Bakker, Raab and Milward (2012) ‘A Preliminary Theory of Network Resilience.’
Citation: Bakker, René M., Raab, Jörg and Milward, H. Brinton (2012) ‘A Preliminary Theory of Network Resilience,’ Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 31:1, pp. 33-62.
Time Period Covered:
Theory, Research Question, Hypothesis:
Bakker, Raab and Milward (2012:54): Seek to “understand and interpret the organizational changes dark networks undergo after massive shocks and attacks by nation states.”
Relationship to Other Research/Ideas Contested/Noted Gaps:
Bakker, Raab and Milward (2012): Identify two main approaches to the study of dark networks: “network-centric,” which attempts to explain network vulnerabilities through the study of the relationships between actors but overlooks the embeddeness of networks in a particular context; and “descriptive/historical,” which demonstrates the in-depth contextual understanding but has lacked the theoretical framework of the network-centric approach.
Concepts and Definitions:
Dark networks: Bakker, Raab and Milward (2012:33): “covert networks operating illegally, outside the boundaries of the law.”
Resilience: Bakker, Raab and Milward (2012:34): “resilience is a dynamic process, associated with systems that persist and perform their primary tasks under pressure from exogenous shocks.” Bakker, Raab and Milward (2012:35): “We operationalize dark network resilience as a latent construct that can be observed from the network’s pattern of operational activity. Operational activity refers to the extent to which a dark network is able to perform the tasks it was set up to accomplish, as demonstrated in observable activities (such as bombings, acts of sabotage, assassinations). Operational activity also refers to the operational output or ‘measurable performance’ of the dark network.”
Uncertainty: Bakker, Raab and Milward (2012:35): “the degree of information available to the network about actions of outside actors or unpredictable environmental elements that are likely to affect the network.”
Legitimacy: Bakker, Raab and Milward (2012:48): “Internal legitimacy refers to the acceptance of the dark network as an entity, including its goals and means, by its individual members. External legitimacy refers to the perception that important support groups outside the network have about the dark network as an entity, including its goals and means. If dark networks are seen as justified and appropriate, they enjoy a high level of external legitimacy among these groups.”
Method:
Bakker, Raab and Milward (2012): Coded qualitative data on African National Congress’ armed wing, the MK; FARC; and the LTTE to identify goals, strength, operational activity, command structure, incidents of shock, influential members.
Primary/Original Data:
Argument/Conclusion:
Limitations/Flaws:
Bakker, Raab and Milward (2012:57): Acknowledge several limitations: limited empirical base; difficulties of observing dark networks, which impacts assessments of operational activities; need for more complex understandings of operational activities; need for assessment of relevance to other dark networks, such as those that are purely criminal; the impacts to networks are highly case-specific; difficult to assess process by which nodes are replaced; lack of primary source data.
Abstract: A crucial contemporary policy question for governments across the globe is how to cope with international crime and terrorist networks. Many such “dark” networks — that is, networks that operate covertly and illegally — display a remarkable level of resilience when faced with shocks and attacks. Based on an in-depth study of three cases (MK, the armed wing of the African National Congress in South Africa during apartheid; FARC, the Marxist guerrilla movement in Colombia; and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, LTTE, in Sri Lanka), we present a set of propositions to outline how shocks impact dark network characteristics (resources and legitimacy) and networked capabilities (replacing actors, linkages, balancing integration and differentiation) and how these in turn affect a dark network’s resilience over time. We discuss the implications of our findings for policymakers.
Notes:
Offer a number of propositions based on their analysis of the case studies: Proposition one: “Resources have a positive effect on a dark network’s capabilities (replacing nodes and linkages and balancing integration/differentiation).” Proposition two: “Internal and external legitimacy have a positive impact on two out of three networked capabilities (replacing nodes and replacing linkages).” Proposition three: “The greater the ability of a dark network to maintain and replace nodes and linkages, the higher its level of operational activity.” Proposition four: “The better a dark network is able to balance differentiation and integration given a certain level of uncertainty, the higher its level of operational activity.” Proposition five: “Centralization moderates between a shock and the impact on network characteristics: When a network is centralized, the shock’s impact on network characteristics is likely to be larger than for decentralized networks.” Proposition five: “Network motivation moderates the relation between network characteristics (legitimacy and resources) and two out of three network capabilities (replacing nodes and replacing linkages, but not balancing integration and differentiation): For grievance-driven networks, the effect of a change in legitimacy will be stronger than for greed-driven networks, while the reverse is true for a change in resources.”