Investigation sheds light on Russian propaganda in Central African Republic
An international consortium of investigative journalists — led by Forbidden Stories and involving Vazhnyye istorii and the Dossier Centre among others — has published information on Russian propaganda operations in the Central African Republic, linked to the Wagner Group and the networks built by its late-owner Yevgeniy Prigozhin.
The members of the investigative consortium have each published separately on the story, meaning some insights and important details are scattered across different outlets and articles. So here, I’ll try and bring together what are the most interesting and important points. It’s not clear whether there is more to come: Forbidden Stories seem to suggest there should be a video report as well, but their link to the trailer lead nowhere. I suspect this will just be a retelling of the textual story though.
The investigation centres around a 29-year-old “journalist” called Fidèle Ephrem Yalike-Ngonzo, who reportedly worked for organisations linked to Wagner and its late owner, Yevgeniy Prigozhin, before fleeing and handing over information to Western media outlets. Between 2019 and 2022, Yalike “contributed to the propagation of false news, promoted anti-Western demonstrations, and fueled arguments in favor of the Central African regime and its supporters in Moscow.” However, he slowly became disillusioned with the work, culminating in his departure from CAR in February 2024.
To reveal the story, Yalike first made contact with Western journalists in South Africa in autumn 2022, providing documentary evidence of his involvement with Wagner and instructions from his handlers. Yalike claims that he became disillusioned after being asked to participate in a cover-up of an attack on civilians in February 2022; he then became Wagner's prime suspect when the true story was leaked to the media the following month, leading to a confrontation with his handler. When he first tried to leave the country in February 2024, he was detained at Bangui airport and the authorities threatened to hand him over to Russian operatives. However, he was released from custody and finally managed to leave the country several days later, via a canoe crossing the Ubangi River. It was only once he was safely out of the country that he was prepared to speak publicly. Forbidden Stories portrays his decision to speak as motivated by a desire “to condemn the actions in which he participated and lay bare the propaganda techniques he used. But above all, it was to expose the clandestine forces of which he was first a witness, and then a victim.” One suspects saving his own skin was a more compelling motivation than moral condemnation — four years is quite a long time to work before remembering such niceties as professional and personal integrity, and he still wrote the cover-up — but who knows.
So what are the key findings from the investigation? The first relates to the evolution of the Russian propaganda network in CAR. The network began establishing itself shortly after Wagner arrived in the country, and Yalike claims this arrival was initially welcomed by locals, who felt abandoned following the decision by former colonial power France to withdraw its troops amid deteriorating relations with the Touadera regime. Yalike was at the outset clearly an enthusiastic collaborator with the network, appearing to put himself forward as a voice of the regime and admitting to being happy to receive the approximately €45 he was paid for each article. From this initial involvement, he progressed to working full-time for Wagner, providing summaries of what was being written about Russian activity in CAR and debunking negative stories via various local outlets — for which efforts he received up to €766 a month. These outlets were not unwitting participants, either, receiving their own payments for the publications. Russian actors, including Sputnik, then disseminated the stories further. Overall, it becomes clear how closely Russian operatives sometimes controlled the narrative, literally dictating stories for publication, although local regime-linked actors also played a key role. The network’s primary goals were discrediting Western countries and institutions, shaping public debate to favour the regime and Russian activities in the country, and finding suitably compliant “experts” to act as talking heads. This worked hand-in hand with other initiatives: Yalike claims, for example, that protests against the UN peacekeeping mission, MINUSCA, were paid for by Russia and then duly reported on by loyal outlets.
The second key finding is the identification of Mikhail Prudnikov as a key operative and Yalike’s handler in the CAR. Prudnikov, a 38-year-old from Tambov Oblast, previously participated in the Nashi youth movement, ran unsuccessfully for the Russian State Duma in 2010, and spoke publicly about information warfare before disappearing from public view in 2016. From there, he has gone on to participate in Prigozhin’s “Lakhta Project,” which coordinates disinformation campaigns around the world. According to Dossier Centre, Prudnikov first worked for Prigozhin in Sudan, after which he moved to CAR. He reportedly remains active in the country, though one suspects his involvement will go one of two ways: quietly moving on to somewhere else, now that he has lost his cover, or embracing a more public profile a la Dmitry Sytyy, who runs the Russian House cultural centre and frequently speaks to international media outlets.
The third key finding is that an organisation called Africa Politology is identified as a central node in the network that Yalike and Prudnikov belonged to. The organisation was led by high-ranking Prigozhin operative Sergey Mashkevich until at least 2022. It’s involvement isn’t perhaps that surprising — Africa Politology has already been sanctioned by Canada and the US for its role in Prigozhin’s propaganda operations — but the investigation offers further confirmation of the types of activities it engages in.
The reports, and a separate article by Forbidden Stories, also testify to the “omnipresent climate of fear” that impacts local media reporting not only in CAR, but also in the other countries where Wagner/African Corps operate: Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Anonymous journalists speak of how Russia has transformed the media landscape in the Sahel through its propaganda, bringing in or paying off journalists to shape narratives in the desired direction. The Russian-language publication African Initiative has, in the words of Filip Bryjka and Jedrzej Czerep from the Polish Institute of International Affairs, now become, “the main transmission belt of Russia’s (dis)information activities in Africa.” One of the cited examples explains how Russia has arranged trips for Malian journalists, who have then become involved in pro-Russian activism back home. Others across the region avoid certain topics for fear of retribution or becoming the target of smear campaigns. Any such fear is well-grounded. It was in CAR, after all, where one of the most notorious efforts to halt journalistic investigations into PMC activity occurred: In July 2018, Wagner operatives (or their local allies) killed the Russian journalists Orkhan Dzhemal, Aleksandr Rastorguyev, and Kirill Radchenko, shortly after they arrived in the country.
Sources: Forbidden Stories, Forbidden Stories, Forbidden Stories, Vazhnyye istorii, Dossier Centre