Barabanov and Korotkov (2024:18): Note Wagner active in Ukraine, Syria, Sudan, Libya, Burkina-Faso, Mozambique.
Barabanov and Korotkov (2024:24-25): Aleksey Mozgovoy was founder of the Prizrak brigade, a pro-Russian militia in Donbas. Authors claim that Wagner likely killed him, on 23 May 2015, for Mozgovoy's refusal to subordinate himself to LNR authorities.
Cites journalist Georgiy Aleksandrov, who says he first heard about Wagner in August 2014 (p.25).
Claims Wagner's activities in 2014 were not markedly different from the proliferation of other armed groups in Ukraine at that time, and no one paid them special attention (pp.26, 30).
Late summer 2014 thus represents first appearance of Wagner. Participated in battles for Luhansk airport in September 2014 (p30).
Cite field commander Sergey Dubinskiy (Khmuryy), who says the initial Wagner group that fought at Luhansk airport comprised 30 people. It then grew to 200, then 300 (p31).
Publish document showing Wagner was receiving equipment from the Ministry of Defence it least from 8 December 2014. This included tanks, artillery and rockets (p33).
Claim Wagner executed the hit on Pavel Dremov, a Cossack commander who also refused to subordinate himself to the LNR authorities, on 12 December 2015. Also cite historian Yevgeniy Norin as implicating them in murders of "people's mayor" of Pervomaysk, Yevgeniy Ishchenko, on 23 January 2015; Aleksandr Bednov (Batman), a field commander, on 1 January 2015. Seen as part of a clean-up of charismatic field commanders who did not fit in the Kremlin's efforts to create a loyal power vertikal in Luhansk Oblast (p36-37).
Utkin, Dmitriy Valerovich (Wagner). Commanded a special forces unit (GRU) in Pskov Oblast until 2012. Native of Arbest, Sverdlovskaya Oblast. Joined military academy in St Petersburg in 1980s. Grew up in Smolino, Kirovogradskaya Oblast, Ukraine. (p40-41). Provides copy of passport (p42), registration document for military unit 75143 (p43). DOB 11.06.1970. Passport #5803589141.
Utkin served in 584th spetsnaz detached company in Budennovsk after hostage-taking incident. Served in Second Chechen War, based near Staryye Atagi. Captain and company commander. Participated in repulsion of invasion of Dagestan. Moved to Pechory, Pskov Oblast, where he married long-time girlfriend Yelena Shcherbinina. Divorced shortly afterwards, reportedly struggling to adapt to civilian life (p44).
In Pechory, Utkin commanded the 700th detached unit of spetsnaz. Registered at military base until 2018. Unit subordinate to 2nd brigade spetsnaz GRU. Reached rank of lieutenant colonel, but could not go higher without requisite education. Became a military pensioner in 2013. (p44-45).
Joined Moran Security Group. Notes Group fully complied with Russian and international law, with all its weaponry registered outside Russia. Focused on protecting marine transport off African coast - among its contracts was Sovkomflot (p45).
A Moran Security Group ship was seized off Nigeria, accused of illegal possession of arms. Eight sailors, seven security personnel arrested. Took a year to release people, ship never recovered (p45-46).
Incident with ship caused financial and reputational damage to Group. Its senior managers decided to adopt a new, riskier strategy to rebuild and expand business. It linked up with the Russian-Syrian businessman Yusuf Dzhaber, who led an armed group fighting for Asad in civil war. Dzhaber commissioned Moran to, officially, defend ail and gas facilities and, unofficially, fight insurgents. Enerdzhi company founded in Russia, which signed a contract with the Syrian Government to protect on and gas facilities; Enerdzhi then contracted Slavyanskiy Corps, registered an Hong Kong, to fulfil it (p46).
Estimated size of Slavyanskiy Corps at time: 250. September 2013 arrived in Latakia. Utkin commanded one of two companies. Tried to seize Deir ez-Zour from IS, but swiftly withdrawn to Russia in October 2013 because of disagreement with Syrian side over its role. Searched by FSB and spetsnaz an arrival in Moscow; fighters released, but senior Moran managers Vadim Gusev and Yevgeniy Sidorov arrested and convicted of mercenary activity - the first in Russian history to do so (p46-47). They received three years and were released after one and a half after cooperating with investigators.
Nothing known of Utkin’s activities until summer 2014. Therefore it is not known what he did during annexation of Crimea. 9 Dec 16 invited in Kremlin. Attended by Andrey Troshev (Sedoy), who had recently commanded a police special forces unit in St Petersburg. Two other Wagner commanders, Andrey Bogatov and Aleksandr Kuznetsov, also present and met with Putin. Utkin received Hero of Russia (p48-49).
Utkin’s fascination with Third Reich began after being dismissed from army. Sometimes signed Wagner documents with an SS symbol. However, authors argue there is no evidence of widespread support for Nazi views among Wagner fighters. Utkin himself said people came to earn money (p49,52).
Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin. Owned Concord holding company, which Wagner belonged to. Claim Prigozhin became acquainted with Putin at the elite New Island restaurant in St Petersburg that Prigozin co-owned. First meeting occurred in 2000 or 2001, depending on the account. Venue used to entertain high-ranking foreign guests. Another theory is that Putin already knew Prigozhin, because both Putin and Viktor Zolotov were connected to Roman Tsepov, an influential St Petersburg businessman with strong lies to the criminal world; Tsepov, in turn, was likely to know Prigozhin, who had ties to the same world (p56-57).
Prigozhin - St Petersburg native. Graduated sports school in 1977. Entered Leningrad Chemical Pharmaceutical Institute, but only completed first year. First conviction for theft aged 18; received conditional sentence, but fled from Novgorod factory where he was supposed to work and returned to St. P. Part of a group that robbed flats. In 1980, sentenced to 13 years for robbery and assault (p58-59).
Prigozhin released in late 1980s for good behaviour. Claims he started selling hot dogs in St Petersburg in 1990.
Boris Spektor. Classmate of Prigozhin who worked for St Petersburg businessman Mikhail Mirilashvili. Mirilashvili owned Kontrast network of supermarkets; Spektor appointed Prigozhin to run them (p60).
Kirill Ziminov. Commercial director Kontrast. Opened Staraya Tamozhnya restaurant with Prigozhin in 1995. (p60).
Concord founded in 1995 (p60).
Staraya Tamozhnya earned $1mn profit in first year. Followed by other restaurants: Russkiy Kitch, Stroganovskiyy Dvor, Sem Sorok, New Island (p61).
Mirilashvili reportedly demanded that Prigozhin hand over Tamozhnya. Aug 2000, Mirilashvili's father kidnapped; Mirilashvili returned to St P. from Israel and regoriated his release. Arrested in 2001, accused of ordering the abduction and murder of the kidnappers. Released in 2009 and now lives mainly in Israel (p61-62).
Prigozhin split with Ziminov, promising him $1mn for his share in the business, but only paying $600k. Police refused to investigate (p62)
Early 1990s Prigozhin married Lyubov Kryazhevaya. Two daughters, one son. Children became nominal owners of companies connected to Concord (p62).
Concord won large state contract to supply food to schools in 2010-2011 (p66). By 2021, these contracts had earned Concord RUB 200 bn, despite reported lawsuits over quality of food and violations of standards. In the early 2010s, Concord expanded to supplying food to the military, and from there extended to building, repairing and maintaining military facilities. (p66-67)
Prigozhin’s diaries from the early 2010s reveal working meetings with Governor Sergey Shoygu; head of presidential administration Anton Vayno and his deputy Vyacheslav Volodin; and press secretary Dmitriy Peskov (p67).
Prigozhin bought highly personalised gifts for influential people. For example, he bought Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov an exclusive cognac (p68).
Ziminov established a rival catering company, Caramel Catering, that competed with Prigozhin for state and major contracts. In June 2012, Prigozhin organised a fake lunch for a business journal, attended by local officials and businessman. Caramel provided the catering; when the guests got serious food poisoning, Caramel lost its major contract for the St Petersburg International Economic Forum (p68).
Andrey Mikhaylov, PR advisor who came up with poisoning idea. Employed by Concord afterwards. Created Federal News Agency (later known as the "troll factory") to write posts and commentaries to spread (dis-)information (p69).
Patriot media company -part of the Concord empire.
Yevgeniy Gulyayez. Head of Prigozhin's security service. Former Leningrad policeman. Recreated Mikhaylov to Concord (p69).
Copy all names on p 70-71 to SNA
Anton Grishchenko. Sochi blogger. In 2013, seriously beaten by Prigozhin's security personnel for posting a disparaging French cartoon of Putin (p72).
Valeriy Amelchenko, Commanded group within security service at the start of the 2010s. Former convict. Claimed that Pagozhin's service operated a chemical factory that was developing fatal poisons (p72-73).
Sergey Fomin. Opposition blogger in Pskov. According to Amelchenko, service poisoned him summer 2016. Same happened to Sergey Mokhov, husband of Navalnyy’s associate, Lyubov Sobol (p73).
Yuliya Latynina. Service followed her and may have been behind attack on her (p73).
Petersburg Observers representative Danil Aleksandrov, beaten up a 9 Feb 2016. Criminal Authorities member Aleksandr Markov, beaten up March 2016. Information about both posted an whoiswhos.me. Website managed for IP address of a Prigozhin Company (p 73,75).
Copy list of organisations p 74, to SNA
Kharkiv News Agency- created by Concord Employee (p75).
December 2016: Syrian oil and mineral resources minister Ali Ganem met Russian Energy Minister Aleksandr Novak in Moscow. They signed agreements on the participation of Russian companies in oil and gas exploitation and security provision. Neither the companies involved nor the security issues were explained by the officials. Documents show that the signatories were the Syrian state, the Syrian state-owned General Oil Corporation, and Evro Polis. The latter were to conduct military operations to recapture oil and gas infrastructure and then secure it. Evro Polis would receive 25% of the value of renewed production at the facilities (p80).
In 2019, Evro Polis' revenues were $20 mn a month; by 2022, it had received RUB 1 bn 114 mn. Evro Polis had been in existence for half a year when the contract was signed (p81).
Evro Polis’ registration number: 1165024055613. An agreement with the General Oil Corporation involved the creation of a joint venture, the Syrian-Russian Fuel (топливной) Company. It also acknowledged that Evro Polis had already liberated Hayan and Shair provinces from IS. It is unclear when this agreement was signed, but it was after 23 May 2017 (p82-83).
4 December 1989 - UN adopted Resolution 44/34 on the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries.
Montreux Document outlines principles for operation of PMCs. Ratified September 2008. Not signed by Russia.
2010 an International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers launched on basis of Montreux Document. There are no companies with headquarters in Russia who are signatories (https://icoca.ch/membership/, checked 18 June 2024).
Outline Operation of PMCs in Russia: A company is registered in Russia with a skeleton staff. Client contracts are signed with companies in offshore jurisdictions. Soldier contracts are handled in the same way. Weapons and military equipment are purchased and stored legally in other countries and never enter Russia (p 88).
RSB-Group protected ships, often being sub-contracted to do so by foreign PMCs. It also protected facilities in Russia, and provided training and certification. Notes that its last reported activity was in 2017, when a Libyan state corporation contracted it to de-mine a cement factory in Benghazi (p89).
VST- a St Petersburg PMC, subcontracted to provide maritime security (p89).
Characterise Moran Security Group, RSB-Group, Redut-Antiterror, VST, Tiger Top-Rent Security as genuine "commercial structures, oriented towards extracting profit and working according to the laws of the country in which they operated." Wagner was nothing like this, and did not operate according to any international norms for PMCs (p89).
Claim there was never any legal entity called Wagner (a though this should be checked against the building in St Petersburg).
Union of Officers for International Security (содружество Офицеров за международную безопасность), Sewa Security - Prigozhin-linked companies that signed security contracts (р90).
Many commanders were long-time employees. Rank-and-file fighters were recruited for specific operations, and those that took part in multiple missions usually joined new units when they did so. Initially, recruitment was through personal contacts. In Ukraine 2014, this continued, but expanded to include those who were already on the ground as volunteers and were attracted by the high salaries Wagner was offering, as well as through veteran communities (p90-91).
The documents that recruits signed were not proper contracts, because they had no legal validity and were signed by non-existent, often unnamed companies. Often paid in cash. Only the management signed contracts with real Prigozhin-linked companies, but their roles there were fictitious (p92).
Claim making money was not always a priority for Wagnerites. Financial compensation for participation in Donbas in summer 2014 was not clearly and consistently defined. From the group perspective, see the activities of the groups as the personal initiative of Prigozhin, an attempt to curry favour with Putin and satisfy his own ambition (p93). Commercial priorities came later, with expansion (p95).
Copy list of companies, people (p94, 96-97)
Oleg Yerokhin, general director of Evro Polis, employee of security service of Concord. Evro Polis owned by Neva, whose general director was long-term Concord employee Valeriy Chekalov (p95).
Syrian government signed contracts with Velada and Merkuriy in December 2019, for exploration and extraction of oil and gas. Formal founder of Velada was Yekaterina Trofimova, an assistant to the leader of a Concord company. She was replaced by Daryl Baranovskaya, a 21-year-old student and the daughter of a general director of a Prigozhin company. Merkuriy signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defence in the mid-2010s, with revenue of RUB 3.1bn in 2018. A Merkuriy helicopter crashed near Prigozhin’s residence at Severnyy Versal near St Petersburg; an investigation into the crash revealed the company’s link to Prigozhin (p98-99).
Andrey Litvinov. Resident of Chesma, in Urals. Fought with Wagner in Syria for four months, before being killed near Tais, Homs Province in September 2015. On his death, his family received RUB5mn compensation. His parents sued his widow to receive a portion of it. They lost because they couldn't prove that PMCs existed, and that their son had died serving in a conflict zone (p102-4).
Explain Russia's unwillingness to use the regular military to intervene in Syria as a desire to avoid Russian casualties, and a negative reaction (presumably social) (p106).
In autumn 2015, four reconnaissance and assault companies operated in Syria. Later, these were reconstructed as storm detachments. There was also the Vesna group, comprised mainly of natives of Ukraine who had fought for the LNR and DNR; a combined artillery group; and a tank unit. Approximately 1.5k total. Initial operations in Latakia, where Russia had a base (p106).
January - February 2016, Wagner - together with the Syrian army and with support from Russian aviation - advanced near oil and gas fields in Deir ez-Zour. Culminated is first successful capture of Palmyra. That was a symbolic success for the Russian mission in Syria. Deputy leader Andrey Troshev and 4th Company Commander Andrey Bogatov (Brodyaga) received Hero of Russia awards for it; Utkin and other commanders and fighter other state awards (p107-108).
In all of 2016, Wagner lost only 25 fighters, with a further 70+ wounded (p108).
In April-May 2016, part of the Wagner contingent left Syria. A company remained to protect facilities, one or two units remained to provide technical support, but the bulk - including tanks and artillery - were withdrawn. (p108).
IS recaptured Palmer. Wagner returned in 2017 to take it back again. First conflict with Ministry of Defence occurred, over the quality of creapons provided to Wagner (p108).
In 2017, Wagner started instituting its own award system.
The second battle for Palmyra resulted in the first major losses for Wagner. Wagner also became better known in Russia, which resulted in it growing, but also in new recruits sometimes lacking necessary military training or physical fitness (p109).
Yevgeniy Alikov. Native of Severoonezhsk, Arkhangelsk Oblast. Travelled to Luhansk in 2014 to fight, most likely with Mozgovoy's Prizrak brigade. Badly injured in 2016. After he recovered, he travelled from home to Rostov-on the-Don, and after a month was dispatched to Syria, where he died a couple of months later, in September 2017. His mother attempted to secure official recognition of him an a veteran, but couldn't achieve more than a photograph on the wall of the local administration and an obituary in the local paper (p109-111).
List of people killed in Syria (p112)
Units and losses list (p113)
January-September 2017: 131 Russian citizens who were not military personnel killed in Syria. Majority likely Wagner fighters. In September 2017 alone, Wagner lost at least 54 people (p114).
Patriot Media Group belonged to Prigozhin. Federal News Agency (Федеральное агентство новостей) а key part. Политики сегодня, народных новости also parts. Results from these outlets often appeared top of search engine results. These outlets often ascribed military successes to Syrian army or pro-Asad militias, because Prigozhin was still denying Wagner’s existence (p114-115).
Syrian mercenaries, using the name IS Hunters, operated under Wagner's command and were often used for PR purposes (p115).
Sergei Gubanov. Former policeman. Employed by Prigozhin's security service. Together with Oleg Yerokhin, co-founded League for the Defence of the Interests of the Veterans of Local Wars and Military Conflicts (p116).
Gubanov traveled to Syria in February 2017, as head of a delegation from Wagner's "head office." With him were Valeriy Amelchenko, leader of a military group, and Oleg Simonov, a graduate from a pharmaceutical college. They arrived to test out a poison. Because of disputes and a refusal to fight, the local Wagner commander proposed using the IS Hunters rather than captives. Simonov likely made a mistake and poisoned both the Hunters and the delegation who were negotiating with them over the dispute. The Syrian muhabarat coordinator died as a result. Three months later Simonov was found dead in his St Petersburg flat, cause of death unknown (p16-117).
First confirmed war crimes: video appeared online in summer 2017, showing a man being beaten with a sledgehammer. Nearby a decapitated head is visible. Armed men without insignia who speak Russian are carrying out the beating. Three other videos, from same time and place, are published online in November 2019. They show decapitation and dismemberment of a man subsequently identified as the Syrian Mohammed Taha Ismail Al-Abdulla. One of the attackers was identified as Stanislav Dychko, born in Dresden and resident of Kray. Russian investigators ignored evidence provided later. Dychko went unpunished, continuing to fight with Wagner until his death in 2021 (p117-122).
Based on documents obtained by Dossier from Wagner’s Special Department, claim that torture and executions were carried out with knowledge of, if not under orders from, Wagner’s leadership. A report to assault detachment Commander Budko (Bes), investigated the leak of the videos and identified the other perpetrators by their call signs, but did not punish the actual crime (p122-125).
7 February 2018. Conflict between US military and Wagner fighters in Khsham, Deir ez-Zour. According to a leaked transcript of Wagner fighters discussing incident, US used artillery and helicopters, and killed 200 Wagner fighters, wounding 700 more. Neither the US, Russia or Syria have provided a full official account of the incident (p128-129).
Marins Park Otel in Rostov-on-the-Don. Owned by Soyuz Marins Grup, founded by Navy veteran Aleksandr Kulikov, killed in helicopter crash in annexed Crimea in 2016. The group was used as an investment fund for veterans' organisations. The hotel was used to host Wagner events, including one on 10 April 2018 where the relatives of those hilled in Deir ez-Zour were gathered together and paid compensation (p129-131).
On 8 February 2018, Pentagon claimed 500 fighters from pro-Asad units had attacked Kurdish forces from the Syrian Democratic Forces; the US had used artillery to repulse the attack, resulting in hundreds of losses among Syrian volunteers. The Russian Ministry of Defence Claimed Syrian volunteers had carried out search and reconnaissance activities that had not been agreed by the Russian operational group; it denied Russian forces were involved and said that 25 Syrians had been wounded (р131-132).
The first official Russian confirmation that Russian citizens were killed came on 15 February 2018, when Mariya Zakharova acknowledged five deaths (p134).
In autumn 2018, the Ukrainian Security Service published a list of 206 Wagnerites who participated in the incident, of which it said 58 died (p135).
According to US sources, Kurdish army general Hassan, the local commander, phoned the Russian contact in Deir ez-Zor on the evening of 7 February 2018, to ask if Russians were planning an operation amid reports of forces gathering. Contact said no and denied Russians operating in area. At some point later, when the US was repulsing the attack, the contact reached out to Hassan and asked for a pause to collect the killed and wounded (p135).
Wagner's own account, according to internal documents, was that it was defending its positions, which came under attack from US aviation (p136).
Authors calculate that 80 people died, with a further 186 injured. Alongside Russians, they included citizens of Ukraine (7), Armenia (1), Kazakhstan (1), and Moldova (1). The greatest losses were suffered by the 5th Storm Detachment, which suffered 41 dead and 140 wounded (out of a total contingent of roughly 200). The Karpaty group, formed in 2014 mostly from Ukrainian citizens, lost 23 with 16 wounded. A third Wagner unit was present but did not participate in fighting (p138).
The 5th Storm Detachment was commanded by Aleksandr Yemelyanov, who previously served as a contract soldier in Chechnya and had been sentenced to community service for threatening to kill someone. Karpaty was commander by Yessentukov native Aleksandr Moskalenko. Both have subsequently been awarded Heroes of Russia status (p139).
Artem Valentinovich Kutsar, from Chita. Born 1984, killed fighting for Wagner in Syria between 7 February 2018 (according to family) and 12 March 2018 (according to death certificate) (p139). Served in Chechnya, took on various jobs after demobilisation. Joined Wagner summer 2016. Call name Apostol, service number 2642. served in Syria for three months, called up again October 2017 (p142).
Aleksandr Sergeyevich Yemelyanov, Born 21 October 1971 in Donskoy, Tulskaya Oblast. Call name Yemelya. Copy ID, proof of conviction (p140-141).
Sergey Bondarev (Bond), officially killed 22 February 2018. Adam Darovskikh (Cheriy), officially killed 27 February 2018. Anton Lakhin (Shakhter), officially killed 27 February 2018. All actually killed 7-8 February 2018 (p145).
Suggest authorities wanted to conceal information about deaths until after presidential elections (p146).
Sergei Makarov, from Sterlitamak, Bashkortostan. Killed on 7-8 February 2018 in Syria. Previously served in army. Fought in Ukraine as a volunteer in 2014. Officially killed Arbil, near Damascus, on 21 March 2018 (p146).
Claim that attack in Khsham was an effort to seize control of an oilfield that would have brought Euro Polis a sizeable profit according to the agreement signed with the Syrian government (p134). Claim that Wagner had signed an agreement with Kurdish forces not to advance beyond the positions it had occupied for months, and this could only have been violated on Prigozhin's order (p147).
Prigozhin himself later claimed that the operation was intended to cut off the Conoco oil refinery from Iraq, clear southeast Syria of IS forces, and prevent Kurdish forces moving south; however, Russian military failed to keep its promise to provide aviation support. Authors say first part is plausible, ever if Prigozhin also clearly wanted control of the refinery itself; however, dismiss idea that military would agree to shoot down US fighter jets and note Prigozhin’s claims came when he was already in open conflict with Defence Ministry (p147).
US Justice Department on 16 February 2018 published Mueller report that accused Prigozhin of interfering in 2016 US presidential election (p148).
Orkhan Dzhemal, Aleksandr Rastorguyev, and Kirill Radchenko arrived in Central African Republican 28 July 2018, with goal of investigating reports that Wagner was operating there. They were ambushed and killed on the evening of 30 July 2018 (p152-154).
Competing explanations for expansion to Africa of PMC operations:
- need for Russia to have a new arena to demonstrate its global influence ie. great power politics
- benefits to Russia of gaining access to local resources and markets.
- personal project of Prigozhin, supported by Kremlin, that allowed him to advance his political and business interests. These included Prigozhin’s desire to acquire greater political influence (p155-156).
First African country Wagner operated in was Sudan. In June 2017, Sergey akım, a former lieutenant colonel from the Marines, now a Wagner fighter with call sign Voron, met with an employee of the Sudanese presidential administration. Sudan became the main transit hub for Wagner fighters deploying to Africa. Authors speculate capacity of Port-Sudan and international airport in capital made Sudan a good location. Russia also later (end of 2020) signed an agreement with Sudan to build a naval support base on the Red Sea, but authors say it is impossible to differentiate cause and effect (p156-157).
Aleksandr Kuznetsov (Ratibor) acted as an "Instructor" at the group's "Spetsnaz" base near the capital. He trained local military. (p157-158).
Vladislav Udodov (Mangust) headed a logistics point at Port-Sudan (p1S8)
Prigozhin's main activities in Sudan were media-related, aimed at supporting Omar al-Bashir's victory in the 2020 presidential elections. Instead, mass protests broke out in December 2018, and Russian mercenaries attempted to play a role in suppressing them. Bashir was overthrown in April 2019 (p158).
M-Invest - a Prigozhin company. In summer 2017, it established Meroe Gold, headed by former Prigozhin employee Mikhail Potepkin. Meroe Gold engaged in gold mining and gained a preferential exemption from the 30% tax on discovered resources. M-Invest also signed agreements with the Sudanese protection company Aswar, which likely provided a mechanism for kick backs to the Sudanese brigadier general who headed military intelligence. After the coup, Meroe Gold was replaced by Al Sawaji (with the same director), which reached new agreements with Aswar (p161-162).
In CAR, M-Finans specialists arrived in September 2017 to discover gold and diamonds. In October 2017, Lobaye Invest started operating a company fully owned by M-Finans. Yevgeniy Khodatov, a former policeman then Concord security service employee, headed Lobaye Invest. Political advisors also aimed to get President Bangi Tuadera reelected, with Prigozhin-linked companies arranging social and cultural events (p163).
Wagner fighters provided security to the Tuadera regime and the president personally. They acted as de facto commanders of local military. A Prigozhin-linked "advisor", Valeriy Zakharov, supported the president. Zakhara was a former St Petersburg policeman and likely provided protection (p164).
Ever Wagner fighters questioned their effectiveness, because they were too few to hold territory that they captured (p168).
Kirill Romanovskiy, who arranged the fixer for the journalists killed in CAR, worked for the Prigozhin-linked RIA FAN (p170).
Official investigation relied exclusively on the testimony of the driver, and no forensic examination of the scene occurred. The Russian Investigative Committee was in the country for three days, including arrival and departure, and similarly only spoke to the driver. Dossier's investigation proves the driver’s testimony to be false, and that Prigozhin's people followed the journalists the entire time they were in the country (p172).
Romanovskiy died of cancer in January 2023. Prigozhin wrote an obituary (p173).
First evidence of Wagner in Libya appeared in February 2021, when a Samsung device with Russian-language files was found among the belongings of someone fighting for Khalif Haftar (p180).
See Libya as the most significant military engagement prior to February 2022 (p180).
Haftar repeatedly visited Moscow, meeting with Defence Minister Shoygu and Security Council Secretary Patrushev in June 2016, and with Shoygu and Foreign Minister Lavrov in November 2016. Following a meeting with Shoygu in November 2018, the Libyan side posted a video to their social media that showed Prigozhin also attended the meeting. TASS claimed he provided catering and cultural support, but video shows him sitting at negotiation table (p182-183).
January 2020, Putin denied any official connection to Russian fighters in Libya. Peskov said more or less the same in February 2020 (p 183,188).
Vladimir Skopinov (Morpekh). St Petersburg native. Former construction worker and contract soldier. Fought with Imperial Legion volunteer group in Donbass in 2015. Joined Wagner in summer 2017, fought in Syria. December 2019 deployed to Libya. Died January 2020 (р188).
Vladimir Andanov (Vakha). Identified as one of the people involved in kidnapping a Libyan family in September 2019. Fought at Debaltsevo in February 2015, then in Syria and Libya. Died fighting in Ukraine in May 2023 (p 189-190).
Unclear what Wagner gained from Libya: Haftar did not appear to give anything in return for support. He did not transfer any of the oilfields or economic assets he promised (p190).
A Die Welt and Dossier investigation revealed that the bulk of the Wagner contingent was comprised of Syrians, of whom there were more than 4,200, compared to just over 2,000 Russians, in November 2020. By March 2021, only one and a half thousand Russians and 800 Syrians remained (p194).
Other countries Wagner/Prigozhin identified as active: Madagascar, Mali, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Guinea, Cameroon. Much of the presence has been political consultants and media, not mercenaries (p195).
Concord earned $16,500 for the last month of an election campaign in Zimbabwe in 2018. DRC president Joseph Kabila paid $8-9k per month (and lost). Helped ANC and president in 2019 elections in South Africa (p195).
In Mozambique, Wagner deployed to fight Islamist rebels on border with Tanzania. Approx 200 fighters deployed. On 5 October 2019, a reconnaissance group of 13 was ambushed, with five wounded; 45-year-old commander Andrey Bondarenko (Granit) died from his wounds - the only confirmed Wagner death in the country. Deployment short- lived because of clashes with local military commanders. A film by the name of Granit was shown two years later in Moscow; it was produced by a Prigozhin-linked company (p195-196).
Andrey Troshev (Sedoy) was Wagner's executive director from the beginning. He oversaw training camp at Molkino, supplies, personnel, and other administrative issues. He became one of Wagner’s public faces after 2022 (p204).
Divides Wagner into three tiers: the top managers; the heads of services and commanders; and then the operatives, i.e.rank-and-file fighters and specialists (p204).
Note that many Wagner employees owed their living and career prospects to Prigozhin - and therefore chose him over the Russian state when forced to (p205).
Aleksey Yuryevich Nagin (Terek). Reportedly served in Chechnya as a contract soldier, then worked for FSB in Volgograd. Went to Crimea in 2014, likely serving in a Cossack volunteer unit; spent two years there. Then went to Georgia (presumably separatist territories). Then spent three years in Syria as part of Wagner. Afterwards Libya, Ukraine. Storm detachment commander. Buried in Volgograd 24 September 2022; Volgograd Governor Andrey Bocharev, Prigozhin attended his funeral. Describe his as a fairly typical Wagner career trajectory for a mid-level employee: military service, law enforcement or security, war in Ukraine, joining PMC; low level of education, problems with law that prevented career advancement in military or police (p205, 207).
Aleksandr Yemelyanov. Tula Oblast native. Conscript soldier, then tractor operator. Contract soldier in Chechnya at start of 2000s. Sentenced in 2015 for threatening to kill someone. Rose to storm detachment commander, fought in Khsham, Syria, in February 2018 (p208).
Nicolay Budko (Bes). Resident of El-Ismail. Served in army, then OMON, then French Foreign Legion. Joined Moran Security Group, then Wagner, eventually rose to commander serving in Syria (p 208).
Aleksandr Kuznetsov (Ratibor). Commander of a spetsnaz company. Accused of kidnapping and robbery, sentenced but released after a year. Commanded first storm and reconnaissance company in Ukraine, then went to Syria and Africa (p208).
Anton Yelizarov (Lotos). Native of Rostov Oblast. Served in southern Russia as unit, then company, then detachment commander. Ministry of Defence accused him of fraud over his service apartment in 2014, given three year suspended sentence and a fine. Joined Wagner, fought in Syria, served as instructor in Sudan, commanded detachment in Libya, then led storm of Soledar (p209).
Marat Gabidullin. Served in military. Later sentenced to a colony for the murder of a local crime boss in Siberia. Worked as a taxi driver before joining Wagner. Signed contract with Evro Polis. Became commander of reconnaissance company. Fought at Palmyra; badly wounded but saved by Ratibor. Wrote memoirs, but Prigozhin stalled with publication. Served as Prigozh8n’s personal assistant in St Petersburg, before returning to Syria to fight at Khsham. Resigned in 2019 and gave interviews to Barabanov and Korotkov. Memoirs published in January 2022; left for France in March 2022 (p208-211).
See Wagner as organised along similar lines to the regular military, with administration and headquarters playing a critical role. Recruits to these parts of the organisation all had a background as officers (p211).
Vladimir Siyenko (Sektor), Head of administration at Molkino. Graduated from military academy. Rose to rank of lieutenant colonel. Copy details p 212-213. Resigned from army as deputy head of the centre for training specialists at a military school in Krasnodar (p214)
Sergey Kim. Lieutenant-colonel in reserve with marines. Graduated naval academy in St Petersburg. Served as deputy head of headquarters. Acted as advisor to president of Sudan (p214).
Aleksandr Palyashchiy. Former commander of artillery division. Worked as storekeeper. Became head of Wagner's artillery (p214).
Andrey Bogatov. Former paratrooper battalion commander. Major in reserve. Electrician at a factory. Became Wagner commander and Hero of Russia (p 214).
Aleksandr Yakushev (Oka). Served in army for 23 years, including in Chechnya. Became head of Wagner headquarters - and Kim’s boss (p214).
Argue that it is easier for HQ staff to leave than for combat commanders: they have more experience and better contacts in general (p214-215).
The Special Department handled confidential matters, personnel, financial and information security. Resolve disputes, ensure no drug or alcohol abuse, liaise with regular military (p215-216).
Ruslan Mikhaylov, Head of Special Department. Former operative in St Petersburg police personal security department. Posted a photograph of himself with Troshev in Latakia (p216).
Andrey Kartashov. Head of counter-espionage in Syria (p216).
Aleksandr Zalichev (Boroda). Joined Wagner 2015. Two-times Russian Champion in duelling (p217).
Oleg Simunyak (Skelet). Also known as Oleg Valetskiy. Fought in war in Yugoslavia. Wrote a book in engineering ordnance, expert on mines (p217).
Alexander Sagaydak (Iskander). Served on Tajik-Afghan border as a reconnaissance sniper, killed in Syria (p217).
Aleksey Naynodin (Bekas). Former head of a SOBR unit near Moscow. Killed in Syria (p217).
Ivan Arkhimovich (Polyak). Former GRU spetsnaz. Fought in Chechnya and Georgia. Killed in Syria (p217).
Nikolay Bushuyev (Minus). From Kamyzyak near Astrakhan. Served as diesel mechanic and electrician while on conscription. Worked as a supermarket assistant. Went to fight in Donetsk in February 2015. Served in DNR GRU spetsnaz. Joined Wagner, killed in Syria (p220).
Aleksandr Kharchenov. From Staryy Oskol. Served as conscript in Soviet army in rocket forces. unemployed. Joined Wagner in December 2015, died three months later (p220).
See Wagner fighters as earning plenty of money, but wasting it just as quickly, necessitating a return to duty. Also struggle to adapt to low social status on retum.(p221).
Belarusian President Lukashenka has characterised his personal relationship with Prigozhin in highly positive terms. Prigozhin likely met him the same way he met Putin: through the New Island restaurant. However, Prigozhin did not appear to have business interests in Belarus (p226).
On 29 July 2020, Belarusian state news agency BELTA reported on the detention of 32 Russians, accused of preparing a provocation to destabilise Belarus. Lukashenka convened a meeting of the Security Council, at which he publicly criticised Russia. Belarusian KGB Chairman Valeriy Vakulchik reported that the detained men were member of Wagner (p226-227).
Men detained at Belorusochka sanatorium near Minsk. Belarusian security services published a list with the names of all of them. Best known was 42-year-old Andrey Bakunovich, who featured in a UN report on Libya. Fought at Luhansk in 2016, wounded, then went on deployments to Middle East. Only one of detainees not released: he was a Belarusian citizen, and what happened to him is unknown (p228).
Aleksey Sapronov (Mozdok). Former Interior Ministry driver. Also detained (p228).
Peskov labelled detentions unfounded and said the men were due to transit elsewhere (p229).
Lukashenka refused to blame Prigozhin, saying decision was made higher up, at deputy ministerial level. Prigozhin distanced himself from operation, while Wagner claimed that 15 men on the list had been connected to the group but then dismissed, between 2017 and 2019. Authors confirm they did not have active contracts. The men were all released and allowed to return to Russia on 14 August 2020, after presidential elections (p229-230).
In 2018, Ukraine's Main Reconnaissance Directorate (GUR) formulated a plan to capture Russian mercenaries who had fought in Donbas. In 2020, pretending to be leaders of the Mar PMC, GUR operatives launched a recruitment campaign to protect Rosneft facilities in Venezuela. Applicants provided details of their military experiences. GUR particularly sought out experts in air defence. In the author's' view, this was an effort linked to the investigation into the 17 July 2016 Malaysian Airlines incident. Ukraine planned to send people a bus from Russia to Minsk, then fly onwards to Turkey - forcing plane to land when it entered Ukrainian airspace. Bus left Moscow 24 July 2020. Plane should have left the next day but was delayed. It was this group that was detained in Belarus. When they were arrested, Ukraine tried issuing arrest warrants and sending extradition requests (p230-234).
Putin statement on Wagner in 2019, See footnote 476. In 2020, footnote 477.
Reference to Mali, noting Putin's comment shorty before invasion of Ukraine in response to European officials raising concerns about Russian mercenaries there following 2021 military coup (p237).
Spring 2020 Aurum Production released film Shugaley, about Maksim Shugaley, a political consultant who travelled to Libya towork for Prigozhin but was captured by Islamists, and still in captivity when film released. Directed by Denis Neymand. Shown on NTV. Aurum Production's only previous film was Rzhev, about the achievements of a company commanded by Yevgeniy Ilich Prigozhin, the other Prigozhin’s grandfather, in the Great Patriotic War. Prigozhin financed film and co-owned Aurum. Shugaley 2 released in September 2020, but Shugaley remained behind bars in Libya until December 2020. Third film then made. Shugaley unsuccessfully tried to become a city council deputy in St Petersburg after his release (p240-241).
As of 2021, Aurum Production had released at least eight films, all but one of which (16th, devoted to troll factory) were devoted to Wagner. This included Tourist (CAR), Granit (Mozambique), Solntsepek (Luhansk), Luchshiye v adu (Ukraine, without being named). Wagner's name is only explicitly mentioned in this last film (p241, 243).
Storm detachments of mercenaries participated in 24 February invasion of Ukraine. These, however, were directly subordinate to the GRU and were not Wagner fighters. One group used the name Yastreb, paying $2,200 for a month's work, and attacked Kharkiv. Redut, which was founded by former officers from the 45ª spetsnaz brigade of the VDV, operated near Chernobyl. They had previously used the Shchit-STG name to protect Stroytransgaz facilities in Syria. Recut also supervised by GRU (p269).
Mercenaries suffered heavy losses during early stages of the war, including as a result of friendly fire caused by poor coordination and communication (p249).
By the start of 2022, Wagner no longer active in Syria, though it did maintain a transit base, a training camp and several contracts to protect commercial facilities (p250).
Became active in Mali several months prior to invasion of Ukraine. Also active in Libya and CAR as before (p250).
Much more difficult to join Wagner because of tighter requirements. Concerns over Ukrainian spies and saboteurs, which meant they no longer took on people from LNR and DNR; citizens of Crimea and Georgia also de facto banned. Health requirements, lack of previous convictions, lack of debts to the state also stricter. Much more open recruitment only began in mid-March (p251).
Wagner often used code names for the places it recruited to: Saratov (Syria), Lipetsk (Libya), Tsaritsyn (CAR), Salsk (Ukraine)(p251).
Sees Russia relying on a three-pronged strategy to fill gaps left by sizeable losses in early stages of war. First, Ministry of Defence offered short-term contracts and called up reservists as part of a major recruitment campaign. Second, Kadyrov mobilised significant forces, first from his security services and then volunteers from across Russia. Finally, Wagner started recruiting across Russia; Molkino wasn't suitable because of the closure of southern airports, but GRU facilitated opening of recruitment points (p251-252).
Aleksey Milchakov. Fought with Wagner. Then headed diversionary storm group Rusich. He took charge of a Wagner recruitment post in St Petersburg (p252).
Redut's main training base was in Kubinka, near Moscow, but moved to a hotel in a suburb of Rostov-on-the-Don with the start of the war (p252).
Marat Gabidullin claims that Russian PMCs were never independent commercial structures: they did not have budgets, did not earn revenue, and did not compete on the open market. They fulfilled the demands of their bosses and operated under the patronage of the GRU. They were allowed to pursue their own interests, so long as they responded to the state's needs when called upon (p252).
From mid-April 2022, recruits to PMCs other than Wagner began to be included in BARS (боевой армейский резерв страны). Fighters and commanders signed contracts with civilian legal entities or individual military units (части), not with Ministry of Defence. Apart from Kadyrov’s forces, all were formally registered with military unit 22179, part of the 150th motor rifle division and located in Rostov Oblast. Wagner fighters had a unique status as a result, being subordinate only to their commanders and Prigozhin (p254).
As late as August 2022, Prigozhin was still suing people - in this case Aleksey Venediktov - for calling him the owner of Wagner. His first public acknowledgment of the fact came around 26 September 2022 (p261).
On 5 October 2022, Peskov continued to characterise Prigozhin as a patriotic businessman and nothing more. By this point, his prison recruitment scheme was public knowledge, and this - like the pardons an offer - could only have been approved by the president (p261-262).
Vladislav Korobenkov, sentenced to 19 years and a large fine for rape and murder in Kaluzhskaya Oblast. Released in autumn 2022 (p263-264).
Vitaliy Vasilyev. Sentenced to 19 years for the murder of an Azerbaijani student in Volgograd in June 2020. Released (p264).
Wagner opened new base near Luhansk for handling the large volume of new recruits (p265).
Yevgeniy Nuzhin, who was killed with a sledgehammer, was the first Wagner prison recruit to be captured by the Ukrainians and provide in an interview details of the recruitment process (p268-269).
Stanislav Bogdanov. Beat a judge to death in Novgorod. Released to fight with Wagner, then pardoned (p272).
Ivan Rossomakhin. Sentenced to 14 years, released to fight with Wagner, pardoned, then murdered an 85-year-old neighbour near Kirov in April 2023. Possibly the first Wagner recidivism case (p273).
Date conflict with Shoygu to operations in Syria, when Shoygu apparently preferred to issue awards to generals rather than Wagner for the capture of Palmyra (p274).
Prigozhin had much better relations with Sergey Surovikin, who commanded the Combined Group of Russian Forces in Ukraine from October 2022 onwards. Instead attacked Head of the General Headquarters Valeriy Gerasimov (p274).
Prigozhin's harsh criticisms and personal abuse of the military leadership would have resulted in at least a fine for "discrediting the army" if made by a regular citizen (p276).
In February, 2023, Wagner lost its prison recruitment privileges. This was taken over by the Ministry of Defence, which recruited then to Storm Z detachments. As a result, Wagner struggled to recruit, while also facing logistical issues with recruitment (p276).
In June 2023, Shoygu issued an order requiring all volunteer units to sign a contract with the Ministry of Defence by July. Prigozhin refused. Putin intervened for the first time, publicly backing the Ministry (p279).
On the evening of 23 June 2023, pro-Prigozhin Telegram channels published a short video showing a destroyed military base, which a narrator claimed belonged to Wagner and had been attached by the Russian military. Journalists and experts later concluded the video was staged. Prigozhin later claimed Wagner had suffered significant losses in the treacherous attack (p283).
On the morning of 24 June 2023, Prigozhin published a video that claimed that Wagner had shot down a helicopter in a Moscow highway. Wagner troops were advancing from their Luhansk base to Moscow to "punish" Shoygu and Gerasimov. Prigozhin characterised it as a “march of justice” (p282).
Rostov was home to the headquarters of the Southern Military District, Wagner faced no resistance when it took the city. Prigozhin arrived at the headquarters, where he held talks with Yevkurov (p285).
Wagner troops advanced on the Don federal highway, bypassing Voronezh. They reached Elets, 400km from Moscow (p286).
Putin spoke at 10am on 24 June. Without mentioning Prigozhin, he called Wagner’s actions a "stab in the back," "treason" and “treachery," comparing events to 1917 and promising punishment. Prigozhin responded, blaming deception, corruption and bureaucracy (p 286-287).
FSB raided Patriot media group offices in St Petersburg. Police visited the homes of former Wagnerites to warn them against participating. Prigozhin’s money seized at different properties (p287).
Lukashenka claims he phoned Putin on the morning of 24 June and offered to mediate. He made contact with Prigozhin, with Yevkurov’s help. By evening, Prigozhin was willing to accept Lukashenka’s terms, in return for which Lukashenka guaranteed the safety of Prigozhin and his troops and passage to Belarus. Whether this account is reliable or not, mutiny over by 8pm. Peskov announced that criminal case against mutineers was closed and Prigozhin could leave for Belarus (p288-289).
Aleksey Dyumin, former bodyguard of Putin and then Tula Oblast Governor, was one of few governors who did not issue requested statement supporting president. Some sources suggest he acted as an informal mediator during mutiny. He was one of only a few officials who publicly commemorated Prigozhin's death (p290).
Sergei Surovikin issued a statement on 24 June calling on Wagner to stop. After the mutiny, he disappeared from view. In late August, it became known that he had been dismissed as head of the Air Space Forces. US intelligence claimed he had known about and supported the mutiny (p290).
Discussion of whether mutiny could have been a successful coup (p291).
The decision to drop charges three days later ignored the law: it claimed that, the mutineers stopped their actions that were oriented towards committing a crime, when by law the crime had already taken place with the start of the mutiny (p 292).
Vadim Suvorov (Khrustal) - the only notable commander who joined Trushev in directly subordinating himself to the Defence Ministry. Authors frame this as being under the auspices of Redut, directly controlled by Shoygu (p293).
Prigozhin's money was returned to him. He used his private helicopters and jets to travel around, including repeated visits to Moscow and St Petersburg. However, former allies in the elite either turned away from him or suffered a down turn in fortunes (p293).
30 June 2023 Roskomnadzor blocked all publications belonging to the Patriot group: RIA FAN, Politika Segodnya, Ekonomika Segodnya, Nevskiye Novosti and Narodnyye Novosti all stopped updating and were then removed (p294).
Concord-linked companies signed new contracts with schools and hospitals worth more than RUB 1bn in the weeks after the mutiny (p294).
Security services leaked photos of Prigozhin’s wealth and assets, his well as IDS, take during raids, in an evident attempt to damage his image (p294).
Molkino base closed and equipment transferred to Ministry of Defence. Troops left for Belarus, relocating to a specially built base in Molgilevskaya Oblast. By end of July 2023, approximately 6,000 based there. Belarus would serve as a transit base for operations is Africa. Prigozhin's last video release came on 21 August 2023 and showed him somewhere in Africa (p294-295).
23 August 2023 Prigozhin’s jet flew from Moscow to St Petersburg. On board with Prigozhin were Dmitriy Utkin, Concord senior manager Valeriy Chekalov, members of Prigozhin's security detail and the flight crew. Plane crashed 20 minutes after takeoff in Tver Oblast, near the village of Kuzhenkino. The criminal investigation into the crash was classified. The International Aviation Committee was not involved in the investigation, and local investigators did not publish their findings. Authors clearly view deaths as non-accidental and ordered by Putin (p295-296).
Note that it has now become much harder to gain Information. There are many more Wagnerites who talk to journalists. But most sources prefer to talk in person and fear talking to independent outlets based abroad. Authors themselves forced he leave country, Russia has targeted even foreign journalists, such as Evan Gershkovich, - the Wall Street Journal correspondent arrested in March 2023. When he tried to investigate recruitment to Wagner in Yekaterinburg (p300-301).
See Wagner as better trained and better equipped than an army reliant on forced mobilisation. Wagner troops were better paid and more highly motivated. Wagner offered many of its participants the only viable pathway to self-realisation (p302).