Jonsson (2019:3): Clausewitz distinguished between character and nature of war, the former continually changing, the latter constant. Difference between form and essence. Soviet military doctrine adhered to this distinction, viewing war as “armed violence applied to a political purpose.” In other words, the continuation of politics by other means.
Jonsson (2019:4): Jonsson therefore asks whether the Russian understanding of the nature of war has changed and, if so, how? .
Jonsson (2019:4-5): sees Russian theorists as starting to shift their views in mid-2000s, as a result of colour revolutions and revolution in information and communications technology. Greater emphasis placed on information warfare, non-military forms of conflict, ideology, economic warfare. Sees a particularly significant shift 2012-14, when political and military elites started talking about transformation in the very nature of war and a blurring of the lines between war and peace. Nonmilitary means comes to be seen as more effect than military means.
Jonsson (2019:5): sanctions, eg post Crimea, not seen as an alternative to war as in West, but as a form of it.
Jonsson (2019:37): “War was viewed positively in the Soviet Union in the sense that it could speed up the transformation of the world into communism.” War was both necessary (to achieve transformation) and inevitable (in a class-based world)
Jonsson (2019:): the justness of war and whether it was offensive or defensive was determined, in the Soviet view, not by the actions but by the sociopolitical nature of the systems undertaking them.
Jonsson (2019:41): argues that a holistic approach to war remains dominant today. This involves looking at the whole and breaking it down into its constituent parts, contrasted with a western approach of starting at the micro and aggregating upwards
Jonsson (2019:91): after Arab Spring and 2011-12 protests in Russia, idea became dominant among key security and military actors that nonmilitary means were so effective that the understanding of war needed to be broadened. Information warfare and threat of colour revolutions become critically important. However, theorists have not for the most part explicitly argued that war should no longer be conceived as exclusively involving armed violence; instead, they have introduced new concepts (hybrid warfare, information warfare, unconventional warfare etc) to account for this.
Jonsson (2019:95): Western concept of information security refers to infrastructure, but Russian understanding covers content as well. Information warfare has both technical and psychological dimensions.
Jonsson (2019:150): “Among Russian military theorists, consensus has emerged that the West’s grand strategic approach relies on a two-pronged use of force, which Gerasimov called the adaptive use of force. The West’s main, and most important, way to achieve its geopolitical goals is through the nonviolent means of a colour revolution. If this fails, armed force would then be applied. This shift among military elites is particularly interesting, as they should be less likely to emphasize domestic threats.”
Jonsson (2019:152): “A distinguishing feature of Russian strategy and warfare is a higher acceptance of risk and a lower threshold for the use of force, be it military or nonmilitary.”
Jonsson (2019:157): criticises prevalent Western view that it is up to them to decide whether or not to enter war with Russia, and therefore taking actions with a view to avoiding escalation. Says this presumes the current state to be one of peace, which does not align with Russian thinking.