What 2025 holds for the world of sub-state security

Prediction #1: Jockeying by the Chechen elite will increase

There are two dimensions to this prediction. The first is internal. The question of who succeeds Ramzan Kadyrov as leader of Chechnya is not going to go away, which means that potential candidates to replace him will try to consolidate their claims to the throne. Ramzan will continue to promote his offspring by giving them more responsibility within the state apparatus, but the Delimkhanov and Geremeyev clans may also try to be more forceful in ensuring their interests are protected. Of course, Ramzan may still be with us in 2026, but that's in the hands of Allah, not the authorities in Chechnya – and the Chechen elite have no clearer idea of when he will die than the rest of us, so will need insurance.

That's a fairly safe bet: there are no points available for suggesting that Ramzan will give awards to his children! The external dimension is perhaps more interesting. Late last year, esteemed Chechen watcher Elena Milashina claimed that Kadyrov was losing influence in Moscow, seeing this as the reason for his verbal attacks on Investigative Committee Head Aleksandr Bastrykin and Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev. I think Kadyrov's issues are narrower than this, but nevertheless significant. On the one hand, he still appears to enjoy the support of President Putin and people like National Guard Director Viktor Zolotov, so I don't think he's in any personal danger. Nor is Kadyrov easy to remove, even if the Kremlin were so inclined. On the other hand, it appears that some of the economic elite in Moscow – in particular Finance Minister Anton Siluanov and Economic Development Minister Maksim Reshetnikov – managed to secure a reduction in funds flowing to Chechnya. This prompted Kadyrov to engage in some pretty sustained efforts at lobbying throughout 2024, with Presidential Administration Head Anton Vayno emerging as a particular focus of attention. Kadyrov also suffered reputational damage, most notably in the Wildberries affair. So I expect Ramzan and his allies to engage in some reasonably high-profile efforts to attract attention and demonstrate their ongoing relevance and influence, and so regain some of the literal and metaphorical capital lost last year.

Prediction #2: The North Caucasus will experience another major, multi-site attack

I won't go into too much detail on this one, because the evidence will be discussed in the aforementioned forthcoming report on key trends in terrorism and counterterrorism in the North Caucasus in 2024. But one thing that we saw last year, particularly in Ingushetia and Dagestan, was evidence of growing coordination between actors. I think we're still a long way short of seeing the reemergence of a full-blown insurgency, so this shouldn't be overblown. But there were multiple incidents where small clusters of actors managed to coordinate across locations – something that became difficult even in the later years of the Caucasus Emirate/Caucasus Wilayah – and evade the security services, albeit only for a short period of time. One of the most significant security events of last year was the 23 June attacks in Makhachkala and Derbent, which produced large numbers of casualties, and the Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow in March also had links back to the region. I think we'll see another multi-site attack like those 23 June events in 2025, most likely in Dagestan.

Prediction #3: Drone attacks on the Chechen security services will increase

There isn't much that leaps out as a major potential change in the world of the Chechen security services, and the planned creation of at least one new unit will not significantly alter their capacity or operations. But from late October, we saw the emergence of a new domestic security issue: drone attacks. There were at least nine of these, five of which appeared to target the facilities of the Chechen security services. If Ukraine was indeed behind them, as seems most likely, then I see no reason why it wouldn't continue to deploy them: they are cheap, impose high costs (including through overreaction), and align with broader Ukrainian military strategy. A focus on targeting the Chechen security services also makes sense: if the goal is to bring the war home to Russia, it makes sense to target the units that are most active there. If they were smart, other non-state actors who want to threaten the Russian state might also look to replicate the tactic, though I wouldn't put money on that level of insurgent innovation.

Prediction #4: PMC activity will double down on Africa, without major success

The world of Russian private military companies is perhaps hardest to predict, because it depends on how highly complex armed conflicts in multiple places evolve. For the most part, I think the main thing will be continuity rather than change. But that makes for a rather dull prediction, so I'll focus on Africa as the main area to keep an eye on.

First, I think we'll see an effort to reenergise operations on the continent, as much as through lack of alternative as anything else: I don't think PMCs will disappear from Russian strategy, but equally there's limited potential for expansion into either Asia or Latin America, and the Russian military will continue to prefer greater control over actors in Ukraine. With rumours that Anton Yelizarov (Lotos) has been kicked out of Wagner circulating on Telegram, I wouldn't be at all surprised to see Aleksandr Kuznetsov (Ratibor) returning to take a leading role in operations on the continent – particularly given the PR work around him and Wagner Legion at the end of last year.

Operationally, though, it's hard to see where major victories or improvements for Russian PMCs are going to come from. It will probably continue to struggle in Mali, so it may scale back its operations to a minimum there. It'll probably also seek to expand its presence elsewhere – perhaps Togo or Equatorial Guinea, given Yunus-bek Yevkurov's visits in 2024 to those countries. But, unless another anti-Western military junta seizes power somewhere else and turns to Russia, 2025 will be marked by a lack of major achievements for Russian PMCs in Africa.