The four questions that will shape Chechnya’s future

Examining scenarios for a post-Ramzan Chechnya

Greetings!

Is the world treating you well this week? I hope your work is inspiring and you’re managing to find time away from the office too!

I delivered a big project last week — alas, one of the many interesting things I work on that I’m not at liberty to share publicly — and have had the luxury of a few days to catch up on things. These windows never last long, but I try to make the most of them while they’re here!

In this week’s newsletter, I want to flesh out some ideas about the Chechen succession process. Specifically, I want to probe four questions that will play a critical role in determining Chechnya’s future. These are based around part of a talk that I recently gave. Ultimately, I think that reflecting on pathways and conditions is more productive than trying to pick the name of Ramzan Kadyrov’s successor.

With that in mind, here’s what you can expect:

Different scenarios for a post-Kadyrov future
Four key questions that will determine which pathway is followed
Current answers to the questions and their limitations

Different scenarios for a post-Kadyrov future

I’ve attempted to visualise the different scenarios of what might happen when Kadyrov finally dies. Thinking through these is useful for framing the discussion and providing the context for the questions that I identify.

Scenarios for a post-Kadyrov future. The three starting points are, left to right, nominated successor, unclear preference, and external disruption. Different pathways depend on whether the desire is to maintain or change the system, and whether a claimant's claim is accepted or not.

With due apologies for the shortcomings of my ability to produce snazzy visualisations, this image can be read as follows. From left to right, you have decreasing levels of control maintained by the political centre, i.e. the Kremlin, over what happens. Less obviously, from top to bottom, we have the passage of time. The top line represents possible starting points, the bottom the desired end-point of all processes.

The simplest scenario comes from the left-hand side: The Kremlin nominates a new leader from within the existing Chechen elite; it aims to preserve the current system; and everyone else acquiesces. Tomorrow’s Chechnya consequently looks very much like today’s, with Ramzan’s death causing limited disruption.

The most chaotic scenario comes on the right-hand side: Ramzan is forcibly removed from power and the current system is overthrown by external actors. This is essentially an ‘external coup’ scenario.

In between, you have varying degrees of control and transformation. The Kremlin could see in Ramzan’s death an opportunity to remake Chechnya and its relationship to the federal centre. The existing elite could also dissent from the perceived trajectory and fracture — either because there is no clear successor or because the proposed successor is not acceptable to them.

All scenarios strive towards the same point: A single figure able to claim an effective monopoly on power. This is likely to be true irrespective of the nature of the system or leader that emerges. At issue is how long, complicated, and bloody the road is to that destination.

Four key questions that will determine which pathway is followed

The different scenarios give rise to four questions, the answers to which will be critical to determining which pathway is followed:

What does the Kremlin want? It has long been said that Chechnya’s fate is determined in Moscow, not Groznyy. This largely remains true today. But, in order to understand the Kremlin’s decision-making process, we have to know its preferences and priorities. The Kremlin may see the maintenance of the status quo as the most desirable option, or it might want to transform the system and reduce the republic’s autonomy and the legal and political exceptionalism that has characterised Ramzan’s rule. The difference between those two pathways is potentially enormous.

What is the Kremlin’s tolerance for risk? This question directly informs the first. The Kremlin (or, acknowledging this term encompasses various factions and interests, influential groups within it) may see a more controlled and controllable Chechnya as the ideal. But any attempt to change the system increases the uncertainty and potential for objections. If the Kremlin has a low tolerance for risk, then a sub-optimal devil you know becomes more attractive.

How clearly does the Kremlin signal its preferences? Perceptions of power and influence matter. It is all very well the Kremlin having a set of priorities that are clear to it, but it needs to communicate those to other actors — who will make their decisions based on subjective interpretations, not facts. The central scenario in the visualisation, where there is elite fracturing from the outset, would emerge if the Kremlin did not clearly indicate its preferred successor and members of the current Chechen elite began fighting among themselves.

Does the Chechen elite acquiesce to the change? Agency does not lie exclusively with the federal centre. If the existing Chechen elite sees the proposed continuity or change as being in its interests, then the transition process could be relatively smooth. If, however, significant players see the proposed pathway as antithetical to those interests, some of them possess considerable capacity for disruption.

Current answers to the questions and their limitations

There is little doubt about Ramzan Kadyrov’s preference for succession. For months, the Chechen state has promoted his son, Adam, as heir apparent. Thus, Ramzan is pushing strongly for the left-hand scenario: A nominated successor who maintains the status quo [Adam, by the way, has just got married. If you have a spare top-of-the-range off-road vehicle or sports car, I’m sure his gift registry is still accepting donations].

However, the complete lack of information regarding questions 1 and 2, i.e. the Kremlin’s preferences and risk tolerance, makes it impossible to guess who they will back. There are multiple candidates within the existing elite for whom a plausible case could be made, and an outsider remains a possibility (even if, ahem, an outside one). Although some people answer with confidence, the available evidence supports multiple scenarios.

Thus, the Kremlin could opt for Adam directly. Here, I think the legal issues around Adam’s age are less insurmountable than some perceive them to be: The Kremlin is happy to turn a blind eye to legal violations when it wants; it could change the law; or it could create a new position to get round them (‘curator’ of the Chechen authorities, anyone?). It could opt for a placeholder, though they would have to hold the place for quite some time. Or they could opt to transform the system and appoint a more pliable figure.

From the right side of the graphic, the extreme chaos scenario is least likely. There are no groups within Chechnya that are strong enough to initiate regime change, and there would be no reason for them to wait until Ramzan’s death if there were. The non-elite forces with the greatest appetite and capabilities are located outside Chechnya. This doesn’t mean that they will not play a role in the transition process. Instead, any role is unlikely to be the starting point and will instead emerge down the line, as a consequence of decisions and mistakes made elsewhere.

What about the chances of elite fracturing? I tend to view the Chechen elite as being as self-interested as any other kleptocratic regime. Everyone will be loyal right up until the moment they are not. But two factors speak against elite-initiated disruption. First, the robustness of the current regime stems from interlocking obligations, interests, and vulnerabilities. These are no easier for a member of the elite to unpick than they would be for the Kremlin. Second, and relatedly, the current elite will be well aware of the risks of chaos. The famous Benjamin Franklin quote aptly characterises their dilemma: “We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately.” There are are lot of people waiting for a chance to hang them.

This is not to say that elite fracturing will not occur. But I think it is more likely to result from either the Kremlin choosing a pathway that is inimical to their interests or leaving a vacuum than it is to directly stem from a desire to seize the throne.

So, where does this leave us? For the most part, watching the Kremlin for smoke coming out of the chimney. Moscow has had plenty of time to ponder its options, but its preferences, decisions, and mistakes will be what plays the critical role.