Broers (2020) ‘How Serzh Sargsyan and the Republican Party of Armenia lost control of a competitive authoritarian system.’
Citation: Broers, Laurence (2020) ‘How Serzh Sargsyan and the Republican Party of Armenia lost control of a competitive authoritarian system,’ in Laurence Broers and Anna Ohanyan (eds.) Armenia’s Velvet Revolution: Authoritarian Decline and Civil Resistance in a Multipolar World, London: I.B. Tauris, pp. 73-100.
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Broers (2020:79): Notes Johannes Gerschewski’s model of three pillars of stability of authoritarian regimes: efforts to legitimise their rule, to repress or coerce dissent, and to co-opt political rivalry.
Broers (2020:79): Legitimacy in the Armenian context based on the movement for unification with Nagorno-Karabakh, military victory over Azerbaijan, and the ability to deal with security concerns linked to these.
Broers (2020:80-81): The Armenian authorities repeatedly made recourse to repression and had a “large and cohesive” security service apparatus, despite Sargsyan’s personal reputation as a ‘soft’ autocrat. Different groups that could acquire sufficient resources and political capital were able to form part of the decision-making elite.
Broers (2020:84): Sees Sargsyan’s rule beginning with a legitimation crisis, on the back of suppression following the 2008 elections, which was compounded by foreign policy failures (Turkish opening, membership of Eurasian Economic Union). The national security pillar of legitimacy was undermined by the April 2016 four day way with Azerbaijan.
Broers (2020:87): Coercion “not deemed a legitimate or realistic response” to the Velvet revolution. The military was not invested in regime survival and willing to bear the costs of repression, nor did it have a distinct corporate identity. The protest crowd was too diverse to be ‘othered’ or branded terrorist; non-violence tactics also prevented this characterisation.
Broers (2020:91-92): Argues that the authorities were possibly too successful in cooptation, creating the sense of shame over selling out and complacency among the authorities.