Brenner (2019) Rebel Politics
Brenner, David. 2019. Rebel Politics: A Political Sociology of Armed Struggle in Myanmar’s Borderlands. London: Cornell University Press.
(2019:6): Challenges predominant treatment of rebel groups “as monolithic actors that act according to a unified strategic rationale in order to maximize their power vis-à-vis the incumbent state.” Argues that many groups act in ways that contradict their apparent strategic objectives.
(2019:8): Sees Myanmar rebel groups as “often internally fragmented into rival factions. Hence individual rebel leaders not only contest the incumbent state but also fight against each other for leadership of their respective movements.” This internal contestation can have major consequences for rebel groups: it can undermine their capacity, redirect violence inwards, lead to losses and eventual defeat, and undermine the pursuit of collective goals.
(2019:8): Builds on Staniland’s distinction between horizontal and vertical ties. “Horizontal fragmentation makes the leadership of armed groups prone to factional infighting and coups. Vertical fragmentation makes it difficult to sustain asymmetric warfare against a militarily superior enemy because it erodes a movement’s support network.” Sees existing scholarship as predominantly focused on vertical ties, but contends that horizontal ones are just as important because they “drive internal contention and thus external strategies.”
(2019:9): “Rather than wielding power within their movements on the basis of pure violence, rebel leaders need to establish some degree of legitimate authority among their grassroots.” Understanding the dynamics of rebel authority is crucial to understanding changing strategies among rebel groups. This explicitly does not diminish the importance of environment, which can significantly impact internal politics.
(2019:13): “Rebellion can be understood as a social process between differently situated but interdependent elite and nonelite actors whose interactions drive the strategies of nonstate armed groups.”
(2019:13): “Rebel leaders rely on the grassroots of the movement to create stable support networks for their rebel social order – or at least willing compliance with their opposition to the incumbent state […] the key to understanding these internal struggles within armed groups, therefore, lies in whether the grassroots of a movement perceives their rebel elites as having legitimate authority. Such legitimate authority depends on two interlaced processes: reciprocal exchange relations between rebel rulers and local communities; and elites’ display of respect for nonelites through interactions that satisfy nonelites’ need to derive a positive social identity from affiliation with the rebellion.”
Focus on relationalism constitutes an explicit rejection of methodological individualism.
(2019:15): “Rebel movements have strict military hierarchies that entail stark cases of domination and obedience. Yet foot soldiers and other low-ranking rebels possess their own motivations and agency, which can both make for an uneasy relationship with elites and shape the dynamics of the overall movement.”
Builds on Pearlman to divide insurgent actors into incumbent leaders, aspirant elites, and grassroots. Incumbent leaders occupy senior positions within the movement, whereas aspirant elites are more junior but nevertheless have a degree of power and authority, as well as political skills and ambition.
(2019:106-107): “Leadership authority in rebel movements is inherently linked to social identities and the struggle for recognition. […] If rebel leaders manage to satisfy their grassroots’ claim to recognition, their rebel social orders are stable. If they do not, their authority erodes and becomes vulnerable to challenge from below.”