Dzutsati, Siroky and Dzutsev (2016) ‘The Political Economy of Support for Sharia: Evidence from the Russian North Caucasus.’
Citation: Dzutsati, Valery, Siroky, David and Dzutsev, Khasan (2016) ‘The Political Economy of Support for Sharia: Evidence from the Russian North Caucasus,’ Politics and Religion, pp. 1-25, doi:10.1017/S1755048316000134.
Time Period Covered:
Theory, Research Question, Hypothesis:
Suggest (p3-4) “state repression and minority status jointly shape the public expression of religion, and thus the state’s obstruction of secular opposition contributes to the creation of religious challengers. Since the state prevents minority groups from adopting alternate (secular) strategies, such as economic advancement and/or allying with the state, those members of the minority who seek political change and oppose the state turn to religion. In this way, religious orthodoxy in the minority group becomes associated with political and economic liberalism by the virtue of attracting economically and politically liberal individuals who are opposed to the repressive secular state and cannot find secular ex- pression for their ideas and needs.”
Hypothesis #1: Respondents expressing greater support for private ownership of enterprises (as opposed to government ownership) will tend to express greater support for Sharia. Hypothesis #2: Respondents expressing greater support for private ownership of the means of production (as opposed to government ownership) will tend to express greater support for Sharia. Hypothesis #3: Aspiring and existing entrepreneurs will tend to express greater support for Sharia. Hypothesis #4: Respondents who favor greater regional autonomy will tend to express greater support for Sharia. Hypothesis #5: Respondents who place the primary responsibility for corruption on the central (non-Muslim and not regional) government will tend to express greater support for Sharia.
Relationship to Other Research/Ideas Contested/Noted Gaps:
Argues that existing literature has argued that orthodox Muslims are more communitarian in their economic views and less liberal in their political ones, but this is based on evidence from Muslim majority countries in the Middle East and North Africa, and the notion that pious Muslims are unlikely to support political liberalism and democracy has been heavily challenged. Religious orthodoxy in these cases might be derivative rather than predictive of political and economic preferences.
Notes that Bayat (2013) argues that, by the time of the Iranian revolution in 1979, “the Shah’s government had effectively eliminated the secular opposition in the country prior to the revolution, leaving only Islam as a possible platform for uniting the opposition.”
Concepts and Definitions:
Method:
Face-to-face interviews with a 74% response rate. Support for shariah indicated on a four-point scale (1 = certainly like to live under secular law, 2 = rather live under secular law, 3 = rather live under shariah law, 4= certainly like to live under shariah). 56% chose 1, 29% 2, 11% 3 and 4% 4. Queried support for private ownership of large enterprises, desire to own own business, desire for regional or federal authorities to have more power, views of blame for corruption, income, education, ethnic native, urban, gender, dissatisfaction with general situation, unemployment, general salary.
Primary/Original Data:
The Institute of Socio-Political Research, a subsidiary of the Russian Academy of Sciences, conducted a survey of over 1769 respondents in seven republics of the North Caucasus in 2008.
Argument/Conclusion:
Individuals who support economic individualism and political liberalism are more likely to favour the adoption of Sharia, and Islam can act as a broad platform for those seeking change.
Limitations/Flaws:
(acknowledged) reliant on self-reported preferences, not practice or behaviour. May only be generalisable to areas where Muslims are a minority or political freedoms are curbed. Unable to examine changing preferences over time.
Abstract: Many scholars have argued that orthodox Muslims harbor attitudes that are more economically communitarian and politically illiberal, since individuals are seen as embedded within a larger community that places a premium on social order. Yet most studies have ignored the potential of Islam as an ideological platform for political reformers. Religion in general and Islam in particular has mostly been treated as a predictor rather than a derivative of political-economic preferences. This article suggests that, in the absence of credible secular political ideologies and representative political mechanisms, reformist-minded individuals are likely to use religion as a political platform for change. When Muslims are a minority in a repressive non-Muslim society, Islamic orthodoxy can serve as a political platform for politically and economically liberal forces. We test these conjectures with original micro-level data from the Russian North Caucasus and find strong support for them.
Notes:
Dzutsati, Siroky and Dzutsev (2016:2): “In societies where Islam has historical roots, Islamic orthodoxy is the most likely alternative to traditional political ideologies.”
Dzutsati, Siroky and Dzutsev (2016:5): “Along with other religions, Islam offers its subscribers a ‘belief system’ (an ‘umbrella ideology’) that provides core beliefs of a predominantly symbolic nature, with important institutions and organizing principles, but it does not compel individuals to adopt the same political and economic outcome across all societies. Islam can therefore be reconciled with diverse political and economic ideologies.”
Dzutsati, Siroky and Dzutsev (2016:7-8): “Despite the government’s high level of control, the state has failed to resolve the pressing issues of the day – the economy remains stagnant; political exclusion and repression are the norm. In the absence of other political mechanisms and ideologies, Islam has become an attractive solution to the region’s social problems. Whereas the secular state is perceived as being inherently corrupt and incapable of addressing the region’s concerns, Islam has become both an attractive political goal – the improvement of public goods provision – and a tool for mobilization in a society that is politically repressive and where the government dominates the economy. Just as Islam can bring together different ethnic groups and social strata among Muslims, it also tends to reinforce the differences between Muslims and non-Muslims.”
Dzutsati, Siroky and Dzutsev (2016:11): “support for Sharia is a religiously infused symbolic resource for those who desire change but have no other avenues for expressing their political and economic attitudes.”
Dzutsati, Siroky and Dzutsev (2016:16): “If Islam were the cause of economic and political attitudes of individuals, we would have seen Islamic revolution in Chechnya in 1991, when the opportunity presented itself, but instead the revolution in Chechnya was secular nationalist. It took roughly 10–15 years of persistent state failure, political repression and economic corruption before the center-periphery dispute in the North Caucasus took on Islamic overtones.”