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African Corps expands operations to Equatorial Guinea

Date published

Jan 28, 2025 2:37 PM

Date last edited

Sep 16, 2025 1:43 PM

Newsletter issue

Explainer: Russian PMCs in Equatorial Guinea

African Corps expands operations to Equatorial Guinea

The Central African country is the latest to embrace Russian military cooperation as part of a broader effort to develop bilateral ties.

Russia has reportedly started deploying military personnel to Equatorial Guinea, following an agreement reached in June 2024 by Russian Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov and Equatorial Guinean Vice President Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue. The deployment is under the auspices of the African Corps, a contract-service unit subordinate to the Russian Ministry of Defence that was set up in summer 2023 as a partial replacement for private military company (PMC) Wagner (for an explanation of the group’s origins, see this profile). What distinguishes this deployment from those to other African countries is that Equatorial Guinea is not facing a domestic insurgency. Alongside security cooperation, the two countries appear to be developing ties in other areas, most notably energy – though Equatorial Guinea is likely most useful as a node in a broader network than in its own right.

Overview

Yevkurov’s Africa tour leads to bilateral military agreement between Russia and Equatorial Guinea

On 7 June 2024, Yevkurov — who supervises African Corps operations within the ministry — met with Nguema Obiang Mangue in the Equatorial Guinean capital of Malabo. Also in attendance on the trip was Admiral Igor Kostyukov, chief of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff Main Directorate (GRU) and representatives of Russia’s business community — although Deputy Defence Minister Timur Ivanov, who was supposed to oversee business cooperation and the development of major civilian infrastructure projects, was absent following his arrest on corruption and bribery charges two months earlier (Defence Blog, 2024; Regnum, 2024). The visit formed part of a broader African tour by the Russian delegation, which covered a number of countries where Russia has provided military support: Libya, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso (Regnum, 2024).

After the meeting, Nguema Obiang Mangue tweeted that the two countries had “signed a military training agreement. This agreement will enable Russian instructors to travel to the country to train soldiers from various corps of the national army” (RT, 2024). The agreement also reportedly included the establishment of a Russian military base in the country (Cameroon Concord, 2024). A formal statement issued by Equatorial Guinea’s Press and Information Office reported that Nguema Obiang Mangue had said the visit would raise bilateral cooperation to a “higher level,” with a particular focus on defence and security, and that Russia had provided 200 scholarships for the military corp in 2024 (Official Web Page of the Government of Equatorial Guinea, 2024).

The website Cameroon Concord opined that the military cooperation agreement would not only bolster Equatorial Guinea’s military, but would have “far-reaching implications for regional security dynamics” (Cameroon Concord, 2024). Equatorial Guinea is distinct from other countries where Wagner/African Corps is operating in one key regard: It is not the site of a local insurgency threatening the stability and survival of the regime. Nevertheless — following talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow in September 2024 — Equatorial Guinean President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo (who is also Nguema Obiang Mangue’s father) drew attention to the threat posed by piracy and Russia’s potential role in tackling it (President of Russia, 2024). One of the key services provided by Wagner’s predecessor, the Moran Security Group, was maritime security.

The agreement now appears to have reached the implementation stage. According to Defence Blog, Russian “military instructors” have started arriving at EMIGO, the Inter-Arms Military School based in Ekuku, just outside the port city of Bata on the mainland part of Equatorial Guinea (Defence Blog, 2024). Pro-Russian Telegram channel Rybar cited local media reporting as showing that the first troops arrived at Nguema Obiang Mangue’s residence already in mid-August, with further personnel reaching Bata in September (Telegram, 2024). Reuters cited three sources that claim that the current deployment comprises between 100 and 200 military instructors, who are training elite guards in the country’s two main cities (Reuters, 2024).

Agreement builds on recent efforts to bolster bilateral ties

The agreement reached by Yevkurov and Nguema Obiang Mangue was preceded by high-level diplomatic engagements between their two countries. Nguema Obiang Mangue led an Equatorial Guinean delegation to the second Russia-Africa summit, held in St Petersburg in July 2023; also in attendance at the summit was late Wagner owner Yevgeniy Prigozhin, fresh from Wagner’s “march of justice” across Russia the preceding month (BBC News, 2023).

In November 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Equatorial Guinea President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo (who is also Nguema Obiang Mangue’s father) held talks in Moscow. The two presidents discussed the potential to open a Russian embassy in Malabo, and Obiang Nguema Mbasogo claimed Russia had an important role to play in tackling terrorism and security threats in central Africa and the Gulf of Guinea (RT, 2024; President of Russia, 2023). That embassy now appears to be fully operational (President of Russia, 2024).

Equatorial Guinea was not included in Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s June 2024 tour of Africa, which took him to Guinea, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Chad (Regnum, 2024). However, Lavrov met with the country’s representatives on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session in New York in September 2022, and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov discussed the development of bilateral relations with Nguema Obiang Mangue during the latter’s visit to Moscow in 2019, and with Equatorial Guinean Ambassador L.N. Ndong Ayekaba in Moscow in March 2024 (TASS, 2024; The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2019; The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2024)

It is worth noting that African Corps is not the only PMC operating in Equatorial Guinea: the Belarusian outfit GardServis, owned by Viktor Sheyman and staffed by many former Wagner personnel, provide personal protection to the president (Regnum, 2024).

Russia-Equatorial Guinea security cooperation complements energy diplomacy

Beyond security, energy appears to be a key priority area for Russia-Equatorial Guinea relations. Both Putin and Obiang Nguema Mbasogo addressed the Russian Energy Week International Forum prior to their September 2024 meeting, and both focused on their countries’ cooperation in the energy sphere, including through the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), in their public comments on the meeting itself (President of Russia, 2024). Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Novak and Equatorial Guinea Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons Antonio Oburu Ondo held talks in September 2024 over the involvement of Russian energy companies into hydrocarbon, solar, nuclear, and LNG projects in Equatorial Guinea and the provision of industrial oil and gas equipment to Equatorial Guinea (Interfax, 2024). Equatorial Guinea was one of seven African countries to sign an agreement in September 2022 on the construction of new network of oil and gas infrastructure.

At present, however, bilateral trade turnover amounts to only a few million dollars, with Russia mainly exporting meat and wood products, pharmaceuticals, minerals, and chemical fertilisers, and Equatorial Guinea sending wood and charcoal in the other direction (TASS, 2024). This suggests that Equatorial Guinea is more useful as part of a broader network and effort to bolster Russia’s presence in Africa than it is in its own right.

Equatorial Guinea is seeking Russia’s approval to host the next Russia-Africa Summit, which is due to be held in Africa in 2026. Obiang Nguema Mbasogo has noted that his country refuses to join the International Criminal Court and thus will ignore its arrest warrant for Putin — as well as resist other “anti-Russian measures” (TASS, 2024; President of Russia, 2023). It is also aspiring to join BRICS (President of Russia, 2024).

In September 2024, Obiang Nguema Mbasogo addressed the Russian State Duma and met with Russian State Duma Chairman Vyacheslav Volodin. Obiang Nguema Mbasogo highlighted Russia’s role as an anti-colonial power, rehashing a theme from his other meetings. The pair also discussed the development of other aspects of cooperation between the two countries, including on a parliamentary level (The State Duma, 2024; The State Duma, 2024).