Al-Shishani (2011) ‘The Rise and Fall of Arab Fighters in Chechnya.’
Citation: Al-Shishani, Murad Batal (2011) ‘The Rise and Fall of Arab Fighters in Chechnya,’ in Glen E. Howard, (ed.) Volatile Borderland: Russia and the North Caucasus, Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation.
Time Period Covered:
Theory, Research Question, Hypothesis:
To study and understand the phenomenon of foreign fighters in Chechnya and their impact on the Russo-Chechen conflict, identify their identity and ideology, analyze the Chechen societal reaction to them, understand what led to their involvement and elimination/decline.
Relationship to Other Research/Ideas Contested/Noted Gaps:
Concepts and Definitions:
Method:
Al-Shishani (2011): Descriptive article drawing on media reports and global jihadist ideological material. Analyzes 51 biographies of Arab volunteers in Chechnya, although it is not clear how these biographies are compiled. Compares ideology in Chechnya with global jihadist ideology but does not cite any primary sources for ideology in Chechnya. Most of the references are either to global jihadist material or to secondary sources.
Primary/Original Data:
Argument/Conclusion:
Al-Shishani (2011): Arab fighters played a major role in the dynamics of the conflict since starting arriving in 1995, becoming a major force 1997-2000. Divides them into three categories: professionals, young volunteers, young Chechens. Divides times periods: the environment from which the Arab fighters emerged (1991-1997), Arab fighters turn into a major force (not specified), the fall of the Arab fighters (2001-2006). Sees decline as being attributable to their lack of logistical support, them no longer being welcome in Chechnya, and pursuing a different agenda to the Chechen independence movement.
Limitations/Flaws:
Abstract:
Notes:
Al-Shishani (2011:265): Argues that “Arab volunteers who follow the Salafi-Jihadi philosophy have played a major role in the dynamics of the Russo-Chechen conflict since they started pouring into Chechnya in February 1995.” Became a major force 1997-2000.
Al-Shishani (2011): Notes inappropriateness of the term “Wahhabi” and places it in context of other pejorative labels Russians have used for Chechens. Also notes difficulties of discriminating between facts and Russian propaganda.
Al-Shishani (2011): Divides foreign fighters into professionals, with experience of fighting in places like Afghanistan, Bosnia and Tajikistan and accounting for the majority; young volunteers, inexperienced youths from elsewhere; and young Chechens, ethnic Chechens from other countries. Excludes young Chechens from analysis.
Al-Shishani (2011:270): Finds that 59% Saudis, 14% Yemeni, 10% Egyptian; 6% Kuwaiti; 11% elsewhere. 51% participated in Afghanistan, 11.7% started fighting in Bosnia and Tajikistan; 13.7% fighting for first time in Chechnya. “The core military leadership gained its experience in the days of the holy war in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union.”
Al-Shishani (2011): Looks at backgrounds of military, ideological leadership. Notes integration through marriage to Chechen women.
Al-Shishani (2011:271): Argues Arab fighters in Chechnya subscribed to core Salafi-Jihadi beliefs and “were more concerned with the establishment of an Islamic state than helping Chechnya escape Russian oppression.” Notes fighting seen as only means of political transformation.
Al-Shishani (2011): Notes Al-Zawahiri’s vision of Chechen and Afghan wars as “buckle” and “tongue” of an “Islamic Jihadi Belt” stretching through Russia to Pakistan and Kashmir, Iran, Turkey, and Central Asia.
Al-Shishani (2011:277): “The first war from 1994 to 1996 was primarily characterized as a nationalist uprising, with Islam merely playing a subsidiary mobilizing role. Indeed, Arab fighters only had a marginal role in the outcome of this war.” Influence grew after the war. Destruction of economy “paved the way for external influences in Chechen politics and gave rise to the Arab fighters’ Salafi-Jihadi ideology, which attracted frustrated young men.”
Al-Shishani (2011:278): Yandarbiyev declared Chechnya an Islamic state with Shariah courts upon succeeding Dudayev. Arab organizations and fighters played a major role due to Russia’s failure to adhere to agreements and rebuild Chechnya. 1994-1996 and post-1996, Arab fighters and organizations came to Chechnya. “These organizations and the Arab fighters that streamed into Chechnya at this time played big role [sic] in Chechnya in the face of Russia’s reneging of its promises and agreements.”. Particularly true regarding Khasavyurt Accords.
Al-Shishani (2011:284-285): “The ascent of the Arab fighters in Chechnya carried the seeds of their demise as well. The attempts to Islamize the Chechen state prior to the second war deepened the divisions in Chechen society. In addition to that, the brutal Russian tactics in the second war and the attacks of September 11, 2001 played a role in accelerating the decline of this phenomenon in Chechnya. The demise of the Arab fighters’ role in Chechnya was ultimately the result of the following causes: the division in society, cessation of funding for Islamic groups, Russia’s liquidation of Chechen military leaders, and the differences in the agendas of the Arab fighters and of the leaders of the independence movement.”
Al-Shishani (2011:285): Sees Arab fighters phenomenon as being in decline 2001-2006. “The demise of the Arab fighters’ role in Chechnya was ultimately the result of the following causes: the division in society, cessation of funding for Islamic groups, Russia’s liquidation of Chechen military leaders, and the differences in the agendas of the Arab fighters and of the leaders of the independence movement.” Sees Salafi ideology as being at odds with Sufi traditions, causing a decline in respect for the Arab fighters. Funding restricted by post-9/11 measures to restrict the funding of extremist groups worldwide.
Al-Shishani (2011:285): Argues that esteem of foreign fighters declined as Sufis viewed ideology as an attempt to impose “strict and foreign patterns of Islam.” As a result, many Sufis, including people like Akhmad Kadyrov, switched to the federal side.
Al-Shishani (2011:286): Views international efforts post-9/11 to close funds to radical Islamic groups as resulting in a lack of funding for Arab fighters in Chechnya, which both restricted the latter’s ability to fight and denied it “the legitimizing factor behind the movement’s presence in Chechnya.”
Al-Shishani (2011): Notes Russia closed its borders, preventing foreign fighters from joining.
Al-Shishani (2011:286): “The lack of funds posed a threat to the activities of Arab fighters in Chechnya and Salafi-Jihadist ideology for two major reasons: 1) It threatened the movement’s ability to continue fighting, and 2) those funds were the legitimizing factor behind the movement’s presence in Chechnya.”