Date profile last updated: 26 September 2024

Apti Alaudinov, the Chechen commander redeemed through war

Spetsnaz Akhmat commander Apti Alaudinov has regained favour by fighting in Ukraine, but is probably only an outside candidate to replace Ramzan Kadyrov as Chechnya’s leader.

Apti Alaudinov commands the Spetsnaz Akhmat “volunteer” unit that has been the primary vehicle for Chechen state involvement in Russia’s war on Ukraine. The war has boosted Alaudinov’s profile and offered him a chance at redemption, after he earlier fell out of favour for his role in an alleged coup against Chechen Head Kadyrov. While his prominence means he warrants inclusion in the conversation about possible successors to Kadyrov, he likely lacks sufficiently robust support networks at home to be considered a favourite.

Key takeaways

• Alaudinov is currently commander of Spetsnaz Akhmat and deputy head of the Main Directorate for Military-Political Work at the Russian Ministry of Defence.
• He has played a leading role in Chechnya’s involvement in Russia’s war on Ukraine, first deploying in March 2022.
• In 2019, he was implicated in a coup against Kadyrov and became persona non grata in Chechnya for at least a year prior to the Ukraine war.
• He has been implicated in numerous scandals and human rights violations, in particular through his prior role as Chechen deputy interior minister between 2011 and 2021.

Overview

• Apti Alaudinov, the most prominent Chechen on the Ukrainian frontlines
• Alaudinov’s fall from grace
• Evaluating Alaudinov’s claim to the Chechen throne
• Apti Alaudinov’s biography
• A catalogue of scandals involving Alaudinov
• Alaudinov’s digital presence
• Alaudinov on the world stage

Apti Alaudinov, the most prominent Chechen on the Ukrainian frontlines

Apti Alaudinov has emerged as one of the most prominent and enduring members of the Chechen security service and elite to have travelled to the Ukrainian front lines.

He first deployed to Russia’s “special military operation” in March 2022 as commander of the Spetsnaz Akhmat “volunteer” unit, with Kadyrov announcing his deployment on 17 March 2022 (Riddle Russia, 2023). Since then, Spetsnaz Akhmat has become the primary destination for fighters coming from or transiting through Chechnya to Ukraine.

Alaudinov has spent most of his time either in Ukraine itself, or deployed as part of a “buffer zone” in Russia’s Belgorod Oblast. He frequently comments on the war and his unit’s activities via his Telegram account.

Reaping the benefits of war

The war in Ukraine has elevated Alaudinov’s profile beyond Chechnya.

In August 2022, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) publicly accused Alaudinov of violating the country’s territorial integrity, focusing on his activities around Rubizhne, Kreminna, and Severodonetsk in the period March-April 2022 (Kavkaz Realii, 2022).

The same month, Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a classified decree that bestowed the Hero of Russia award on him — Alaudinov has claimed this was in recognition of his role in liberating 36 villages, including Lisichansk, in the Luhansk People’s Republic (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2024; Lenta.ru, 2024; Caucasian Knot, 2024).

Alaudinov’s role in responding to the challenges facing Russia

In October 2023, Alaudinov oversaw the incorporation of parts of Wagner into Spetsnaz Akhmat following negotiations with Wagner commander Aleksandr Kuznetsov (Ratibor), as part of the Russian state’s response to Wagners “march of justice” in June 2023 and Wagner owner Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s death the following August (Kommersant, 2024; Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2024). Alaudinov has claimed he enjoys good relations with Wagner fighters.

Alaudinov’s profile received a further boost in August 2024, when he became a de facto spokesperson for the Russian military responding to Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast (Lenta.ru, 2024; BBC Russian Service, 2024). In a front page interview with state newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Alaudinov claimed the incursion was orchestrated by NATO with the goal of bringing Russia to its knees; however, he also portrayed it as a failure that led to the loss of 5,500-6,000 Ukrainian troops and a significant quantity of NATO-provided equipment (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2024).

Criticisms of the performance of troops under the command of Alaudinov

Alaudinov’s recurring claims of military successes notwithstanding, his Spetsnaz Akhmat unit has been the frequent target of criticism.

Since the start of the war in Ukraine, critics have repeatedly labelled it a “tik-tok army” for alleged disparities between their self-promotion on social media — which Alaudinov has played a key role in disseminating — and their actual battlefield performance, and for preserving Chechen fighters at the expense of non-Chechen recruits. Spetsnaz Akhmat faced further criticisms for their failure to prevent Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast (Novaya Gazeta, 2024; Kavkaz Realii, 2023).

Spetsnaz Akhmat has likely violated international humanitarian law during the conflict, beyond violating Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and Alaudinov, as commander, bears responsibility for both the crimes and the failure to investigate them.

Alaudinov himself has frequently posted videos to Telegram showing Ukrainian prisoners of war, in particular through a series called “our captives” that has been promoted by Chechen state media. These videos, in which the prisoners are clearly identifiable, are a potential violation of international law, which mandates that detainees should not be exposed to unnecessary humiliation or public curiosity (Crawford and Pert, 2015:115).

Change and continuity in formal roles occupied by Alaudinov

Although his leadership of Spetsnaz Akhmat has been a constant, his other formal roles have changed over time.

Between July and October 2022, he simultaneously occupied the role of secretary of the Council for Economic and Public Security of the Chechen Republic.

Shortly after being dismissed from that position, he was appointed in November 2022 as deputy commander for the combat activities of the 2nd Army Corps of Directorate of the People’s Militia of the Luhansk People’s Republic; the following month, this unit became the 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Armed Forces in December 2022.

On 16 April 2024, he was appointed to his current role as deputy head of the Main Directorate for Military-Political Work at the Russian Ministry of Defence (Kommersant, 2024; RIA Novosti, 2022).

Alaudinov’s fall from grace

Participation in Russia’s war on Ukraine has offered Alaudinov a path to redemption after he fell from grace in 2019-2021, primarily for his role in an alleged plot against Ramzan Kadyrov.

A loyal foot soldier of the Kadyrov regime

As deputy interior minister, Alaudinov had cultivated a reputation of a loyal member of the regime. In February 2016, for example, he had addressed a forum of the Chechen elite, at which multiple senior officials called on Kadyrov to remain as leader in response to his suggestions that he could retire; in his comments, he described the Interior Ministry as “Ramzan Kadyrov’s foot soldiers, and infantry cannot function without its commander (EurAsia Daily, 2016; Groznyy Inform, 2016).

In 2017, Kavkaz Realii asserted that “he has a solid reputation as a person with a complete lack of his own opinion, incessantly striving to anticipate the desires of Ramzan Kadyrov. The general is often accused of personally torturing people who are undesirable to the regime” (Kavkaz Realii, 2017).

Earlier doubts about Alaudinov’s position within the Chechen elite

However, Alaudinov’s position within the regime was not always secure. For example, he survived rumours that he had been forced to resign as a result of a major insurgent attack on the Chechen capital, Groznyy, in December 2016 (Novaya Gazeta, 2016).

Similar rumours had circulated the preceding April over a scandal involving Ramazan Dzhalaldinov (see below), prompting an explicit denial from Kadyrov (Caucasian Knot, 2024).

The coup attempt and the role played by Alaudinov

However, it was not until October 2019, when Novaya Gazeta published a report claiming that Kadyrov had been purging his inner circle for the last two months, that Alaudinov finally fell from grace.

The purge involved the imprisonment and torture of senior Chechen officials and security service personnel — as well as their relatives and acquaintances — the confiscation of their property, and forced donations to the Akhmat Kadyrov Foundation.

The cause was an alleged coup orchestrated by Ibragim Temirbayev, who had recently been dismissed from his role as Argun mayor and was immensely displeased with the development.

Others involved included former Groznyy Mayor (and distant relative of Ramzan) Islam Kadyrov, former Chechen Deputy Prime Minister Khalid Vaykhanov, Chechen traffic police head Shamkhan Denilkhanov, Chechen Emergencies Minister Ruslan Yakhyayev, Urus-Martanovskiy Rayon Head Valid Abduredov, former Chechen Forestries Minister Dikmagomed Mulayev — and Alaudinov, then Chechen deputy interior minister, who had allegedly mocked a portrait of Kadyrov at a meeting in Temirbayev’s house.

Alaudinov denied any involvement in a coup against Kadyrov. In December 2019, however, Kadyrov effectively acknowledged that there had been some kind of conspiracy against him but exonerated several of the alleged participants: Islam Kadyrov, Vaykhanov, Denilkhanov, and Yakhyayev. By contrast, he singled out Temirbayev as plotting against him (Caucasian Knot, 2024; Caucasian Knot, 2019; Novaya Gazeta, 2019).

The repercussions

Several of those who allegedly participated in the coup appeared to suffer repercussions as a result.

Most obviously, Temirbayev ceased to play an active role in Chechen politics and eventually died in a car accident in April 2021 — something that several commentators viewed as more likely to be linked to his role in the coup than poor driving skills (Caucasian Knot, 2021).

Islam Kadyrov had already fallen out of favour, having been removed from all official posts in April 2017 for his alleged role in an earlier assassination attempt on Kadyrov (Kavkaz Realii, 2017). Nevertheless, in late October 2019, Chechen state TV aired a lengthy report that showed Islam torturing a woman and claimed his abusive behaviour towards the population was the reason for his dismissal in 2017 (Novaya Gazeta, 2019).

Alaudinov, by contrast, entered something of a state of purgatory, evidently being seen neither as a direct threat nor someone to be trusted. He held on to his post in the Chechen Interior Ministry, but there were widespread rumours that he was now out of favour and in a state of de facto semi-retirement (BBC Russian Service, 2024).

Then, in February and March 2021, Novaya Gazeta published an investigation into extra-judicial killings in Chechnya, based on the testimony of a former member of the Akhmat Kadyrov Patrol and Checkpoint Service (PPS) Regiment. Although Alaudinov featured only marginally in the report, on 18 March 2021, Putin dismissed him as Chechen deputy interior ministry, with commentators seeing the two as linked. Although Kadyrov then appointed Alaudinov as his aide, this was a vague role that offered relatively few opportunities for exercising influence in Chechnya — and the developments were widely interpreted as further confirmation of Alaudinov’s marginalisation (Caucasian Knot, 2024; Novaya Gazeta, 2021; Novaya Gazeta, 2021; Caucasian Knot, 2021).

A chance for redemption for Alaudinov

Coverage by the tightly controlled Chechen state media confirms Alaudinov’s status as an unperson in this period: ChGTRK Groznyy’s website completely ignored Alaudinov between December 2020 and March 2022, while Chechnya Today’s made no mention of him between March 2021 and March 2022. Indeed, Novaya Gazeta reported that Alaudinov’s primary residence from March 2021 onwards was Moscow, not Chechnya (Novaya Gazeta, 2024).

Chechen opposition activists portrayed Alaudinov’s participation in Russia’s war on Ukraine as his attempt to win rehabilitation after these events (Kavkaz Realii, 2022). Certainly, he has attained a prominence in Chechnya and Russia that was denied him in the period before March 2022.

Evaluating Alaudinov’s claim to the Chechen throne

The health of Ramzan Kadyrov, and the consequent need to identify a replacement, have been the subject of long-term speculation.

Alaudinov’s star had risen sufficiently off the back of the war in Ukraine that, in April 2024, Novaya Gazeta published an article claiming that the Kremlin had definitively chosen Alaudinov as Kadyrov’s heir-in-waiting.

Further interrogation of the evidence underpinning this claim, however, reveals the case to be less than convincing.

Novaya Gazeta’s claim in context

A couple of notes on the Novaya Gazeta itself warrant attention, before the merits of its claim are assessed.

First, it was written by the newspaper’s Europe desk, not its veteran Chechnya reporter Yelena Milashina. While its not clear whether Milashina had any input, that is significant given the credibility she typically brings to the paper’s coverage of the republic.

Second, Novaya Gazeta is the only respectable source observed to identify Alaudinov as successor. Chechen Prime Minister Magomed Daudov, State Duma Deputy for Chechnya Adam Delimkhanov, Chechen Deputy Prime Minister Abuzayd Vismuradov, and the Kadyrov children, such as Adam Kadyrov, are frequently mentioned, but Alaudinov has hitherto not been included in the conversation.

For this reason, he was not covered by a policy brief exploring the succession question, which (publication date notwithstanding) was produced prior to Novaya Gazeta’s article.

The basis of the claim

Nevertheless, Novaya Gazeta felt confident enough to not merely anoint Alaudinov as a potential successor, but to claim “the Russian presidential administration has, to all appearances, definitively identified Ramzan Kadyrov’s successor” (emphasis added) (Novaya Gazeta, 2024). There were four key strings to Novaya Gazeta’s claims, each of which warrants consideration in turn:

• His elevated profile due to Russia’s war on Ukraine;
• His prominence at the December 2023 United Russia congress;
• His formal appointments;
• His efforts to appeal to a national, rather than exclusively Chechen, audience

The first string: Alaudinov’s elevated profile – and its limits

Of these strings, the first is clearly the strongest: As documented above, Russia’s war in Ukraine has boosted Alaudinov’s profile and provided him a path to personal redemption.

At the same time, there are important limitations. Much of Alaudinov’s profile comes from self-promotion via Telegram, which in turn provides easy material for journalists and commentators, but does not necessarily signify political influence.

Moreover, the lack of attention afforded to him in some quarters is as revealing as the coverage he does receive.

A review of the Telegram channels of key members of the Chechen elite conducted in September 2024 shows, for example, that they do not mention Alaudinov frequently. Kadyrov, for one, did not mention him at all until his deployment to Ukraine in March 2022 (Kavkaz Realii, 2022), and has only mentioned him 123 times since then. Moreover, the average number of mentions per month has actually fallen: from 6.3 in the last ten months of 2022 to 3.8 in 2023 and 2.1 in the first eight months of 2024.

Other senior figures, like Daudov, Delimkhanov, and Nationalities, External Ties, Print, and Information Minister Akhmed Dudayev have only mentioned him a handful of times. This needs to be placed in context: Kadyrov does not mention anyone outside of himself and his family much (Delimkhanov, who has never been out of favour, has actually been mentioned fewer times) and other members of the elite devote most of their effort to extolling the greatness of Ramzan and his family.

Nevertheless, what Kadyrov talks about performs a signalling role to others within Chechnya. It is no accident that references to Alaudinov on the website of Chechen state TV channel ChGTRK Groznyy are almost identical to those of Kadyrov’s Telegram, averaging 6.2, 5.6, and 2.6 times per month for the respective periods of 2022, 2023, and 2024.

Fellow members of the Chechen elite congratulated Alaudinov, in February 2024, on graduating from the Military Academy of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff, but did not congratulate him two months later on being appointed deputy head of Main Directorate for Military-Political Work at the Russian Ministry of Defence — because that was what Kadyrov did.

While this evidence is not conclusive, there isn’t much positive data available to suggest Alaudinov possesses the type of support within Chechnya that he would need to establish control there.

It seems reasonable to claim that his former persona non grata status would make others wary of building a relationship with him without Kadyrov’s approval — especially as anyone not trusted will be closely monitored — and his location outside Chechnya makes it difficult for him to build networks within it.

The second and third strings: Reading the signals from the Kremlin

The second and third strings work in harmony. In December 2023, Alaudinov addressed the United Russia congress that nominated Vladimir Putin for reelection to the presidency.

Novaya Gazeta saw this as hugely significant, noting Alaudinov’s confidence and more polished demeanour compared to other member’s of the Chechen elite. Per Novaya, offering Alaudinov a prominent role at the conference acted as a public signal from the Kremlin of the esteem with which he was held.

Alaudinov’s formal appointments and accreditations reinforced this. Thus, in January 2024 he was appointed as Putin’s trusted representative during the presidential elections; in February, he graduated from the Military Academy; and in April, he obtained his current role within the Russian Ministry of Defence.

The cumulative effect of these “signals” meant that Novaya felt confident enough to anoint Alaudinov as Kadyrov’s successor-in-waiting.

Appointments certainly can play an important signalling role in the Russian political system, where elites try to read the tea leaves in much the same was as commentators do.

However, Alaudinov’s case arguably shows their limit as indicators too. When Alaudinov fell from grace in Chechnya, he did not lose his formal position: he remained as Chechen Deputy Interior Minister for a year and a half, but in a state of semi-retirement — no longer able to exercise the same influence as before.

In October 2022, Kadyrov unexpectedly removed him from the post of Secretary of the Chechen Security Council, but this does not seem to have hampered his war-time rehabilitation; instead he was promoted to military major-general, preserved a largely meaningless post as aide to the Chechen leader, and acquired an ambiguous posting in the People’s Militia of the Luhansk People’s Republic.

Novaya interpreted the April 2024 appointment as an event of major significance, but the post he acquired was hardly a top-tier one that yields significant power or access to resources. It fell well short of the (admittedly fanciful) rumours that he could have received a post like deputy defence minister.

Alaudinov’s current role offers him an opportunity to build relationships with members of the Chechen security services deployed to fight, but not evident access to significant resources that would enable him to build patronage networks.

The fourth string: Interpreting Alaudinov’s appeals across religious lines

What, then, of the final string — Alaudinov’s efforts to appeal to a national, rather than exclusively Chechen, audience?

Novaya drew attention to the fact that Alaudinov’s speech at the United Russia congress referenced God five times, but Allah only once. Novaya interpreted this as an effort to present himself as a “good Chechen” and appeal to a Russian, i.e. national, audience.

The wider evidence for this use of religion is ambiguous. On the one hand, his interview with Rossiyskaya Gazeta followed a similar pattern: He used bog (God) 15 times, compared to 4 references to Allah. In the text of his Telegram posts (an important methodological limitation, given that he often communicates via video), the number of references to God outside of set phrases is more than double the references to Allah.

On the other hand, references to Allah are hardly absent: The standard phrase of the Chechen elite “Akhmat sila, Rossiya moshch, Allakh velikh” (which lacks the same force in English, but translates as Akhmat is power, Russia is strength, Allah is great) features almost 1,400 times, whereas the variant “Akhmat sila, Rossiya moshch, Bog velikh” only appears 47 times. The standard Muslim phrase “Allahu akbar” is likewise frequently used, often in combination with “bog edin” (God is one).

The tendency for references to both God and Allah is to use them in the tediously repetitive way that characterises the speeches of the Chechen elite, but there is certainly no effort by Alaudinov to hide his Muslim faith, nor is there an immediately obvious change in patterns over time.

Instead, a more reasonable conclusion is that Alaudinov is trying to emphasise both his religiosity and conservatism — which plays well with audiences in Russia and Chechnya — and what unites “true believers,” be they Muslim or Orthodox.

In his Rossiyskaya Gazeta interview, Alaudinov claimed that he is religious and prays five times a day and has completed the hajj, and he has emphasised his strict, conservative upbringing (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2024). This doesn’t fully negate Novaya’s point about Alaudinov orienting himself towards a national audience, but it doesn’t support the concurrent rejection of a Chechen one that is implied.

A less-than-compelling case for seeing Alaudinov as Kadyrov’s successor-in-waiting

Taking these points together, does this mean that Alaudinov is not a candidate to replace Kadyrov?

As a prominent and experienced member of the Chechen elite whose involvement in Ukraine has undoubtedly drawn the attention of the Kremlin, he probably warrants consideration.

Predicting leadership succession in authoritarian regimes is fraught with difficulties, and Alaudinov’s claim is comparable to someone like Vismuradov’s or even Daudov’s.

But the one source that has made the case for considering Alaudinov heir apparent has not made a particularly strong one.

Alaudinov’s greatest difficulties would come with building the networks he needs within Chechnya. His prior missteps would make it difficult for him to do this behind Kadyrov’s back, and there is no reason to think Kadyrov would favour him as a successor over Delimkhanov or his own children and thus support these efforts.

As such, he can be considered a candidate, but an outside one.

Apti Alaudinov’s biography

Alaudinov’s family

Alaudinov is a member of the Benoy teip (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2024).

His father, Kharon Alaudinov, was a retired Soviet military officer (Lenta.ru, 2024). In 2012, a hafiz school was opened in his name in Urus-Martan (Kavkaz Online, 2017). Alaudinov characterised his upbringing as conservative and strict (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2024).

Alaudinov claims his father and brother died while fighting against the forces of Chechen Republic of Ichkeria President Dzhokhar Dudayev in Urus-Martan in October 1994. His relatives fought on Russia’s side when it invaded Groznyy in 1994, with many dying in the process (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2024; Lenta.ru, 2024). Alaudinov has said that his decision to pursue a career in the Interior Ministry was motivated by a desire for blood revenge against those who had killed his family (24SMI, undated).

Alaudinov has said that he has 12 children, with his oldest daughter aged 24 and his youngest son aged 8 (as of September 2024) (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2024).

His younger brother, Abdul Alaudinov, is head of the Directorate of the Court Bailiffs Service in Perm Kray (Kavkaz Realii, 2024).

Alaudinov’s business interests

Alaudinov does not have any reported business interests.

Alaudinov’s career trajectory

• Prior to 2000: Trader, Groznyy market (Kavkaz Realii, 2017).
• 2000-2001: Employee, Chechen prosecutor’s office (Kommersant, 2024).
• 2001-2002: Inspector, acquisitions division (otdel komplektovaniya) of the Interior Ministry (Kommersant, 2024).
• 2002-2004: Employee, Directorate of Personal Security, Chechen Interior Ministry (Kommersant, 2024).
• 2004, July-2005: Deputy head, surveillance division, Directorate of Personal Security, Chechen Interior Ministry (Kommersant, 2024).
• 2005, November: Head, Directorate for Combatting Organised Crime, Chechen Interior Ministry (Kommersant, 2024).
• 2006, April: Head, special commission for monitoring observance of norms and rules for residing in temporary migration centres (Kommersant, 2024; Lenta.ru, undated).
• 2009, March-April: Head, Directorate of the Chechen Ministry of Justice (Kommersant, 2024; Lenta.ru, 2024).
• 2009, April-2011, June: Deputy head, criminal police, Chechen Interior Ministry (Kommersant, 2024; Lenta.ru, 2024).
• 2011-2021, March: Chechen deputy interior minister (Kommersant, 2024).
• 2012: Promoted to the rank of police major-general — the youngest person to hold that rank in the Russian Interior Ministry (Kommersant, 2024; Lenta.ru, 2024).
• ?-2017, February: Vice-president, Terek football club (Kavkaz Realii, 2017).
• 2021, March-2022: Aide to the Head of the Chechen Republic (Kommersant, 2024).
• 2022, March-date: Commander, Spetsnaz Akhmat.
• 2022, July-October: Secretary, Council for Economic and Public Security of the Chechen Republic (Kommersant, 2024).
• 2022, November-2024, April: Deputy commander for the combat activities of the 2nd Army Corps of Directorate of the People’s Militia of the Luhansk People’s Republic. Promoted to the rank of military major-general (Kommersant, 2024; Lenta.ru, 2024).
• 2024, January: Trusted representative of Vladimir Putin during Russian presidential elections (Lenta.ru, 2024).
• 2024, 16 April: Deputy head, Main Directorate for Military-Political Work at the Russian Ministry of Defence (Kommersant, 2024; Lenta.ru, 2024).

A catalogue of scandals involving Alaudinov

Helping strengthen the Kadyrov regime’s control

On 19 April 2006, then-Chechen Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov announced the creation of a special commission for monitoring the observance of norms and rules for those residing in temporary migration centres. Kadyrov claimed that many “dead souls” were registered at such centres and announced his plans to close the, claiming they were hotbeds of criminality, drug addiction, and prostitution. Kadyrov appointed Alaudinov to head the commission (Lenta.ru, undated).

In autumn 2006, Alaudinov accused former Gorets commander Movladi Baysarov, an opponent of Kadyrov, of abducting and murdering the Musayev family in January 2004. In October 2006, a grave containing 10 members of the family was discovered, with Alaudinov claiming its location had been revealed by one of Baysarov’s former subordinates.

The following month, the Chechen Interior Ministry placed Baysarov on the federal wanted list on suspicion of the murders, although he was officially classified as a witness in the case files. A Chechen operational group shot Baysarov in Moscow when he allegedly resisted arrest (Lenta.ru, undated).

In 2016, Kadyrov attempted to appoint Alaudinov as head of the Chechen Supreme Court, having forced the previous leadership of the court to resign. Alaudinov passed the qualifying exam for a federal judge role, but the Russian Supreme Court rejected his candidacy due to his lack of experience as a judge (Novaya Gazeta, 2016).

In August 2018, Alaudinov caused controversy when a picture of him circulated online that showed him holding a Chechen flag in an Ingushetian village, with a caption that claimed it was part of Chechnya. The Chechen-Ingush border and alleged Chechen encroachments on Ingushetian territory have been the subject of fierce disputes (OC Media, 2018).

Alaudinov implicated in multiple human rights violations

As Chechen deputy interior minister, Alaudinov was regularly implicated in the human rights violations perpetrated by the Chechen regime, including torture, persecution of opposition, and extrajudicial killings.

In December 2013, at a meeting with local officials in Urus-Martan, he endorsed summary killings and the planting of evidence as part of the struggle against the local insurgency: “Here is a new police chief next to us. I personally told him: ‘Smash them. If you want to put somebody in jail, put them there. If there is a chance to plant some kind of evidence in somebody’s pocket, plant it. Do whatever you want to do and kill anyone you want to kill.” Alaudinov claimed this message originated from Kadyrov himself (RFE/RL, 2013).

In February 2015, Ruslan Kutayev, chairman of the Assembly of the Peoples of the Caucasus, was arrested. Formally, he was charged with possessing drugs, a tactic that has been employed against numerous activists; unofficially, his true crime was organising an academic conference to discuss the deportations of the Chechen people, in defiance of an order by Kadyrov that the deportations be commemorated in May (on the anniversary of his father’s death) rather than February (when they actually occurred).

Kutayev’s lawyers accused Alaudinov and Chechen parliamentary speaker Magomed Daudov of involvement in the torture of Kutayev when he was held in detention. Both Daudov and Alaudinov denied the charges in court, and both were sanctioned by the United States for their involvement in the treatment of Kutayev (Caucasian Knot, 2024; Novaya Gazeta, 2014; Amnesty International, 2014).

In 2016, Dagestani activist Ramazan Dzhalaldinov publicly appealed to Ramzan Kadyrov and Vladimir Putin, complaining about the lack of reconstruction of his village of Kenkhi. Dzhalaldinov claimed that Alaudinov threatened him that he would face the same fate as killed Chechen activist Natalya Estemirova if he continued to complain (Caucasian Knot, 2024).

In July 2017, Novaya Gazeta identified Alaudinov as one of a number of senior figures within the Chechen security services implicated in mass arrests and executions of people the preceding January, as part of broad counterterrorism operations conducted in the wake of a December 2016 attack in Groznyy. Human rights group Memorial was able to partially confirm Novaya’s findings (Novaya Gazeta, 2017; Novaya Gazeta, 2017).

Facilitating regime enrichment

In July 2017, Kavkaz Realii accused then Chechen Parliamentary Speaker Magomed Daudov of trying to extort R30 million from the head of the Chechen branch of Sberbank Rossii, Sayd-Magomed Dzhabrailov.

The key meeting was reportedly attended by Alaudinov and Chechen General Prosecutor Sharpudi Abdul-Kadyrov and took place in the office of Chechen Deputy Prime Minister Yakub Zakriyev. Dzhabrailov was placed on the federal wanted list when he allegedly refused to pay (Kavkaz Realii, 2017).

Controversies within the context of the war in Ukraine

In February 2023, Kadyrov reported on an attempt to poison Alaudinov using a laced envelope. Alaudinov was treated in hospital in Moscow, returning to Ukraine the following month (Kommersant, 2024). Prigozhin visited Alaudinov when he was being treated in a Moscow hospital for poisoning in February 2023, gifting him a sledgehammer (see picture above) (Lenta.ru, 2024; 24SMI, undated).

By his own admittance, helped organise a camp for children in the Luhansk People’s Republic, where participants were taught combat medicine and military skills. The first group consisted of 67 children, the second more than 100. Some were the children of killed Akhmat and other fighters, others came from across Russia (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2024). In February 2024, he became involved in a dispute with the nationalist unit Rusich, whose commander criticised a proposal to set up an Akhmat training camp for children (Kavkaz Realii, 2024).

In September 2024, he publicly defended a group of Chechens who became involved in a brawl over a woman in a cafe in Anapa, claiming the woman had provoked the incident. Military correspondent Dmitriy Steshin criticised Alaudinov for his position, claiming he had placed ethnic relations over national unity and his own reputation (Lenta.ru, 2024).

Also in September 2024, Alaudinov claimed in a Telegram post that members of the unit who surrendered to Ukraine don’t “deserve to live.” He claimed they had “surrendered like little girls” and no effort would be made to secure their release through a prisoner swap (Novaya Gazeta, 2024).

Alaudinov’s digital presence

Alaudinov’s main channel for communication is the “Apti Alaudinov Akhmat” account on Telegram.

Alaudinov also has a VK account and a Rutube channel.

Alaudinov on the world stage

Alaudinov was sanctioned by the United States, alongside Magomed Daudov, in 2014 for his alleged role in the detention and torture of Ruslan Kutayev (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2014; Reuters, 2014).

He was banned from entering Latvia in 2018 (Lenta.ru, 2024).

In December 2020, the United Kingdom sanctioned Alaudinov, Daudov, Argun police head Ayub Katayev, and the Terek Special Rapid Response Unit (SOBR) for “torture and other human rights violations against LGBT people in Chechnya” (Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office, 2020).

Alaudinov was sanctioned by Poland in November 2022 for his role in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2024; Lenta.ru, 2024; TASS, 2022).

Ukraine finally sanctioned Alaudinov in December 2023 (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2024; Lenta.ru, 2024; Global Sanctions and Export Controls Blog, 2023).

Canada sanctioned Alaudinov in December 2023 under the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (Sergei Magnitsky Law) (Government of Canada, 2024).

Alaudinov has not been sanctioned by the European Union, as of September 2024.