Clarity and ambiguity among the armed Chechen opposition
Pro-Ukrainian Chechens are clearer on the headline goal than on how they plan to achieve it
Happy Friday!
Things appear to be pretty quiet at the moment — both personally and politically. A quiet interlude, if you will. But that’s no bad thing, so I’ll try and enjoy it while it lasts!
This week, I wanted to reflect on an interview given recently by several representatives of the Sheikh Mansur Battalion — the one fighting on Ukraine’s side in its war against Russia, not the identically named pro-Kadyrov unit. In particular, I want to consider what it says about the armed opposition’s plans for the future and how they plan to get there.
With that in mind, here’s what I’ll be covering in this issue:
- What pro-Ukrainian Chechens are fighting for
- Visions for the future
- Moving beyond aspiration
What pro-Ukrainian Chechens are fighting for
Members of the Sheikh Mansur Battalion have given a number of interviews since the start of the latest phase of Russia’s war on Ukraine. In many ways, the latest interview repeated several common themes. It was, therefore, interesting but not groundbreaking.
First, the group are clear what they are fighting against: Putinist Russia and its imperial policy. They are not, therefore, focusing their efforts on the regime of Ramzan Kadyrov in Chechnya. Chechen separatist groups of various ideological stripes have been pretty consistent over the years in characterising Kadyrov as little more than Moscow’s puppet and thus a secondary concern, and this is a view shared by the Sheikh Mansur Battalion. It was expressed most clearly by commander Muslim Cheberloyevskiy in an interview he gave in March 2022, when he declared Russian President Vladimir Putin “my main enemy” and dismissed any idea of Kadyrov as an independent figure — instead labelling him “Putin’s slave and lackey.” The sentiment is not expressed as clearly in the latest interview, but it can nevertheless be discerned behind the discussion of Chechnya as “occupied” and the “treachery of those who serve the Kremlin.”
Second, and relatedly, Chechen participation in Ukraine’s struggle can be seen as a case of displaced conflict. It is not, in other words, motivated by exclusive or even primary concern for Ukraine and its interests; to some extent, Ukraine is merely the most logical place to wage the war against Russia. As Idris Cheberlo, one of the group’s leaders, states: “For us, this is a war that began back in Chechnya. It is a continuation of our own fight for freedom.”
Visions for the future
Both ideas are far from unique: They can be found in previous comments by representatives of the group and in those of other pro-Ukrainian Chechen units — with which the Sheikh Mansur Battalion insists it maintains good relations.
What is consistently less clear from interviews is whether there exists any kind of plan for how to get to the desired destination. The two conditions for peace articulated by Said, the battalion’s press secretary, are almost juvenile in their simplicity: “First: the complete collapse and capitulation of Russia before the peoples of Ukraine and the people of Ichkeria. Second: that the remaining republics can also live independent of Russia.” Well, that’s simple then!
Of course, it could be argued that such an absolutist position is both understandable and irrelevant. The acquiescence of Chechen units in any peace agreement will not be a factor in negotiations between Russia, Ukraine, the EU, and America. And it is hard to disagree with the claim that immediately followed this statement, that “any agreement with the Russian authorities isn’t worth the paper that it’s written on.”
However, what is consistently missing from interviews is any concrete and practical plans — at least in the interviews that I’ve seen. It is as if they hope that, so long as they continue fighting, one day they will simply wake up and Russia won’t be there any more. This contrasts sharply with Chechen opposition movement Niyso, which has published a detailed “deoccupation program” (Part One and Part Two). While the latter in many aspects appears removed from reality, at the very least it represents a plan. If the Kadyrov regime were to fall today, I often fail to detect among many sections of the Chechen resistance a sense that they know what they will do tomorrow — much less beyond.
Moving beyond aspiration
Perhaps this search for a plan is a flaw on my part — a reflection of a personal preference for logic over emotion. Perhaps it is naive to expect any plan when the future pathway will be shaped by conditions that can’t yet be predicted. When any plan will succumb to the Mike Tyson problem: That everyone has a plan until they get punched in the mouth (or, if you prefer the more erudite equivalent, no plan survives contact with the enemy).
However, having studied the Caucasus Emirate (IK) for years, I’d argued that any resistance movement that tries to survive on vibes and general sentiment alone will eventually run into the ground. The IK was equally clear what it was fighting against — similarly, Putin’s Russia rather than his Chechen “puppet” — and what it wanted to achieve — namely, a region free from Russian influence and ruled by Sharia. What it consistently failed to articulate was a plan for achieving this and responding to the realities of Russia’s ongoing presence. Over the long-term, this impacted its ability to mobilise supporters, something even its own leaders came to recognise.
Tyson, of course, wasn’t advocating not having a plan. He was talking about the ability to adapt when the plan doesn’t work. After decades of fighting, its hard to escape the impression that some sections of the Chechen resistance understand this better than others.