Barber and Harrison (2011) ‘Patriotic War 1941-1945.’
Citation: Barber, John and Harrison, Mark (2011) ‘Patriotic War 1941-1945.’
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Notes: Barber and Harrison (2011:199): Soviet Union opened eastern front on 22 June 1941. Had prepared for war since 1920s, fearing attack from France and Poland. By mid-1930s, Germany and Japan had become main threat.
Barber and Harrison (2011:199): Argues purges not only impacted Red Army by cutting high command, but also undermined willingness of Western countries to enter into alliance “with a regime that seemed to be either rotten with traitors or intent on devouring itself.”
Barber and Harrison (2011:199): Following Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, Soviet Union continued to prepare for war, assimilated eastern Poland, annexed the Baltic states and northern Romania and attacked Finland.
Barber and Harrison (2011:200): USSR remained at peace with Japan until August 1945. Both countries wanted to avoid conflict and opening up new front.
Barber and Harrison (2011:200): By September 1941, German forces had penetrated 1000km, captured Kiev, surrounded Leningrad and were approaching Moscow. Resistance was chaotic but involved a scorched earth policy that denied German army resources. German retreat began following defeat at Stalingrad in 1942 and a winter counter-offensive. Last German offensive occurred summer 1943.
Barber and Harrison (2011:200): July 1941 Britain and USSR signed mutual assistance pact. in August, the United States extended Lend Lease to the USSR. In December, United States joined the war. Until late 1942 Allies routinely defeated. After Alamein, Stalingrad and Guadal canal, Allies routinely won.
Barber and Harrison (2011:201): Unlike United States and Britain, USSR suffered extensive territorial losses in early stages of the conflict. Contributed half of Allied forces, one in four combat aircraft, one in three artillery and machine guns, 2/5 of armoured vehicles and infantry rifles, half machine pistols and two-thirds of mortars. Negligible contribution to naval power.
Barber and Harrison (2011:201-202): Argues that USSR faced 90% of German military strength for three years. German policy was extermination and annexation. USSR suffered approximately 25 million war deaths, compared to 400,000 in US and 350,000 to Britain. Red Army records show 8.7 million military deaths, of which 6.9 million died on the battlefield. 4.6 million captured or missing. German records show 5.8 million Soviet prisoners, of whom 3.3 million died. By 1945, one in five people alive at the start of the war were dead. Those who survived suffered physical and mental trauma.
Barber and Harrison (2011:202): Civilian economic output returned to pre-war levels within one five-year plan after war, but this does not account for what growth would have been.
Barber and Harrison (2011:203): Argues Red Army morale going into war was low, with weakened officer corps and peasants traumatised by memories of collectivization. Collaboration with Germany was a major problem and General Vlasov recruited Red Army soldiers to fight for them. Labour indiscipline and food crimes were endemic.
Barber and Harrison (2011:204 205): Attributes Soviet resistance to three factors. First, number of people who were committed to helping Soviet state survive outnumbered those seeking its downfall. Second, Soviet authorities promoted patriotism and punished defeatism, including treating retreating and capture as crimes. Third, German treatment of captured prisoners and occupied territories destroyed illusions of alternative. This also stiffened German resolve, because they knew what treatment they could expect if captured.