Barbashin (2008) ‘Informal Power Structures in Russia and Ethno-Political Conflict in the Northern Caucasus.’
Citation: Barbashin, Maxim U. (2008) ‘Informal Power Structures in Russia and Ethno-Political Conflict in the Northern Caucasus,’ in Gammer, Moshe (ed.), Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder, London: Routledge, pp. 1-18.
Time Period Covered:
Theory, Research Question, Hypothesis:
Relationship to Other Research/Ideas Contested/Noted Gaps:
Concepts and Definitions:
Method:
Primary/Original Data:
Argument/Conclusion:
Ethno-political conflicts involve an element of manipulation by elites trying to achieve their goals, but the confrontation can then become self-perpetuating.
Limitations/Flaws:
Abstract:
Notes:
Barbashin (2008:3): Elites in Russia often based on “informal mechanisms and influences” rather than formal positions, and guided by group or family rather than national [or sub-national] interests.
Barbashin (2008:4): North Caucasian elites often from the 2nd and 3rd tiers of old nomenklatura elites; role of parties and movements restristed; power principally controls capital rather than the other way round.
Barbashin (2008:4): “The advantage of an occupied position is too great to challenge in open competition. People occupying leadership positions resist change and try to put obstacles to the creation of new channels for power advancement. Thus, the participants are unequal in their starting points and equality in social competition is impossible.”
Barbashin (2008:4-5): Offers increasing positional inequality as a reason for ethnic conflicts in region.
Barbashin (2008:5): True causes of conflict may be concealed from uninitiated spectator because elites use different languages to talk to different audiences, and what is really being decided may be hidden from view. Likewise, true power may be concealed because this increase its security.