Mezhidov, Khuseyn

Khuseyn Mezhidov is the commander of the Ministry of Defence’s 270th Motor Rifle Regiment Akhmat-Kavkaz.

Mezhidov is reportedly a close friend of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov and has built his career in the Chechen security services, but most of the time he has stayed away from the limelight.

His first known posting was as head of the training centre for SOBR Terek (now SOBR Akhmat), a Rosgvardia unit that has been heavily implicated in human rights abuses in Chechnya. At the time, SOBR Terek was commanded by Abuzayd Vismuradov, another close friend and ally of Kadyrov; Vismuradov has since moved on to become a Chechen deputy prime minister and one of the most influential figures in the Kadyrov regime.

Later, in March 2019, he assumed the role of commander of the 49th Detached Special Motorised Battalion (Yug), a Rosgvardia unit. What’s unclear is when (or why) he stepped down from that role: In April 2022, Kadyrov announced that Saydi Lorsankayev, at the time deputy commander of SOBR Akhmat, was coordinating the activities of both SOBR Akhmat and Yug in Ukraine. In July 2022, Chechen state media was still referring to Mezhidov as Yug’s commander; however, by December 2022, it was referring to Lorsankayev as the occupant of the role — a position he still holds today. I haven’t yet found an official statement confirming Mezhidov’s removal/Lorsankayev’s appointment.

What was the nature of his involvement in Ukraine?

One thing we can say with confidence is that Mezhidov, as commander of Yug, was one of the first to deploy to Ukraine. The evidence for this comes straight from the horse’s mouth: On 26 February 2022, Kadyrov claimed in an Instagram post that Chechen forces had seized control of a facility belonging to an operational brigade of Ukraine’s National Guard. He accompanied the post with a video clip showing Mezhidov erecting a flag at a checkpoint. (In the early days of the war, Chechen officials were still mainly using Instagram, which achieves the rather dubious distinction of being even more annoying to work with than Telegram, their current preference). Other social media sources from around the time confirmed that Chechen forces were at Hostomel, 30 km from Kyiv.

Mezhidov appears to have cycled through Ukraine relatively quickly. This was true of a lot of senior Chechens in the early days of the war. As with the question of when he ceased to be Yug commander, when exactly he left is still to be determined. Posts by Mezhidov to Telegram suggest he was back in Chechnya no later than July 2022: numerous clips show him there, and all of the subsequent posts that cover his activities in Ukraine seem to be referring back in time, rather than reporting on contemporary activity. It is, however, possible if not likely that Mezhidov left well before that, in May if not April 2022.

There is no compelling evidence that Mezhidov has returned to Ukraine since that early deployment. Instead, Mezhidov largely seems to have dropped from view until his reemergence as Akhmat-Kavkaz commander (a role that will likely see him return to Ukraine).

Confirmation that Mezhidov was at Hostomel

One thing we can now say with certainty that Mezhidov was at Hostomel. Not only do we have the original Reuters report, which geolocated social media posts, and Kadyrov’s own comments. We also have statements from the (other) horse’s mouth: Two posts in July 2022 on Mezhidov’s Telegram account reflect on his happy memories of his time there.

This is not, right now, hugely significant: There was no reason to doubt Reuter’s claim. But it’s a necessary step in the process of arriving at a more precise picture of when and where exactly Mezhidov operated. And there are a few videos from his Telegram account that may help achieve more precise geolocation.

We also have firm evidence of command responsibility — this is the doctrine in international law that allows for the prosecution of military commanders for the actions of their subordinates. On 25 July 2022, Mezhidov stated “I have fulfilled and fulfil the orders of the head of the Chechen Republic, no matter where 👊 only forward 👊 Akhmat power 👊.” Analytically, this is again not significant: There’s no doubt that the Chechen security services are operating on instructions from Kadyrov. But the judicial burden of proof is much higher than the analytic one, so collecting such statements by actors are useful for satisfying it.