Alonso (2007) The IRA and Armed Struggle
Citation: Alonso, Rogelio (2007) The IRA and Armed Struggle, London: Routledge.
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Alonso (2007:4): âmany of the young people who joined the IRA did not have a developed political motivation based on strong ideological foundations.â
Alonso (2007:8): âMy own research into the republican movement suggests the existence of a group mentality which results in the ideological convergence of its member and their adherence to an accepted âofficial explanationâ of their conduct.â
Alonso (2007:68): Uses Irving Janisâ model of groupthink, the main elements of which are: âillusion of invulnerability which leads to group members being convinced that their behaviour is always correct; constant use of stereotyes, particularly when referring to rivals, in order to justify the position taken; group members believe in the rightness of their cause and that they are morally superior â in this way, the negative consequences of the groupâs acts can be justified as necessary; self-censorship and pressure on dissidents that could threaten the groupâs certainty and cohesion so leaders are protected from criticism and any questioning of their leadership.â
Alonso (2007:72): Speaking of one case in particular, but at the same time representing a broad theme running through the book, notes: âideology was not a main motivational factor but rather a part of the memberâs self-justifying rhetoric, which in fact was acquired after joining the group.â
Alonso (2007:85): Cites one participant: âThe republican movement was not a very analytical movement for a long time, so they never looked at the question of armed struggle. This is what they had always done. Once you have an armed struggle, thereâs people dying, it takes on a certain momentum of its own, you keep on going because you canât give up.â [In other words, there doesnât have to be a clear consideration or articulation of end goals]
Alonso (2007:91): âapparent empathy does not mitigate the suffering of the victims of violence, nor did it lead its perpetrators to stop what they were doing. In other words, cruelty is justified by an abstract idea to which individuals are subordinated.â
Alonso (2007): His discussion of the organisational structure of the IRA shows a strictly hierarchical organisation with a clear command-and-control structure, where the decisions of the leadership are paramount and unquestioned and any internal dissent is crushed. [For such a group, it may be that a social movement perspective is less useful or less applicable. But the IKâs history shows many examples of internal debate and dissent, the questioning of leadership, and the need to balance the interests of the leadership and the rank-and-file. This, logically, affects how we consider the role of ideology. Firstly, it cannot simply be imposed from above. Secondly, can it perform the same role of post-involvement group cohesion? Arguably, it is more about shared values and ideals, and negotiating these â with leadership having a primary role in the process by virtue of having greater institutional/organisational voice.]
Alonso (2007:169): âThe IRA campaign became a mere expression of protest consisting of terrorist actions that were defined as effective by those who perpetrated them, although the apparent perception of power that such attacks helped to create masked their real weakness.â
Alonso (2007:181): Talks about perceptions of Northern Ireland being âa place apartâ within the UK, with its status subject to the opinions of the people of Northern Ireland. Notes 2001 opinion poll showing 41% of those surveyed in Great Britain being in favour of a unified Ireland, and quotes a unionist MP as saying unionists were unconcerned because [paraphrased] âNorthern Ireland could only leave the United Kingdom if a majority of the population of Northern Ireland so desired, and therefore the views of the rest of the British population were irrelevantâ [this has certain parallels to the Russian view of the NC: it doesnât really matter what Russian people think, the status of the NC can only be determined by the people of the NC, and Moscow cannot unilaterally declare independence on its behalf]
Alonso (2007:184): âRepublicans have relied heavily on propaganda trying to depict the conflict as a struggle between a national liberation movement and occupying forces, studiously ignoring the pre-eminent role of internal or endogenous factors. Further, in its desire to be seen as a genuine army, the IRA used typical army terminology such as âbrigades,â âbattalions,â âcompaniesâ and âactive service unitsâ which are far from the IRAâs true state in terms of numbers and organisation. Such delusions reflect the âfantasy wayâ idea contructed by terrorist groups which allow its members to consider themselves as soldiers.â