Russia subtly shifts from Syria to Sudan
Sudan announces agreement on naval base as Russia maintains delicate balance
Sudan’s Foreign Minister Ali al-Sharif has reported that his country has reached an agreement on a Russian naval base in the country, following talks in Moscow with his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov.
Al-Sharif was in Moscow for what Russia called a “working visit,” dedicated to “resolving the ongoing military and political crisis in that country.” The talks over the base resurrected an agreement originally reached in 2020, but placed under review by the Sudanese authorities in mid-2021. Now, al-Sharif says there are “no obstacles” to implementing it. The base would be hosted near Port Sudan, which is the headquarters of the Sudanese army and the country’s de facto president, Abdul Fattah al Burhan. In its original conception, it would have lasted for 25 years and provided a logistics hub for warships and up to 300 personnel.
What is curious about the latest agreement — which at this stage remains verbal — is the silence from Moscow. Lavrov did not comment on the meeting directly, and the Russian Foreign Ministry’s press release made no mention of agreement over the base. Mainstream Russian media outlets were similarly silent: the talks were not covered by the print editions of Kommersant, Vedomosti, Izvestiya, or Rossiyskaya Gazeta.
One reason for the silence could be that Russia is maintaining a delicate balancing act. It has, after all, long had ties to both the Sudanese Armed Forces and their opponents, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Sudan was the first African country that Russian private military company (PMC) Wagner deployed to, way back in 2017, and companies linked to its founder, Yevgeniy Prigozhin, leveraged their ties with Sudanese military intelligence to establish a variety of commercial operations in the country. At the same time, Wagner reportedly supplied RSF with weapons. There was considerably continuity in Russian operations before and after the ousting of long-serving leader Omar al-Bashir — the naval base deal was first discussed with Bashir in 2019 before being signed by the military that ousted him in November 2020. Russia may simply be hedging its bets, given the fragile hold on power of the current Sudanese regime. Another reason for Moscow’s caution could be a lack of trust, following the Sudanese authorities reversal on the base in 2021. There is little question that a base would serve Russia’s strategic interests, and Russian officials have repeatedly visited Port Sudan in recent months.
The backdrop for the talks is uncertainty over the fate of Russia’s Tartus naval base and Hmeimem air base in Syria, which I covered in the newsletter a couple of weeks ago. Since then, Syria has signalled its willingness to let the bases stay. In an interview with The Washington Post, Syrian Defence Minister Murhad Abu Qasra said the country was willing to allow Russia to keep its air and naval bases if it was in Syria’s interests. Both sides appear to be adopting a pragmatic approach to negotiations. The new minister embraced the idea that, in politics, there are no perpetual enemies, only interests. He also refused to comment on whether Syria had requested the extradition of ousted dictator Bashar al-Assad. Russian President Vladimir Putin, meanwhile, spoke with new Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa on 12 February and expressed his support for Syria’s territorial integrity, but the future of the bases was not mentioned in the press release about the call. Just as Russia may be hedging its bets within Sudan, it may be doing the same in regards to Syria.