The infuriating inconsistencies of the sanctions system
The UK realises Aymani Kadyrova is not a nice person
Happy Friday!
As I write this, the early morning sun is trying to break through and bring a little bit of joy to the day. The world hasn’t properly started yet and there’s still a degree of calm and quiet. But for a slight deficit of sleep, it’d be delightful!
This week, I wanted to reflect on the latest sanctions against members of the Kadyrov regime — and how they (again) highlight the inconsistencies and flaws of the sanctions regime as a whole.
With that in mind, here’s what you can expect:
- Aymani Kadyrova finally makes the list
- A flawed approach to designations
- If you’re going to do something, do it right
Aymani Kadyrova finally makes the list
On 3 September, the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) announced that it was adding yet more people to its list of sanctioned Russian citizens. From Chechnya, two people and one organisation were included: Aymani Kadyrova, head of the Akhmat Kadyrov Foundation and mother of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadryov; Zamid Chalayev, commander of the Chechen Interior Ministry’s Akhmat Kadyrov Special Purpose Police Regiment; and the Akhmat Kadyrov Foundation itself.
The stated reason for the designations was their involvement in Russia’s efforts to “forcibly deport and indoctrinate Ukraine’s children and erase their Ukrainian cultural heritage.” It’s a reference to Russia’s activities in occupied Ukrainian territory and long-running efforts to hold Russian officials accountable. The UK claims that, to date, 19,500 Ukrainian children have been deported. The Kadyrov Foundation and Aymani are implicated through “re-education programmes,” including “militaristic training,” which they run.
A flawed approach to designations
The announcement is the kind that provokes a degree of disbelief and irritation — not because it is prima facie wrong, but because it invites the question: How are they not already on the list?
There are three main flaws with the Western approach to sanctions in general (which I’ve written about previously): They often contain factual errors; they neglect key actors; and they are not adequately coordinated among Western partners. The first is, frankly, inexcusable; the third is difficult but not impossible to resolve without a major initiative and some minor pooling of sovereignty. The latest designation, however, is an excellent example of the second problem.
For those of you lucky enough to be unfamiliar with the delight that is Aymani Kadyrova, allow me to introduce her. As already noted, she is the mother of Ramzan and the wife of his late father and focal point of the regime’s cult of personality, Akhmat Kadyrov. She is, thus, a key member of the Kadyrov clan which is currently working out how to transfer power to the next generation of human rights abusers. However, she is not merely guilty by association (though, since the Kadyrov regime practices collective responsibility, it could hardly complain if this were the grounds for designating her!). She is also a key figure in regime propaganda and oversees the regime’s primary financial vehicle, i.e. the Kadyrov Foundation. If some members of the Chechen system have blood on their hands, she is soaked head to toe.
Which begs the question: Why it has taken until 2025 to sanction her? The UK has been designating members of the Kadyrov regime for years, and most of the grounds that have been used for those designations could easily have been applied to her. Indeed, the deportation of Ukrainian children is possibly one of the harder ones to evidence. Which is not to say that it’s not true, but simply that, from a legal perspective, there are much easier cases to make. To a lesser degree, the same is true for Zamid Chalayev, who is a fairly prominent member of the Chechen security services.
If you’re going to do something, do it right
There are reasonable arguments to be made that the whole logic and approach of the Western sanctions region is flawed and ineffective. I don’t plan to visit those here. But, whichever side of the debate you fall, there’s a lot to be said for the mantra of ‘if you’re going to do something, do it right.’
Those who believe sanctions are effective — a group that presumably includes UK government officials — should be in favour of a systematic approach. This means working out clear criteria for designation and then identifying all those who fit the criteria. Otherwise, it’s like fishing with a big hole in your net. But if you believe sanctions are purely symbolic, then you can still make the case for the same. Otherwise, the signal that you’re sending is that you really don’t care enough to get it right.
Chechen officials have, to date, been sanctioned on myriad grounds, including repression and violations of human rights, LGBTQ rights, the territorial integrity of Ukraine, and, now, the deportation of Ukrainian children (often reflecting a Western media agenda rather than any genuine concern for Chechen rights, but that’s a topic for another day). Yet it is absurdly easy to find senior regime officials who are heavily involved in each of these areas who either evaded sanctions for too long or who have still not been designated. It took me a grand total of one attempt to find a UK example (if you’re curious: Abuzayd Vismuradov, deputy prime minister and in the top-five of current regime officials).
If a sanctions regime is ever to be effective, it needs to start from a premise (the grounds for designation) and then systematically identify the key people who meet the criteria. This does not require a great deal of time and resources. At present, however, the whole sanctions regime looks like it has been outsourced to an intern with no language skills or subject-matter expertise, who spends their days surfing Twitter and looking for the outrage du jour. Even as a symbolic effort, both Chechnya and Ukraine deserve better.