Forney (2015) ‘Who can we trust with a gun?’
Citation: Forney, Jonathan Filip (2015) ‘Who can we trust with a gun? Information networks and adverse selection in militia recruitment,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, 59:5, pp. 824-849.
Abstract: How do the leaders of nonstate armed groups recruit new members? Most studies of recruitment of combatants focus on explaining the supply of fighters—who fights and what kinds of people volunteer to fight depending on the incentives offered. We know comparatively little about how the leaders of armed groups manage influxes of volunteers to ensure their quality. This article examines the questions of who recruits fighters, and how the capacities of recruiters affect the quality of the individuals who they recruit. The histories of three understudied civil militias in Sierra Leone are used to develop and refine a theory of screening in nonstate armed groups. Evidence from intensive fieldwork suggests that access to civilian information networks can allow the leaders of armed groups to successfully screen recruits and exclude low-quality types even when the pool of volunteers is flooded with opportunists.
Main research question or focus:
Forney (2015): How do the leaders of armed groups manage recruitment processes and implement quality control in selecting volunteers.
Forney (2015:828-830): “Hypothesis 1: When the leaders of armed groups have access to significant material resources (e.g., diamonds or government sponsorship), they will tend to offer recruitment incentives. Hypothesis 2: When the leaders of armed groups offer recruitment incentives, they will tend to attract a lower quality pool of volunteers.” “Hypothesis 3: Higher costs associated with joining an armed group will discourage low quality individuals, resulting in a higher quality pool of volunteers.” “Hypothesis 4: Groups with access to intact information networks will be more effective at screening volunteers and will induct higher quality members”
Data and method used to answer the question:
Forney (2015): Draws on fieldwork and interviews to assess three different armed groups (civil militias) operating in Sierra Leone.
Central argument:
Forney (2015): The leaders of armed groups are better able to filter out opportunists and ensure recruits are of sufficient standard when they have access to civilian social networks that can provide information. This helps them avoid a resource curse when providing material incentives for recruitment [This does presume that leaders want to screen out people motivated by material incentives, presumably because they want people committed to the cause].
Key patterns supporting the central argument:
Literature speaking in support of:
Forney (2015): Not so much supporting, but based on Weinstein’s theory that rebels face a resource curse, and therefore they need a way to mitigate its effects.
Literature seeking to challenge:
Limitations:
Concepts and definitions:
Claim about determinants of attitudes to violence:
Claim about role of networks in attitudes to violence:
Notes:
Forney (2015:825): The hallmark of everyday life within civil warfare is not violence; it is uncertainty. Armed actors, whether insurgents or counterinsurgents, face similar challenges of gathering reliable information about friends and foes.”