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Russian private military companies don’t really exist. Here’s why — and why that matters

Date published

Sep 12, 2024 8:41 AM

Date last edited

Sep 17, 2025 9:32 AM

Newsletter issue

Russian private military companies don’t really exist. Here’s why — and why that matters

Since Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russian private military companies (PMCs) have attracted considerable attention. However, the term “PMC” is misleading in the Russian context and there are arguably no true Russian PMCs. This issue of definition has significant policy implications. Whilst the term is likely to persist, its limitations need to be clearly acknowledged.

Globally, a private military company is understood as a corporate entity that provides military services, including operational support, protection, training, and sometimes direct combat operations (Wither, 2020). Russian PMCs differ significantly: They don’t compete in a marketplace, they are directly linked to the Russian state, and they engage in activities beyond the military domain. This article examines these features to argue that Russian PMCs do not exist in the conventional sense, and it explores the implications of using incorrect labels.

Overview

Breaking down a term: Why ‘Russian private military company’ is a misnomer

Not quite companies: Russian private military companies lack a legal identity

The Wagner Group, owned by Yevgeniy Prigozhin until his death in August 2023, has dominated discussions of Russian PMCs. Yet it has never formally existed. The only legal entity registered in Russia that used the Wagner name was the PMC Wagner Centre that opened in St Petersburg in November 2022 (The Moscow Times, 2022). By that point, the group had been operating in one form or another for almost a decade.

The lack of a corporate identity for Wagner and other Russian PMCs stems from the fact that PMCs are illegal in Russia. Article 359 of the Russian Criminal Code outlaws mercenaries, and other legal provisions complicate their status (Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, undated). Despite recurrent debates about legalising them and their activities becoming progressively less clandestine, Russian PMCs remain illegal. Consequently, they either register as private security firms (PSCs) — which are legal* — or as other entities. Moran Security Group, for example, registered as a PSC, and ENOT Corps registered as a provider of “military-patriotic education” (Foreign Policy, 2013). Slavonic Corps, created by Moran, registered in Hong Kong (Meduza, 2019).

* This is why the commonly used acronym PMSC is problematic in a Russian context: it conflates legal and illegal phenomena.

Definitely not private: Russian PMCs are intimately linked with the Russian state

There is little evidence that Russian PMCs operate in a competitive marketplace. Former Wagner commander Marat Gabidullin notes that Wagner never had a budget or earned money for itself (Barabanov and Korotkov, 2024). Prigozhin-linked companies profited from state contracts, but money did not flow through a corporate entity providing military services. Instead, Russian PMCs rely almost exclusively on state support. After Wagner’s aborted mutiny in summer 2023, President Vladimir Putin admitted that the state had exclusively funded Wagner (BBC News, 2023). Other PMCs have earned significant revenues from state-owned companies like Gazprom and Rosneft (Asymmetric Warfare Group (2020)). In the post-Wagner landscape, groups like the African Corps and Redut are funded by the Ministry of Defence.

A couple of significant caveats are necessary here. First, strong state links are almost inevitable in the PMC sector, given the importance of defence contracts. Secondly, the boundaries between the state and the private sector are blurrier in Russia than is typically the case in the West. Yet a key question is whether Russian PMCs are able to operate autonomously and pursue interests independent of the state. Developments over the last decade indicate they cannot. Wagner operated from Molkino, alongside a base belonging to the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces — better known as the GRU (CSIS, 2020). It is implausible that the GRU did not know and approve of Wagner’s activities there. In Syria and Ukraine, PMCs have operated alongside and received operational support from the regular military. On the other hand, the law has been used to selectively punish those organisations that appear to lack sufficiently powerful patrons. Thus, Slavonic Corps leaders were prosecuted as mercenaries, while ENOT Corps leaders were convicted of being part of a criminal community (Kommersant, 2015). By contrast, similar activities by Wagner went unpunished.

More than military: Russian PMC activities extend well beyond the military domain

Russian private military companies engage in direct combat, unlike many Western counterparts. In Syria, the Central African Republic, Libya, and Ukraine, they have fought insurgents and regular troops — sometimes alongside the Russian military. The military component is highly relevant. Yet Wagner and other Prigozhin-linked actors also engaged in cyber, media, and influence operations, as well as purely commercial activities like mining (Stanyard, Vircoulon and Rademeyer (2023)). In some countries, military activities are secondary; in others, they are entirely absent. Labelling these activities as “PMC” mischaracterises the phenomenon and the threat.

For the most part Russian: Command and control is Russian, even if membership is not exclusively so

Arguably, the only part of the “Russian PMCs” label that is accurate is the “Russian” part. While Russian PMCs do recruit non-Russians, control remains distinctly Russian. This is clear from who occupies ownership and managerial positions in them, as well as from the Russian state actors that supervise them.

Do definitions matter? The policy implications of the Russian PMC label

Problems need to be identified before they can be solved

Erroneous labelling of Russian PMCs can mislead. Analysts and policymakers need a common understanding to address the issue effectively. Many actors, such as insurgent and terrorist groups, lack a clear legal identity, but they can instead be isolated through their activities. The range of activities that “PMCs” have engaged in — which overlap with other actors that have nothing to do with military service provision — complicate this option. The “Wagner” label was always misleading in this regard: It would have been more accurate to call it “Concord,” after the Prigozhin holding company that tied his complex operations together.

Clear definitions also help us identify appropriate tools for responding. Different mechanisms are required to deal with security provision in authoritarian states in Africa than with cyber and influence operations. Different organisations need to be brought into the conversation to design and implement responses. These issues become particularly acute in the legal domain, where a vague ‘we know it when we see it’ approach is clearly insufficient. If “PMC” actors are to be held accountable for their actions — ranging from interference in democratic political systems to extensive human rights violations in conflict zones — then robust legal frameworks are necessary. Treating PMCs as corporate identities that can be targeted with sanctions obscures the continual processes of transformation that these actors go through. Designating them all as “Wagner” when they have no links to the original structure — and that structure no longer exists — risks the law appearing arbitrary.

The dangers of incorrectly identifying Russian private military companies

With Wagner’s demise, the Russian state is bringing Russian PMCs under closer control. This subordination can limit the flexibility of actors: Russia may feel it has no choice but to respond to incidents when its own troops are involved, but it may also decline to undertake certain activities for that very reason. Although the state has long exercised control over PMC activities, plausible deniability has always been more concerned with deniability than plausibility. The legal burden of proof is much higher than the analytic one, and Russia exploits this. Referring to PMCs as “private” can inadvertently support Russia’s denial of responsibility — and thus its efforts to circumvent its obligations under international law. Indeed, the challenges of attribution have merely shifted: Even if we can prove African Corps is a Russian state actor, we still face the difficulty of proving that the “Russian instructors” who appear in a conflict zone belong to the African Corps.

Incorrect labels also lead us to disregard fundamentally similar actors, losing sight of the bigger picture. Groups like the Chechen security services (the Kadyrovtsy) share more similarities than differences with the likes of Wagner: Both are state actors, whose activities and influence extends far beyond their bureaucratic identity. Yet these are frequently treated as different phenomena, addressed by different parts of the policy community.

Why the Russian private military companies label is likely to persist

Imperfect alternatives and the challenges of reaching audiences

Alternatives to the PMC label exist, but they bring their own problems. The term ‘militia’, for example, means different things in different contexts; like ‘non-state proxies,’ it does not foreground state links. The terms ’state proxies’ and ‘state-sponsored groups’ work better in this regard, but overlook the fact that the African Corps and many Kadyrovtsy units are simultaneously part of formal state structures and so much more. The term ‘mercenaries’ has a pre-existing legal meaning that may complicate policy responses, as well as prejudicing discussions of the motivations of participants.

Some terms are not widely recognised, highlighting a further problem: We need to use terms that are familiar to our audiences if we want to engage them. Most of us do not have the power to control the discourses around these topics. Thus we end up consciously using imperfect terms.

In lieu of a solution

The PMC label will likely to persist — and I will continue to use it here and elsewhere. Despite ever-greater integration into state structures, actors like Wagner and the Kadyrovtsy are still distinct from regular military units, and it is their ambiguous status that makes them attractive to Russia. Without a widely accepted alternative, analysts should instead seek to identify and emphasise the links to Russian state structures, ensuring they are explicitly articulated rather than implicitly understood. Thankfully, considerable investigative and analytic effort is currently concentrated on revealing those links. Maintaining that focus is essential.