Campana and Légaré (2010) ‘Russia’s Counterterrorism Operation in Chechnya.’
Citation:
Campana, Aurélie and Légaré, Kathia (2010) ‘Russia’s Counterterrorism Operation in Chechnya: Institutional Competition and Issue Frames,’ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 34:1, pp. 47-63.
Theory, Research Question, Hypothesis:
Chechenization progressively elaborated as a result of institutional competition among federal forces.
Method:
Findings:
Abstract: This article analyzes how Russian Federal policies evolved between 1999 and 2005 to justify the policy of “Chechenization” and the legitimization of an autocratic-style regime in Chechnya. It argues that this strategy was progressively elaborated during the conflict as a result of institutional competition between three main Federal agencies (the Presidential Administration, the secret services (FSB)), and the military over the framing of the conflict. This process paved the way for the formation of the “totalizing frame” under the leadership of the Kremlin, which incorporated various discursive constructions into one coherent and exclusive interpretation of the conflict.”
Notes:
Campana and Légaré (2010:47): Second Chechen war “was never referred to as a war but rather labeled as a “counterterrorist operation.” As the counterterrorist/counterinsurgency operation dragged on, Moscow promoted a political solution based on two premises: the denial of the political grievances and the illegitimacy of Chechen separatist claims.”
Campana and Légaré (2010:48): Argues “the Russian leadership had no real clear-cut policy at the very beginning of the second Russo–Chechen war in 1999. It demonstrates that the solution, which progressively emerged in response to the continuing hostilities, is primarily the result of institutional competition between three main Federal agencies (the Presidential Administration, the Federal Security Service (FSB)), and the military over the framing of the conflict and the interpretation of the unfolding violent events. Ultimately, it was the Kremlin that took the lead in this rivalry by incorporating the different discourses and views supported by the main Federal agencies involved in the implementation of the policies in Chechnya. It therefore created a “totalizing frame” that made Chechenization possible and justifiable.”
Campana and Légaré (2010:48): “It is contended here that the different interpretations of the operation in Chechnya influenced the transformation of Federal policies toward the Republic.”
Campana and Légaré (2010:48): “A “totalizing frame,” by definition, incorporates diverging ideas into a single narrative that discounts other interpretations, reduces the complexity of meanings, and constructs the perception of events.”
Campana and Légaré (2010:49): “Framing is central to the agenda-setting and problem-solving processes.” By analyzing the frames, it is possible to understand the evolution of the policy.
Campana and Légaré (2010:50): “This article argues that it is possible to explore the meanings of the competing discourses and their respective influence on the framing process solely by considering the interplay of the actors’ rhetoric with respect to unfolding events.”
Campana and Légaré (2010:50): “one cannot strictly link one discourse to one specific agency since discourses circulate between the various actors. Processes are observed that drive law enforcement agencies to embrace and adapt discourses that originated in another institutional context to preserve their own position, particularly vis-à-vis the presidential administration, which remains the dominant player in this competition. Power struggles, consequently, have a strong influence on the evolution of the discourses. Although the discourses would refer to the same subject, they diverged in their description and interpretation of the causes and dynamics of the conflict. Each actor formulated a certain understanding of the confrontation through the use of specific terminology, images, labels, and categories.”
Campana and Légaré (2010:51): “Vladimir Putin, first as Russian prime minister and later as president, was instrumental in guiding the framing process. He consistently put forward and enforced what could be called a “no-war” thesis that depicts the Russian intervention as a “counterterrorism operation.” He stated that “there will be no second war in Chechnya,” but a systematic “wipe out” of “bands” and “terrorists.””
Campana and Légaré (2010:53): “the emphasis on the failure of Ichkerian–Chechen state-building fulfilled a double function. First, it provided a justification for the intervention—since the regime was unable to police its territory and live in peace with the rest of the country—and, later on, the establishment of a new political order. Second, it completely undermined the Ichkerian political project. According to this discourse, the Chechen attempt at state-building had clearly failed, and there was no room for a second chance.”
Campana and Légaré (2010:54): “Framing process, which at first lacked clarity and direction, became more coherent after major changes occurred in the international context (namely the terrorist attacks of 9/11), in the national context (multiplication of terrorists attacks in the North Caucasus, the major hostage taking crises of October 2002 and September 2004), and in the Russian political landscape (centralization and concentration of powers). Between 2001 and 2004, the presidency progressively imposed its view by merging discourses on the “Ichkerian regime failure” and the “war against international terrorism.””
Campana and Légaré (2010:54): “the American intervention in Afghanistan created new opportunities for the Federal authorities to obtain international approval for their campaign in Chechnya. Indeed, the Kremlin reshaped its discourse to make it congruent with the UN- sanctioned mission.”