become untenable. Chechen rebels faced increasing pressure from Russian security services, declining recruitment, and factional struggles within the insurgency.

An Islamist wing had risen to prominence after the First Chechen War, drawing support from foreign activists and aligning with radical actors in Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Ingushetia. These alliances helped sustain the insurgency but also demanded a shift from nationalist goals to a jihadist ideology. By 2005, when long-serving ChRI President Aslan Maskhadov was killed, the Islamists dominated the insurgency. Maskhadov’s successor, Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev, expanded the conflict beyond Chechnya by forming the Caucasus Front, laying the groundwork for Dokka Umarov to proclaim the IK in October 2007.

The Role of Dokka Umarov

Dokka Umarov played a pivotal role in establishing the IK but was not its sole architect. Initially a nationalist, Umarov transitioned toward jihadism to maintain unity within the insurgency. He believed that a jihadist framework resonated more with potential recruits and aligned with the realities of the broader conflict. Despite significant internal dissent, Umarov’s leadership consolidated the insurgency under a single banner, enabling the IK to operate as a unified entity.

ChRI President and later IK Emir Dokka Umarov (1964-2013)

The ideology and objectives of the Caucasus Emirate

The ideological framework

The IK represented a significant ideological shift from the ChRI’s nationalist aims, explicitly aligning the insurgency with the global jihadist movement. Its primary goal was to establish an Islamic state across the North Caucasus governed strictly by sharia law. While it adopted some rhetoric from groups like Al-Qaeda, the IK focused primarily on Russia as the main enemy and the source of the region’s problems. Hostility toward the West and the United States existed, but targeting them was never a priority.

Appeal to local and global audiences

The IK sought to appeal both to local populations and to a global jihadist audience. It framed its struggle as a religious duty and portrayed armed resistance as the only viable path to change. Locally, it tapped into grievances about Russian repression and economic hardships. Globally, it emphasized a shared Muslim identity and positioned itself as part of the wider jihadist struggle to attract funding and support.

The structure and leadership of the IK

Organisational structure

The IK divided the North Caucasus into vilayyats (provinces) broadly matching regional administrative boundaries. Its main activities were concentrated in Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria. While vilayyats operated semi-autonomously, they were nominally subordinate to the central leadership. This structure allowed for decentralised operations but made cohesion difficult, particularly as leadership losses mounted.

A map showing the territory claimed by the IK

This map, which circulated on pro-IK social media, shows the territory claimed by the IK. The solid yellow areas represent the IK’s core “vilayats”: (1) Dagestan Vilayat; (2) Nokhchiycho Vilayat (Chechnya); (3) G1alg1ayche Vilayat (Ingushetia); (4) The United Vilayat of Kabarda, Balkaria and Karachay (Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachayevo-Cherkessia); and (5) Nogayskaya Steppe Vilayat (Stavropol Kray). Core insurgent activity was concentrated in Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria. The map also demonstrates the ambiguous status of the wider region: the striped yellow area, covering Adygea and Krasnodar Kray (6) was simultaneously claimed by the IK but did not belong to a distinct vilayat. An Iriston (North Ossetia) Vilayyat was originally part of the IK, but was incorporated into (3) in 2009.

Leadership challenges

The IK’s leadership was hierarchical on paper, with a central emir and a shura (council) at its core and the same structure replicated at lower levels. Dokka Umarov managed to maintain a degree of unity through pragmatism, prioritising cohesion over ideological purity. His successors, Aliaskhab Kebekov and Magomed Suleymanov, were more ideologically driven but struggled to command loyalty and coordinate across the vilayyats. By 2015, the IK’s leadership was largely decimated, leaving the organisation fragmented and ineffective.

A simplified visualisation of the IK’s leadership structure. An emir was in charge of each level of the hierarchy, often supported by a leadership council. Each vilayat was sub-divided into sectors, usually corresponding to a particular area or district, while larger cities typically had their own emir.

Key operations and activities

Notable Attacks

At its peak, the IK carried out high-profile attacks that underscored its capacity to threaten Russian national security:

The 2010 Moscow metro bombings: Suicide bombers killed 40 people and injured over 100 at Lubyanka and Park Kultury stations.
The 2011 Domodedovo Airport bombing: A suicide bomber killed 37 people and injured over 170 at Moscow’s busiest airport.
The 2013 Volgograd suicide attacks: Coordinated bombings targeted a train station and trolleybus, killing 34 and injuring over 70 ahead of the Sochi Olympics.

In addition to these operations, the IK orchestrated ambushes of security forces, assassinations of local officials and religious figures, and attacks on infrastructure.

Tactical and strategic shifts

The IK’s tactics evolved over time. Initially reliant on guerrilla warfare, it increasingly focused on urban terrorism to disrupt public confidence and governance. Suicide bombings were a recurring hallmark of its operations, although Umarov repeatedly imposed and lifted moratoriums on their use. However, as the IK weakened, it became more reactive, and Russian security forces emerged as the main drivers of violence in the region.

The fragmentation and demise of the Caucasus Emirate

Russian counterinsurgency efforts

Russian security forces systematically targeted the IK’s leadership, decimating its ranks through assassinations and intense pressure. High-profile operations ahead of the 2014 Sochi Olympics further weakened the group. While effective, these methods often relied on heavy-handed tactics that alienated local populations.

Competition with the Islamic State

The conflict in Syria and Iraq presented an existential challenge to the IK. It offered a more viable environment for jihadist state-building, drawing North Caucasian fighters from the region and expatriate communities. These challenges only accelerated once IS proclaimed its caliphate. Splits within the global jihadist community were mirrored in the North Caucasus, and high-ranking IK commanders began defecting to IS in late 2014, critically weakening the organisation. By August 2015, with the death of its last emir, the IK had ceased to exist as a coherent entity. IS maintained a limited presence in the North Caucasus for a time but eventually suffered a similar fate.

What to read next

If you want an overarching history of insurgency in the North Caucasus, read 🖊️A brief history of the North Caucasus insurgency.

If you want a more detailed understanding of North Caucasian involvement in the Syrian conflict, check out ‘Russian-Speaking’ Fighters in Syria, Iraq, and at Home: Consequences and Context, a policy brief coauthored with Dr Cerwyn Moore for the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST).

If you want to learn more about how the Caucasus Emirate impacted the North Caucasus, read 🖊️The legacy of the Caucasus Emirate: Evaluating the impact of an insurgency.