Radicalising movements through repression

The question rises as to whether the violence that results from repression is actually unintended.

Happy Friday!

Today, I'm continuing my mini-series on 'how to start an insurgency,' looking at lessons and mistakes from the North Caucasus' recent past. The theme this week is the radicalisation of movements – and it's Kabardino-Balkaria that provides our case study.

With that in mind, here's what you can expect this week:

• The transformation from an overt to covert movement What happens when you cut off peaceful avenues of protest
• The lessons Russia refuses to learn

The transformation from an overt to covert movement

The collapse of the Soviet Union triggered processes of identity seeking across and beyond the North Caucasus. In Kabardino-Balkaria, these initially centred around ethnic identities and the penetration of religious ideas was limited – something that is perhaps unsurprising, given Islam's shallower historical roots there. Nevertheless, over time the salience of Islam slowly increased and it assumed an increasingly important role in social and political life. To a certain extent, as ethnonationalism declined as a political force, it was supplanted by religion.

As this process developed, a divide emerged between the old religious establishment and a new generation of believers. On the one side, the local religious authority, the Spiritual Board of Muslims (DUM), aligned itself closely with the political establishment. In return, it was allowed to establish a de jure monopoly over religious life. On the other side, a new and often better educated generation sought to elevate Islam's role in society. These 'New Muslims' criticised the religious ignorance of the DUM and the corruption, clientelism, and lack of opportunities that pervaded all spheres of life. By the late 1990s, they had coalesced into a broad social movement known as the Kabardino-Balkarian Jama'at (KBJ).

Over time, relations between the KBJ and the political and religious authorities became increasingly antagonistic. Generally hostile to dissent, the authorities – backed by the DUM –adopted increasingly repressive measures. Religious institutions were closed down and practicing Muslims were harassed, and the KBJ was a particular target. At the same time, Chechen rebels saw the republic as offering an opportunity to expand their conflict, and jihadist violence linked to Kabardino-Balkaria and radical element within the KBJ occurred in and beyond the republic.

In 2004-2005, these parallel stories of religious conflict and insurgent activity became fully intertwined. The KBJ's leaders and many members disappeared underground, resurfacing at the head of a major attack on Nalchik, the republic's capital. Kabardino-Balkaria now had its own insurgency, which aligned itself with groups elsewhere in the region – and contributed significantly to the ideological infrastructure of insurgency.

What happens when you cut off peaceful avenues of protest

The case of Kabardino-Balkaria was unique, involving the migration of the rump of a large-scale movement underground. It gave rise to conflicting interpretations. After all, the KBJ's leaders had resisted calls, from inside and outside the movement, to engage in armed struggle for the best part of the decade. Was this just dissimulation, allowing the KBJ to build strength, or was there a genuine change in attitudes?

In truth, it's hard not to have some sympathy for the KBJ. State repression escalated to such a degree that it became virtually impossible to practice religion. Those who wanted to were left with an unsavoury choice: leave or fight. The authorities' persecution of the KBJ was such that it influenced public perceptions of its legitimacy – and blame for the Nalchik attack did not fall exclusively on the insurgents. Even the Kabardino-Balkarian president of the day accepted that police crackdowns could have caused it. Repression also altered the internal dynamics of the KBJ and calls for armed struggle found increasingly fertile soil.

The lessons Russia refuses to learn

Of course, the KBJ itself shares some of the blame for Kabardino-Balkaria's descent into violence. At the same time, any effort to paint illegal action as immoral and illegitimate becomes harder when the state itself operates on the wrong side of the law. It is not hard to imagine a scenario where Kabardino-Balkaria followed the path of Karachayevo-Cherkessia: not exactly problem-free, but peripheral to wider security concerns.

The key mistake made by the authorities was the failure to differentiate between peaceful and violent manifestations of dissent, and to allow space for alternative, even critical viewpoints. There was a clearer path to dialogue between insurgents and the authorities in Kabardino-Balkaria than anywhere else in the region. Even after the turn to violence, insurgents there remained far more restrained in their attitudes to violence. The same mistake was repeated elsewhere, in the relentless repression of Salafis irrespective of evidence of their involvement in violence.

Yet a question arises as to whether this 'mistake' was always accidental. The security services are not stupid: They cannot fail to be aware that their repressive practices and human rights violations are antagonistic and counterproductive. They encourage some to embrace violence, and others to sympathise with those that do. At times, it is hard to escape the impression that this is the point. After all, the violence that results justifies both further repression and funding for the security services.