Нийсо
Brief description
Niyso is a Chechen opposition movement. It operates a Telegram channel by the same name, which means ‘justice’ or ‘equality’ in Chechen. This remains one of its primary manifestations, and the channel regularly reports on human rights violations and repression in Chechnya, as well as alleged splits within the regime of Ramzan Kadyrov.
In a political programme published in November 2023 (see below), the group explicitly stated that it does not represent all Chechens and is not a government-in-exile. Instead, it positions itself as an anti-Russian force seeking the liberation of Chechnya from colonial occupation (OC Media, 2025). Within this framework — and similar to many Chechen opposition groups — it characterises Russia, not Kadyrov as the main enemy; Kadyrov, in this view, is little more than a Russian puppet. Ansar Dishni, a representative of the group, characterised it as “a collective of people who are not indifferent, who see what is happening around our people, and in general in Russia with regard to Caucasians” (Kavkaz Realii, 2025).
Background
In August 2022, activists from the 1Adat Telegram channel led by Ibragim Yangulbayev announced that they were establishing the group as an Islamic jama’at seeking an independent Chechnya. The group is notionally headed by an emir and a shura (leadership council) (OC Media, 2025).
The group claims that it originated as an information space for highlighting the crimes of Russia and the Chechen authorities in Chechnya (Kavkaz Realii, 2025).
Goals and strategies
Niyso claims to be working towards the de-occupation of Chechnya and the political and religious education of the Chechen people, as well as working with human rights activists and for charitable purposes (Kavkaz Realii, 2025).
In November 2023, it published a detailed de-occupation programme (Part One and Part Two) outlining four stages of resistance:
- Organising a system of resistance:
- Electing a leadership;
- Establishing plans and strategies;
- Determining alliances;
- Mobilising and preparing society:
- Media and information operations;
- Preparing a military strategy;
- Developing military skills;
- Developing relations with future allies;
- Collecting resources and preparing an economic strategy;
- Training cadres in Islamic jurisprudence;
- Armed resistance:
- Conducting military operations in Chechnya;
- Carrying out economic sabotage;
- Conducting cyber operations;
- Building military alliances;
- Process of de-occupation:
- Compelling Russia to recognise Chechen independence;
- Establishing a special commission for lustration and assessing the crimes of Russian security service personnel;
- Securing the release of political prisoners.
In line with the second and third stages, the group has stated that violent methods are acceptable for achieving its goals. However, it does not advocate Chechen involvement on the side of Ukraine in the post-2022 war (Kavkaz Realii, 2025; OC Media, 2025).
The general orientation of the programme — and of the group’s Telegram posts — is conservative Islamic.
Leadership
Although the de-occupation programme identifies the establishment of leadership as a key goal, there is little information on the leadership of the group — largely for security reasons.
The two main administrators of the Telegram channel and representatives of the group are known only as Ansar Dishni and Abu Zaid (Kavkaz Realii, 2025; OC Media, 2025).
In an interview given in April 2025, Dishni stated that there is no unifying leader for the Chechen opposition: “I do not see that today there is some kind of personality that unites us. The idea of deoccupying our land unites us” (Kavkaz Realii, 2025).
Official response
Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov accused the group of being behind violence in the republic — such as the murder of a traffic policeman in April 2025 — and called for relatives of group members to be expelled from the republic (Kavkaz Realii, 2025).
