Insurgent overspill and the role of incompetent governance

In Ingushetia, the authorities played a key role in the spread of insurgency

Welcome back!

I hope this week has been a festival of joy for you. Or, at the very least, a small gathering of joy. If not, why not?!

For my part, after a couple of slightly more relaxed weeks, I’m back on the metaphorical treadmill, working hard on client projects. And, in my spare time, I’ve been thinking a lot about Chechen state-building — as you do. More will follow on that in due course…

This week, however, I want to continue my mini-series on ‘how to start an insurgency’, asking how the different insurgencies of the North Caucasus’ recent past came about and what lessons we can draw from them to help us interpret contemporary developments in the region. Conflict in each of the republics followed a different trajectory, so in some regards — especially those of origins — it is worth considering them as separate phenomena.

The second instalment of the series will look at the overspill effect, or how conflict spreads from one area to the next. As such, here’s what I’ll cover:

• The murky origins of Ingushetia’s insurgency
• How corruption and incompetence pushed Ingushetia over the edge
• The lessons we can draw from Ingushetia’s decline

The murky origins of Ingushetia’s insurgency

For many years, Ingushetia walked a tightrope. It is the republic with the closest social, cultural, historical and political ties to Chechnya. Unsurprisingly, therefore, it was deeply affected by the two wars between Chechnya and Russia (1994-1996 and 1999-2002). At the same time, it chose to follow a different pathway, remaining within Russia and avoiding becoming a direct party to the conflict. While Ingushetia certainly did not emerge unscathed, it escaped the wholesale devastation visited upon its neighbour.

Exactly how this situation changed and an indigenous insurgency emerged within Ingushetia itself is, surprisingly, something of a mystery. When one looks at think tank reports and academic articles and books, one emerges with the impression that the insurgency appeared almost overnight. One moment the republic is a footnote to the Chechen conflict, the next it is discussed as if insurgency was always there. Very little attention has been paid to the origins of the specifically Ingush groups that emerged in the mid-2000s.

In many ways, this is because the Chechen and Ingush stories are impossible to disentangle. The first major clash between Chechen rebels and federal security services on Ingushetian territory occurred in late 2002, and the situation deteriorated from there. Ingush fighters were heavily involved in major insurgent operations, such as the 2004 raids on Nazran and Karabulak and the Beslan school siege of the same year. Throughout 2006 and 2007, the situation in Ingushetia declined further and the existence of an indigenous insurgency became irrefutable. Some Ingush groups emerged within the Chechen theatre, others in the refugee camps created by the wars. Yet, without further research, we cannot separate Chechen and Ingush threads and isolate the origins of a specifically Ingush insurgency in the same way that we can for Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria.

How corruption and incompetence pushed Ingushetia over the edge

If it is difficult to answer how an indigenous insurgency emerged in Ingushetia, the same is not true of the question of why. There are multiple reasons, including a deliberate Chechen strategy to expand the war beyond the republic to ease the pressure at home and a broader regional zeitgeist of Islamist revival and resistance to Russian rule. Yet the pivotal event was surely the decision to remove Ingushetian president Ruslan Aushev and replace him with Murat Zyazikov.

Aushev was far from perfect, and subsequent developments have certainly helped to burnish his reputation. But, like Mintimer Shamiyev in Tatarstan — and unlike Dzhokhar Dudayev in Chechnya — he appears to have been a highly skilled political operator who could balance local and federal interests. Aushev’s leadership played a key role in maintaining the republic’s balancing act and keeping it out of the war next door.

By contrast, you would struggle to find a figure in post-Soviet history more loathed than Zyazikov — which is quite some achievement! Zyazikov’s appointment marked a clear turning point in the history of the republic. It heralded a period of extensive human rights violations and corruption. By 2007, the state had virtually collapsed and the rule of law was notable only by its absence. If history has been kind to Aushev, it has been utterly damning with regard to Zyazikov (as an aside, he was appointed as an adviser to the Russian president and, most recently, as ambassador to Cyprus — proof, if ever it was needed, that competence is not a criterion for survival in the Russian political system!).

The lessons we can draw from Ingushetia’s decline

What is the relevance of Ingushetia’s story for the North Caucasus today? I think two points warrant particular attention. First, the competence of state appointees makes a huge difference. Democratic accountability is lacking in the region, and the Kremlin today would be unwilling to tolerate as independent a figure as Aushev. But even within the parameters of authoritarian governance, there can be huge variance in legitimacy and a ruler’s sensitivity to societal concerns, and the actions that leaders take can ameliorate or aggravate tensions.

Zyazikov’s successor, Yunus-bek Yevkurov, succeeded in improving the security situation by demonstrating a willingness to listen and respond to public concerns (though it must also be acknowledged he could hardly have made them worse and benefitted considerably from just not being Zyazikov). In neighbouring Kabardino-Balkaria, President Arsen Kanokov dropped some of the more egregious policies of his predecessor, which had fuelled the creation of that insurgency (more on that next week). Neither were democrats, or even particularly virtuous. They were simply more competent — or what, in Kabardino-Balkaria’s case, was labelled ‘enlightened’ in their authoritarianism.

This lesson seems most pertinent to Chechnya, where the Kremlin may soon need to make a decision about the next leader. The competence and skillset of its choice could play a significant role in determining how unstable the situation could become. The Adam Kadyrov option does not inspire confidence in this regard…

Second, the spillover effect calls attention to the role that the movement of people can play in the spread of conflict. Ingush travelled to Chechnya, where they learnt combat skills, while Chechen rebels took advantage of the refugee camps to spread their influence outside their republic. Both processes led to the forging of the relationships that underpinned Ingushetia’s indigenous insurgency.

The obvious parallel here is Ukraine, where North Caucasians (in particular Chechens) have travelled and are fighting against Russia. They could look to bring their skills, experiences, and relationships back home. Russia has long been acutely aware of this threat, and for this reason the inward flow of radicals has been much more tightly managed than the outward one. But a warning sign of destabilisation would be if Russia’s control over its borders weakened and the movement of people became easier.

There are, as yet, no indicators of this happening — even if the war in Ukraine has distracted the security services. But that doesn’t mean the status quo will persist in perpetuity.