Akhmadov and Lanskoy (2010)

Akhmadov and Lanskoy (2010), The Chechen Struggle: Independence Won and Lost.

Citation: Akhmadov, Ilyas and Lanskoy, Miriam (2010) The Chechen Struggle: Independence Won and Lost, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

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First-hand narration of events.

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Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010): Chechens lacked ideological cohesion and a well-developed nationalism. Dudayev dealt with a much more uniform population, whereas Maskhadov had to deal with a tired and traumatized population. Claims criticisms that West failed to offer support have some validity. Chechens are exhausted and the proclamation of the Emirate is a mistake that benefits Kadyrov.

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Notes:

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:1): Describes himself as a “nationalist who favored independence and supported General Dzhokhar Dudayev.”

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:3): “Politics involved only a small sliver of the population of one million; most people did not understand why a particular shoot-out had occurred or why the supporters of one politician or another were rallying in front of the presidential palace.” Describes that as changing with outbreak of first war.

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:8-10): Divides opposition against Dudayev into three groups: one headed by Umar Avtorkhanov, who in August 1994 sent a telegram to Yeltsin on behalf of the Provisional Council, calling on Russia to intervene militarily, and who led the Marsho party; a group of criminals surrounding Ruslan Labazanov; and former Dudayev associates arround Beslan Gantemirov. There was also party opposition in the form of Marsho and Daymohk, led by Lecha Umkhayev. Geographically, opposition was focused on Tolstoy-Yurt (Avtorkhanov?), Gekhi (Gantemirov) and Argun (Labazanov).

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:67): Views the Khasavyurt Accords as having “ended hostilities by postponing all the difficult questions and without establishing clear processes for resolving them.”

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:78): “As President, Maskhadov wanted to maintain unity, which meant including the opposition, the minority who lost the elections.” Maskhadov made concessions to their platforms and “expected that they would make similar compromises and the experience of doing so would teach even the radicals to become responsible. Instead, because they did not make similar compromises, his compromises became one-sided concessions and every concession Maskhadov made emboldened them to become increasingly more brazen and rebellious.”

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:80): Claims post-war position in Chechnya, including job opportunities, became linked to role in war, thereby disenfranchising the majority of the population who were not directly involved. Senior positions in government and administration had to be approved by a troika, usually consisting of a former fighter and a religious authority, and focused on candidates’ religiosity.

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:85-87): Berezovskiy supported campaigns of Movladi Udugov and Akhmed Zakayev in presidential elections.

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:98): Describes the issue of demobilisation, particularly of mid-level commanders of 50-60 men who were not important enough to gain government appointments but did not want to subordinate themselves to other commanders, as a major issue. “If you were a mid-level commander, how could you disband your unit? If you disbanded your unit, you would be just another man unable to find his place in this new reality.” Such units had four primary means of supporting themselves: personal security provision, seizing and stripping facilities, acting as a mediator and debt-collector, or hostage-taking. Describes unemployment as being around 70% throughout inter-war period.

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:99): “Ironically, Maskhadov facilitated the emergence of the commanders as a political entity. In 1997 he started to convene the council of commanders, which included those who had served during the war but were not currently in government positions, clearly an extra-constitutional body. He convened this body to discuss current problems and essentially ratify government decisions. Maskhadov unwittingly created a parallel structure that laid the groundwork for the dual government that emerged later.”

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:99-100): Sees Maskhadov as repeatedly conceding authority in his efforts to involve groups in new system. Compares it to Soviet government responses to democratic and nationalist movements in the 1980s. Maskhadov “could see that certain ideas were becoming popular among some active segments of the population and he tried to win them over by implementing portions of their program. He created the council of commanders, he brought radicals into government, and he eventually proclaimed sharia law. He did these things reluctantly. He did not believe that they were best for the country, but he made compromises with political and ideological opponents because he sought unity.”

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:101-102): Sees hostage trade as stemming from Russian position that it was not at war, and therefore captured Chechens were criminals and captured Russians were hostages. Russian army seized hostages, which could only be released through payment of ransom or exchange. Explicitly rejects notion of historical or cultural reason for hostage taking, or that the FSB deliberately created the hostage-taking trade.

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:106-107): Claims media helped create “brand names” in the hostage-taking industry, so that hostage-takers such as Arbi Barayev would use someone’s name for a higher ransom, and that person would release a video statement in return for a cut but have no other involvement.

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:117-118): Rejects idea that execution of four Grainger Telecom workers was linked to Movladi Udugov, who had a monopoly on the cell phone business in the republic, or to efforts to discredit Maskhadov’s international image. Instead, views it as a form of costly signalling as Barayev sought to protect his image amid competition from the Melkhi, who had kidnapped three of his people.

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:121-122): Claims Maskhadov repeatedly demonstrated that he had popular support and that the invasion of Dagestan was by a group that had lost the internal power struggle and was trying to revive its political fortunes.

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:152-153): claims that Kebedov returned from the Congress of the Nations of Ichkeria and Dagestan to his home in Tsumadinskiy Rayon without informing Basayev; upon his return, he was surrounded and besieged by local police; this changed the intended flow of events because, as Basayev’s deputy, Basayev felt compelled to defend him, leading to the invasion of Dagestan. Claims the Congress had planned operations, but their precise manifestation was a response to events. “One had to be deaf, dumb, and blind not to know that the incursions were coming. There was, for instance, the famous parade in Serzhen Yurt with all the alumni of Khattab’s school. They carried black banners with Islamic writing led by Khattab, Shamil, Udugov, and his brother Isa Umarov, all of them in uniform.” Russian border posts removed before invasion.

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:153): “I doubt very much that Shamil had entered into an agreement with the Kremlin, nor do I think an explicit agreement was necessary. The Russians didn’t need to do anything to make this incursion happen; they just need to pay attention and make the most of the opportunity that Shamil himself was creating.”

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:209): Regarded the shift in language from colonel and division to mujahideen and jama’at as “not merely a change in terminology; there was also a creeping change in the mentality of the Chechen resistance.”

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:205): Views Basayev as taking responsibility for Nord Ost after the fact in order to discredit Maskhadov and undermine pro-Western groups.

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:208-210): Views Nord Ost as closing off any political avenues in the West.

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:231): Maskhadov represented the final obstacle to Chechenisation, a legitimate symbol of the resistance; his death was thus necessary to complete the process.

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:231): “we don’t have a great deal of information to evaluate what he intended to do and we don’t know how he would have performed once he had obtained more experience. I formed my sense of him and his philosophy on the basis of just five or six statements that he made in the first few months in office. It’s clear that he made substantial departures from Dudayev and Maskhadov. He spoke in a more religious style and Islam became more prominent in his public pronouncements. He also belittled the idea of pursuing a political solution, he declared that the only means against Russia was war, and it was never clear what the ultimate goal of that war would be.” Describes the idea of “fronts” across Russia as “bizarre” and as “breaking a fundamental tenet of both Dudayev and Maskhaov with this statement. Our goal was to drive the Russian army out of Chechnya and acquire independence. And that’s it. There were no other goals.”

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:232): Sadulayev conducted two government reshuffles, including appointing Basayev as Prime Minister, which Akhmadov portrays as a huge error that condemned the government to “pariah status.”

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:233): Also sees continuity in Sadulayev’s actions, with him maintaining a parliament and government. Agrees with those who view Sadulayev as laying the groundwork for the IK, and that he was killed before he had the chance. Also sees Basayev as an obstacle to abandoning the goal of an independent Chechnya.

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:235): “I knew all the main Chechen leaders, but even so, there are many things about which I can only speculate, and I don’t completely understand. At the same time, there were many situations where the underlying processes, ambitions, and motivations turned out to be simpler and more cynical than they seemed at first. There isn’t a logical or predictable process that can be reduced to a set of factors, and what is happening today certainly isn’t just a manifestation of international forces and competitions.”

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:237): “When I listen again to Maskhadov’s audiotapes to me, I understand that there had to be a degree of duality; that he had to find a common language with different segments of the resistance.”

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:237): “Maskhadov was President of a different Chechnya [to Dudayev]: he inherited a traumatize population, field commanders who demanded to share political power, and a different level of bitterness and hostility between Russia and Chechnya. Dudayev used religion selectively and instrumentally and he always kept it subordinate to his political goals. Maskhadov had to contend with radicals, who were a minority, but an increasingly active minority.”

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:237): “Abdul-Khalim Saidullayev and others who came after Maskhadov, sought to focus the Chechen struggle on religion rather than on statehood. They identified religion as the primary issue. Their argument was easy to make, ‘The West did nothing for us. Maskhadov and his various ministers who exalted western institutions were simply distracting people from the real struggle.’ It was understandable that this resonated with some Chechens, who were very isolated and have seen so little of the West.” Sees truth in the argument that the West failed to act in accordance with the stated principles of its own organisations, but also sees Chechnya as contributing to Western disillusionment.

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:241): “The North Caucasus today is not home to ‘separatist’ movements. The North Caucasus republics are colonial territories engaged in national liberation struggles. However, over the last few years the insurgencies have become explicitly Islamic. What drove people to this is not Islamic education or emissaries from the Arab world but the state failure, anarchy, violence, and the hopelessness that reigns in the North Caucasus.”

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:241-242): Argues that people join the insurgency outside Chechnya for “very local and personal situations,” whereas Chechens in the 1990s were motivated by national independence. Views Islam as the only common denominator among the North Caucasian peoples.

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:242): “The new resistance movements in the North Caucasus have developed in a different context, where there is no political space to debate openly, they can’t safely promulgate political platforms, they have not proclaimed independence, and the only apparent common denominator among these groups seems to be Islam. At the same time we can’t judge the depth of the religiosity. Is it more than a sign of protest? The dzhamaats, community of beliers, are the only alternative to the prevailing chaos and injustice. The dzhamaats offer people stability, social cohesion, and protection from a dysfunctional and predatory state.”

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:242): Notes Saidullayev pursued contradictory policies, not abandoning Maskhadov’s nor building on them. Umarov described as experienced in combat but not in politics.

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:244): Claims that it was clear when the Emirate was proclaimed that “this concept was not well considered and had no coherent ideological foundation.” Offers as reasons for its declaration: the insurgency had reached a dead end; the West offered no support; and there was no hope for a negotiated solution.

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:244): Suggests Emirate’s proclamation was written by Udugov. “The ‘concept’ was a foreign innovation being grafted in an artificial way onto the Chechen resistance. There was no internal consistency.” Claims Umarov lacked legitimacy, but both radicals and moderates seek to portray themselves as the heirs to Dudayev, Maskhadov and Sadulayev.

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:245): “I can accept that a new generation of fighters can develop the ideology of the resistance, but I don’t believe that the concept that Doku Umarov read on that video came from within the ranks of his own men, and I don’t see the benefit in promulgating undeveloped views, particularly in such a primitive form.”

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:245): Describes proclamation as a mistake that split resistance into “two rival camps that don’t recognize each other” and allowed Ramzan Kadyrov to position himself as the guardian of Chechen tradition, instead of revealing him to be fully dependent on the Kremlin and trampling on those traditions.

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:246): Chechens “accept the formula that causes them the least amount of physical harm, but under a different set of circumstances the spring will uncoil with greater force.”

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:246): “Doku Umarov is the leader of the armed resistance; the locomotive of the conflict.”

Akhmadov (with Lanskoy, 2010:247): “Kadyrov provides a modicum of stability, security, and prosperity. This will only satisfy people for a short period. After basic needs are met, the Chechens will seek to control their own affairs again; they will seek justice, and as many times in their history, they will seek independence. The dream of an independent Chechen state has merely been deferred.”