A brief profile of the Erzi Battalion

A new Ingushetian sabotage and reconnaissance unit set up to wage Russia’s war in Ukraine

Happy Friday!

I hope the sun is shining on you and giving you all the inspiration you need. And maybe some tasty tomatoes. They’re one of the best things about summer, after all, and it’s not too long before the winter takes them away.

This week, I thought I’d offer a very brief portrait of the Erzi Battalion, a new unit launched in Ingushetia with the goal of waging Russia’s war in Ukraine. It won’t be particularly in-depth — more of a snapshot of what is known thus far. But it might serve as a useful baseline for the future, should the group become involved in any interesting developments.

With that it mind, here’s what you can expect this week.

• Where the Erzi Battalion fits in the military structure
• Who’s behind the group
• The logic of such units

Where the Erzi Battalion fits in the military structure

Erzi is a “sabotage and reconnaissance battalion”, subordinate to the Cossack Terek reconnaissance brigade. The Cossack Terek brigade is itself a relatively new formation that was also created for waging Russia’s war on Ukraine. As OC Media reported, it is “part of a system of Cossack units that have been revived since 2022.”

The group is commanded by Akhmed Kotiyev. A recent interview given to local media identified him as “an experienced soldier” who has already been involved in the “special military operation” and served as deputy commander of the Bars-Bryansk volunteer battalion. The interview itself was standard patriotic slop and doesn’t suggest that he’s going to be a rising media star. A Telegram channel linked to the Ingushetian security services noted that Kotiyev was born in Nazran; received a “financial, military-legal and spiritual education,” including becoming a hafiz; chairs the Union of Patriots; speaks Russian, Ingush, Arabic, and Turkish; and is the recipient of the award “Excellence in the border service.” He is a relative of the the late Akhmed Kotiyev, the secretary of the Ingushetian Security Council who was shot dead in 2013.

Erzi has been described in local media and on its new Telegram channel as an “international” brigade, indicating that it will not be comprised exclusively of Ingush fighters. Given that reports emphasised the historical role of North Caucasians in defending Russia, it is more likely to be comprised of fighters from across the region. Kotiyev himself stated that the majority of fighters will be Ingush, with additional volunteers coming from other regions.

Who’s behind the group

At first glance, it looks like pretty much everyone has a finger in the Erzi pie.

The unit has been described as the brainchild of North Caucasus presidential plenipotentiary Yuriy Chayka. Current Ingushetia Head Makhmud-Ali Kalimatov and his predecessor (and current Russian deputy defence minister) Yunus-bek Yevkurov also sponsored that idea. That gives three groups — the plenipotentiary’s office (and thus the federal authorities), the republican leadership, and the Defence Ministry — an interest in it.

Yet one suspects the real control will be exercised by the Federal Security Service (FSB). Aydamir Valiyev, an assistant to Chayka, has been appointed as curator of the unit and has featured prominently in its social media content, coordinating with various officials. Valiyev is a career chekist: He performed various unspecified roles for the organisation between 1993 and 2018, graduating from the FSB Academy in 1999, before briefly stints in private business and as an aide to a State Duma deputy. He joined the plenipotentiary’s office in 2020, initially as head of the department for issues of the law enforcement, defence and security apparatus. His security service ties likely served him well in all those roles.

The logic of such units

At this stage, it’s not particularly clear what the benefits of creating such a unit are.

Since the start of Russia’s war on Ukraine, there has been a rapid proliferation of new units, some fully integrated into existing structures, others more paramilitary in nature but still cooperating closely with regular security services. There is a huge variety in the types of units, their combat effectiveness, and their degree of autonomy. Erzi will be very different, for example, from the many new Chechen units — which will be subject to a much greater degree of control and influence by the republican authorities.

Possibly, the unit simply reflects a zeitgeist: Every branch of the Russian state and every local authority wants some kind of paramilitary structure that it can call its own. If Chechnya has one and Crimea has one, then Dagestan and Ingushetia want one too. If that’s the case, then we might not hear much of interest about the group going forward. Time will tell.

But perhaps you have a more compelling rationale? If so, hit reply and let me know!