The flagrant impunity of the Chechen authorities

Expect more of the same under Adam Kadyrov.

Happy Friday!

I hope your week is going well. Mine has been decidedly meh, although I did get to meet up with a motley crew of Russianists, which is always fun. I didn’t think I’d have anything newsletter-worthy this week, but then the Kadyrov regime popped up and did something…so here I am!

What I want to touch on this week is yet another example of the Kadyrov regime flaunting its ability to violate the law — and what we can expect if Adam Kadyrov succeeds in replacing his father.

With that in mind, here’s what you can expect this week:

• A regime propagandist admits violations of due process
• The purpose of the regime’s displays of impunity
• Why we should expect more of the same under Adam Kadyrov

A regime propagandist admits violations of due process

The propagandist in question is Chingiz Akhmadov, director of Groznyy State Television and Radio Company (ChGTRK Groznyy). His channel promotes the Chechen state’s narratives and engages in rights violations of its own on a regular basis. For example, as noted by OC Media, it regularly broadcasts the public apologies and humiliations of those who have dared criticise the Kadyrov regime.

Akhmadov told members of the Chechen opposition group Niyso that the Chechen security services “catch atheists and enemies of the homeland […,] put them in the boot [of cars], the basement, and send them to court.” For those unfamiliar with the requirements of the Russian legal system, this is a violation of due process, presumptions of innocence, or respect for the rights of detainees.

The purpose of the regime’s displays of impunity

Given whom Akhmadov made his comments to, there is little doubt that he intended for them to be widely disseminated among Chechen communities. And this is far from the only demonstration of impunity by the regime. Whether we are talking about the conflict in Ukraine — where the Chechen authorities publicly parade prisoners of war in violation of international humanitarian law — or systematic violations of human rights and freedom of expression within Chechnya, flagrant legal violations are par for the course with Kadyrov’s Chechnya.

The question of why the regime doesn’t even make a token effort to hide its transgressions — with, for example, bold-faced denials of fact or knowledge in the style of Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitriy Peskov — answers itself: Because it can. For the Kadyrov regime, demonstrations of impunity serves as a way of displaying strength: Look at what we can do, and there’s nothing you can do about it.

This, to a degree, serves as a depressing counter to the noble idea put forward by Nikolay Bobrinsky and Stanislav Dmitrievsky in their excellent book on transitional justice in Russia, Between Revenge and Oblivion (you can find a detailed English-language summary here). They directly address an objection to their meticulous documentation of Russia’s human rights violations in the post-Soviet period: Why bother, when officials will never be held to account anyway? Their answer (and I’m paraphrasing here) is that opportunities for justice arise quickly, unpredictably, and often only for a short period; therefore, it’s important to be ready when they do.

I found this argument to be considered, persuasive, and uplifting: Having started the book quite sceptical about what could have been pie-in-the-sky discussions of transitional justice, I realised it was fully grounded in reality. But only in general. Once the first, second, third waves of crimes have been documented, the sense of futility creeps back in. In the unlikely event senior officials ever stand trial for their crimes, the difference between two and four life sentences is a concern for the historical record, not the recipients themselves.

In the case of Chechnya, senior regime officials are unlike to be held accountable anyway. But, if they are, there is so much evidence against them that one more crime won’t make much difference. You might as well be hanged for a sheep as, well, a sheep.

Why we should expect more of the same under Adam Kadyrov

One of the signals that the Chechen regime is currently sending is: Don’t expect much to change under Adam Kadyrov.

For such a young guy, Adam has already clocked up an impressive track record for acting with impunity. His debut on the political scene was, after all, a video of him beating up a detainee. He has been filmed driving a car and carrying a weapon, both in violation of the law. He has flaunted wealth that cannot be accounted for by any legal source — most recently, another expensive watch and a flash Groznyy mansion. He has been appointed to state positions that he is not legally allowed to hold. And so on.

Impunity and human rights violations are, therefore, likely to continue under Adam’s watch, should he succeed in replacing his father. Indeed, there’s good reason to expect a ratcheting up of repression: He will need to demonstrate his authority and purge any challengers. The model here is not so much his father as Kim Jong Un in North Korea — a similarly overprivileged, chubby son of a dictator whom few people thought an independent figure when he assumed control. Brutality is the only strategy that the Kadyrovs know — and it is a system into which Adam has been raised.

A recent statement by Ramzan — that he no longer sees the need for harsh methods of rule because terrorism has been defeated and the system of governance functions like clockwork — is thus no more than an anomaly. More representative of his attitude was a comment in the same interview that he wouldn’t change a thing since he took office.

In other words, don’t expect a Damascene or death-bed conversion from Ramzan or any other members of the regime. Instead, expect more of the same.

Which is, I admit, rather a grim note to leave you on. Perhaps console yourself with this: Most people — and least of all the dictators themselves — don’t see the end of brutal regimes coming until it’s already too late.