Cronin (2009) How Terrorism Ends.
Citation: Cronin, Audrey Kurth (2009) How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns, Woodstock, Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press.
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Cronin (2009:2): “Ending terrorist campaigns is difficult. Terrorist movements are often at their most dangerous just before they die.”
Cronin (2009:8): Identifies six ways in which terrorist groups decline: decapitation (arrest or death of a leader); joining the political process; success; implosion or the critical loss of support; defeat and complete elimination; and transition to other forms of violence. “Patterns of decline reflect factors that are both internal and external to the campaign itself: again, terrorist groups implode for reasons that may or may not be related to measures taken against them.”
Cronin (2009:14): “The immediate effects of removing a leader vary, depending on the structure of the organization, the degree to which it fosters a cult of personality, the availability of a viable successor, the nature of its ideology, the political context, and whether the leader was killed or imprisoned.”
Cronin (2009:14): “A clear finding in what follows is that arresting a leader damages a campaign more than killing him does, especially when the jailed leader can be cut off from communicating with his subordinates yet also paraded in humiliation before the public.” However, the effectiveness of decapitation depends not on his own operational effectiveness or the type of counterterrorist action, but on his support: if he has widespread support, decapitation has no or a negative effect.
Cronin (2009:15): “Because organizations that rely on terrorist attacks typically lack the strength to employ more legitimate forms of violence, leaders must formulate a narrative that mobilizes followers and has consistent elements. First, whatever the political motivation, terrorist attacks demand a rationale that overshadows moral qualms about targeting civilians. Perception is at the core of terrorism. Without an articulated sense of political purpose, the violence is nothing more than murder and redounds against a group or its cause. Second, supporters must believe that there is no alternative to killing. This requires a carefully crafted story, infused with a sense of urgency. Grievances are a necessary but not sufficient ingredient: potential supporters must also accept that the best, in fact the only, way to remedy the injustice is by killing noncombatants. Third, followers must be convinced that civilians who are killed as a result of terrorist attacks are not really innocent, but represent ‘the Enemy.’ Finally, a compelling personality thrusts followers beyond the threshold of personal doubt. The leader convinces them that they are not only right in their actions and convictions, but innocent of the harm that they do.”
Cronin (2009:15): Notes that states often view terrorist groups as mirrors of themselves, with clear hierarchies and leaders, but this is not necessarily the case.
Cronin (2009:28-29): Cites Russia’s sustained decapitation strategy towards Chechen leaders as an example of where such a strategy has not brought about the demise of a movement engaged in terrorism. [This, however, views the movement as a unitary whole, rather than considering the impact of decapitation on the trajectory of the movement]
Cronin (2009:94): In asking why terrorist movements fail, answers are often biased: “Since terrorism research tends to be subsidized by governments and affected by policy imperatives, the role of counterterrorism is often overemphasized in answering this question. The degree to which groups evolve independently of government action is seldom fully appreciated. Government data are what analysts know, what they can acquire, what they can most easily quantify and verify. Even with the best of intentions, they can be biased toward linking decline to specific government policies, especially after the fact, although the relationship between cause and effect may be unclear and unverifiable. Frequently the most powerful forces of decay operate within the group itself and are only indirectly affected by the policies of governments.”
Cronin (2009:95): Argues that terrorist movements appear particularly vulnerable to failure when transitioning from one generation to the next.
Cronin (2009:110): “The core of a terrorist organization’s viability is its claim to be acting altruistically, on behalf of a larger cause. This claim of legitimacy is the source of its strength, but also its vulnerability: if a group miscalculates and targets poorly, the blunder is potentially more damaging than a comparable error by the state.”
Cronin (2009:112): “Organizational suicide” includes operational mistakes, failure to transition to a next generation, burnout, individual departures or betrayals and splintering.
Cronin (2009:136-137): Referring to Russia’s treatment of Groznyy during the Second Chechen war, argues: “There is a point at which military force, particularly when used internally against a threat within one’s territory, succeeeds in destroying terrorism because it destroys everything.”
Cronin (2009:142): “Terrorism is not a threat to be analyzed using the kind of unitary actor theories that are the foundation of twentieth-century strategic thought in the West. States operate in a world where they benefit from a constituent population and the right to use force. Groups that use terrorism have neither; they are premodern and postmodern, subnational and transnational, and transcend our Westphalian state system. There are no existential terrorist organizations; instead, terrorist groups are really political, religious, ethnic and ideological communities.” Therefore considering their beliefs and philosophies is important.