Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013)

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013) Chechnya’s Secret Wartime Diplomacy.

Citation: Akhmadov, Ilyas and Daniloff, Nicholas (2013) Chechnya’s Secret Wartime Diplomacy: Aslan Maskhadov and the Quest for a Peaceful Resolution, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013): Book consists of audio letters between Maskhadov and Akhmadov, sent via courier and post. 60% in Chechen, 40% in Russian. Akhmadov translated into Russian, then whole translated into English and shortened. Shortening removed some repetition (because of concerns cassettes not received) and verbal interjections. Material relating to Chechens wanted by Russia for treason cut. Details of internal problems also cut. Complete audio to be made available after 15 years.

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Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:vii): Note observes that “the Russo-Chechen wars have been studied mostly through the day of the Russian government, recollections of Russian officers, and reports from Russian and Western journalists. To date, little has come out that reflects the thinking and goals within the Chechen political leadership.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:2): Akhmadov accuses Russia of “working in the old Soviet way of encouraging revolutionary uprisings in the banana republics of Africa. They did not have any other political experience. Their idea was either to buy off Dudayev or overthrow him.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:3): Maskhadov received 59.3% of votes in presidential elections.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:3-4): “Maskhadov soon became the object of internal criticism. Not that there were stable opposition forces; rather, groups would come together then dissolve. So Maskhadov was put in the position of defending himself against both internal and external opposition rather than agreeing with the Russians on the issue of reconstruction. In this situation, he took the view that he should adhere strictly to the agreements with the Russians in the hope that it would yield some results. As time went on, it became clear that Moscow was largely interested in revenge; they were not interested in defining the status of Chechnya by 2001.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:4): Accuses Russian security services of destabilising the situation in Chechnya, involvement in the apartment bombings.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:4): Akhmadov named foreign minister several weeks before the Second War and was sent abroad to seek support and advice. Unable to use satellite phones because of what happened to Dudayev, exchanged 24 audio letters by courier between 1999 and 2003.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:4-5): Describes the communication system: “Maskhadov organized a broad courier and intelligence-gathering service. A large number of the couriers were women because they were subject to less scrutiny at border posts than men. The courier would first have to get out of the war zone, generally to Baku, Azerbaijan, with the cassettes. There the messenger could resend the cassettes through various postal services like DHL. Occasionally, the courier would have to go further afield to Istanbul where conditions were much more favorable. “There were instances when couriers were arrested and the cassettes confiscated. The courier would often have to wait for weeks for a window to open. He would have to wait for Russian control to weaken and then he would have to figure how to go from point A to point B. It depended on a lot of factors. Naturally this caused problems when you needed a quick answer to your message, or you needed to transmit a speedy message to Maskhadov, or you were about to have a meeting and you needed some instructions from him.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:5): Akhmadov based in Baku, shuttling between there, United States and Europe.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:5): Maskhadov understood the problems with the communication system “perfectly well and he had to speak in oblique ways sometimes in case the cassette fell into the wrong hands.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:6): Lyoma Usmanov acted as unofficial representative in Washington and helped assist Akhmadov’s visits and talks. Trips financed by Chechen businessmen, not by Maskhadov.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:9): Letter One, 21-22 July 2000. Maskhadov calls “uncertainty in relations between Russia and Chechnya” the cause of war, as well as the “need to bring the right man to power,” and dismisses kidnapping for ransom and the invasion of Dagestan as causes. Accuses Russia of being involved in human trafficking in the first war.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:10): Maskhadov claims that all the kidnappings of high-ranking officers, politicians and journalists were arranged by Adam Deniyev and the Saidov brothers, and the brothers were shot and their accomplices arrested. Accuses Moscow of protecting Deniyev. [An endnote claims Deniyev was identified as an FSB agent and co-chairman of the Party of Islamic Resistance, responsible for killing of six Red Cross workers in 1996].

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:10-11): Also accuses Akhmad Kadyrov of leading kidnapping of people in Ingushetia and Dagestan, describes him as “Moscow’s henchman. National traitor. A puppet. An agent of the FSB since 1982 under the codename Adam.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:11): Attributes second war to “collusion with the Kremlin, the financial oligarchy, and the military” designed to bring either Lebed or Putin to power. Putin chosen and needed an extended war.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:11): Notes lack of evidence of Chechen involvement in the apartment bombings, need for independent hearing.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:12): on the issue of Sharia and the Wahhabis, Maskhadov claims that “I would have come to terms with the young people, and I almost did it. But I was constantly reproached that this sleazebag [Kadyrov] was near me.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:12): “We have strongly rejected any Wahhabism, fundamentalism, extremism. We have always said that traditional Islam is moderate Islam that rejects Wahhabism, fundamentalism, extremism.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:12): Says he wanted to prevent civil war among the Chechens and “the war was inevitable, whether I condemned them [Basayev, Udugov, Yandarbiyev and Khattab] or I didn’t condemn them. […] if I started gangland-style shoot-outs among us, that would mean a split. Again a defeat for us, and victory for Russia.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:13): Notes signing of Peace Treaty on 12 May 1997 and claims that on 30 August 1997 he tried everything to secure a comprehensive agreement, offering major concessions, including common economic and military space, common diplomatic obligations. However, he alleges “those hawks that surrounded Yeltsin prevented the signing.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:13): Claims that “the Russian generals have lost this war” but can’t admit they can’t control Chechen territory.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:13-15): Talks of the success of suicide attacks.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:17): Claims he approached Basayev and asked him to join with Maskhadov, “but as long as Umarov, Udugov, and Yandarbiyev are alive, they won’t let him subordinate himself to my authority and it’ll be very hard for him.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:18): Akhmadov, in his commentary on the first letter, highlights as important lessons that it revealed the depth of the troubles with radical commanders; his negative assessment of the capabilities of the Russian armed forces; his belief that the political and military elite had sponsored the war to secure Putin’s election; his negative assessment of Putin as a mediocrity; and his desire for a peaceful negotiated settlement.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:19): Letter Two, 5 October 2000: Lays out communication difficulties, which involve sending a message to Akhmadov once a week via Dagestan or Ossetia to Baku, and Akhmadov similarly sending a weekly message back. Asks Akhmadov to officially recall all the “so-called Maskhadov freelance representatives” and centralise foreign policy decision making through Akhmadov’s ministry.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:20): Accuses people of provoking the second war and then running away at the start of it, claiming to be his representatives, and “now, they organize the same provocations they did here, spreading lies and making themselves ridiculous in front of the people who live there.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:20): Displays optimism over public support for the resistance, claims there are fighter units in every settlement.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:20-21): Welcomed potential recognition from the Taliban, describing it as “simply moral support of the Chechen people,” and expressing hope other Muslim states would follow suit. However, adds: “But we have our own conception about building a state. Talk in that vein. Do not cut off the conversation abruptly, don’t say that we do not need any relations with them. It should be handled in a very restrained way.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:21): Describes Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe as “a very powerful tool for us with which to pressure Russia,” talks of importance of sending a “good man” there.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:21): Claims night-time control of Groznyy and that the Russians are entrenched in Gudermes out of despair.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:23): Denigrates Kadyrov: “even the Russians have completely given him up as a bad job. And here even children have contempt for him as doomed for shame by God. Has there ever been such a dirty creature as this one in the course of 3,000 years since the Chechen people have lived in their homeland.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:23): Views Aslakhanov’s election to State Duma as Kremlin appointment, claims not even 5% voted for him.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:23-24): Says he met with Basayev and Khattab, expressed displeasure at the way they fought and that they could do more.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:24): Describes it as a guerrilla war using tactics designed to wear down the enemy. Views contact with the Russian military and government as OK, but requires “ironclad” guarantees provided by either foreign government or international group for any agreements.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:24): “today the situation is like this: the Russian generals understand that the war is lost, it is useless to use force! The army is demoralized, the army has stalled, the army is decaying, the soldiers don’t want to fight. These contract soldiers – they’ve gotten completely out of hand and are looting, making money. Making money. And if they’re making money, it means that they set the Chechen people against themselves. “We are in a stalemate situation, when the Russian military understood that it is time to get out of Chechnya.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:25): Views Putin as “history,” “afraid of stopping the war,” and “a short-sighted politician, not the most politically literate. To my mind, he is uneducated.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:25): “we have the human rights groups, general public, all these judicial international organizations, through them they constantly bother both Western states and Russia. We shouldn’t abandon them, saying that we have already worked with them; we should constantly provide them with new facts, and reasons for pressure, pressure, pressure. We must be very active in this respect.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:26): Speaks of the need to bring order to the Istanbul office and the importance of the money coming from there.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:26): In his commentary, Akhmadov views Maskhadov as a product of his times and Soviet upbringing, inclined to “see ‘the long arms’ of the CIA capable of taking many covert, subversive actions and getting away with them.” Claims Maskhadov “did not have a clear understanding of how Western governments worked in practice.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:31): Letter Three, 7 November 2000: “We should never assume that there is space left in big politics for such a small nation as the Chechens. All the places have already been divided among the big states. All these human rights organizations, international organizations are the same instruments for conducting the politics of the governments of big states. And nothing else.” Accuses such organizations of abandoning Chechnya in return for the slightest concessions and engaged in blackmail, first of one side, then the other [contrast with 2013:25]

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:31-32): Accuses Russia of using the threat of Islamic extremism to blackmail other countries as a means of limiting NATO’s eastward expansion, argues: “it is advantageous for Russia to keep this hotbed of tension going. So, if the Chechens haven’t been finally smashed, this is a threat against everyone.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:32): Talks of need to “show there is really a war going on, a real war. To show that hundreds of Russian soldiers, officers, members of police force die daily. But again, today there’s a total information blockade.” Claimed it is only possible to make two or three calls from phones before the Russians identify them and shut them down.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:32): Says it is very important to work out what the US wants if they are to pin hopes on it.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:33): Claims threat of Islamic extremism has worked well to secure support for Russia in Muslim world, Turkey, and these countries “are already turning their backs [on Chechnya].”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:33-34): Unable to retain services of Francis A. Boyle, a specialist in international law who was prepared to give legal advice, notes Russian pressure on finances, urgent need for money.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:34): Describes Russian army as “on its last legs. It is exhausted and it is 100 percent clear.” Gantamirov’s forces dismissed as only interested in extorting money.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:35): Everyone on Russian side, from generals to Chechen police, depicted as interested in extracting money: “this drunken, hungry gang jump all over our miserable people; they are literally skinning them alive.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:36): “And our ‘great military leaders,’ Gelayev, for example, to my mind I absolutely don’t conceal it, not without prompting from Moscow, he is conducting such tactics so as to divert at least one soldier from the war. So what is he up to now? So far he has said that he’s organizing a ‘training unit’ for young conscripts, he led the fighters in circles around woods for two or three months not letting them take a single shot. And now he says, we’ll move to Georgia, we will improve our health, conduct combat training, and then we’ll come back and will fight in spring.” Views this as pulling resources away from conflict, undertaking provocative actions that “set the Georgian authorities against us.” Opines “they are working in agreement with the Russians, and today isn’t the first time!”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:36): Accuses Basayev of dragging his feet over proposal to attack Groznyy. “Sometimes if they run into the Russians, they go into action, but they don’t get involved in any active offensives. I don’t know why.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:37): Describes Taliban recognition as “purely moral support.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:37): Endnote describes Isa Umarov as a step-brother of Udugov.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:38): Remarks on complete absence of negotiations: “So far, we don’t have any contact with the Russians. So far, it’s absolutely out of the question. I don’t know why, but if they used to mention it casually, a possibility of negotiations, for the moment there’s absolute silence.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:38): “Sergey Kovalev said: ‘Chechens jump at tanks like cats; they are brave, desperate, but they lack civic courage. They always fear the people might think that they’re bad Muslims or bad patriots. That is really true. For example, if you seat a so-called field commander and ask him: ‘Well, if the Russians stopped this war, and we had to establish some relations with them, and some legal basis should be found, what do you think about it?’ Everyone would raise the standard to the maximum, although one-to-one with you, he could say this: ‘Yes, here we could make a concession, and here this or that could be done.’ But when everyone is around he will do his best to look most radical, most of all concerned, most of all patriotic, most of all Muslim.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:39): Akhmadov comment: “President Maskhadov had enough experience to know that wars need to end at the negotiation table. His view was that a bad peace was better than a good war. Despite the indifference of the West, lack of interest of the Russians and the terrible human rights abuses they were committing, he stood firmly for negotiations. This caused him serious problems with his internal opponents like Shamil Basayev, Movladi Udugov, and Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev. They were opposed to peace negotiations with the Russians, saying talks were only a distraction from their aim of creating an Islamic state.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:40): “By their brutality, they [Russia] were radicalizing the Chechens, they were wounding possible talking partners, and pushing the situation into a dead end. The eventual killing of Maskhadov in 2005 would spell the end of our wing of peaceseekers. The Russians got, in return, die-hard opponents who were willing to meet terror with terror.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:40): Claims Russia doesn’t understand situation in the North Caucasus and now have “ironically turned themselves into dependents of the pro-Russian Chechens they eventually put into power.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:41): “We have often been accused of receiving financing from al-Qaeda for the war. The Russians, particularly, tried to exploit every opportunity to make it seem we were pawns of al-Qaeda or the Taliban in Afghanistan. It is possible that some Chechen radicals did receive some monies from them, but I had no knowledge of such deals if they existed. Listening to Maskhadov’s audio letters it is clear he was hard pressed for money.” Says representatives did collect money and support communities existed in Turkey, but effort were sporadic and financing through Qatar and the UAE were shut down by US efforts.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:43): Letter Four, 11 November 2000: Instructed Akhmadov to make statements in name of president, get message to Western media now he was deprived of opportunity to do so.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:43-44): Discusses redeployment of Russian forces from Itum-Kale, Shatoy to Nozhay-Yurt and from Vedenskiy to Tsentoroy, Belgatoy, Dargo, Benoy. Also mop-up operations by kontraktniki in lowland areas.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:44): Describes Gelayev’s redeployment from Itum-Kalinskiy and Shatoyevskiy Rayons to Chemulga as “treacherous,” allowing Russian units to concentrate elsewhere.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:45): Also accuses Gelayev of transferring 200-300 fighters to Georgia “by deception,” claiming: “the way I see it, it was coordinated with the Russians. To transfer one fighter of ours there from this country is to weaken our positions here. And, accordingly, to raise the level of crime there [in Georgia] and make them a problem for the Georgian authorities and spoil our relations with Georgia.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:45): Accuses Basayev of inactivity, and both Basayev and Gelayev of trying to “drag this war out by any means” and wear Russia down through attrition. Disagreed with the approach, saying it hindered efforts at negotiations.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:46): Described Taliban recognition as coming at “the most unsuitable moment for us…maybe it would seem worth waiting…at this time, it is playing into the Russians’ hands.” Russia portrayed as seeking to show Chechens receive financing and weapons. Accused Basayev and Yandarbiyev of using his position to claim Maskhadov and Akhmadov rejecting Muslim recognition and thereby encourage disobedience.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:46): “Every nation has a right to self-determination. Afghanistan was the first to recognize us because it experienced the same thing itself – what the Russian army is like! It’s moral support for us. We have no bases in Afghanistan, no armaments, we don’t need their help. We can cope by ourselves.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:46): “There were doubts regarding this Gelayev even before the first war began and it was still a civil war.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:47): Talked of having replaced “all these Murdashevs, Atgeriyevs, Batalovs, Arsayevs, Sultanovs, Gelayevs” with new reinforcements and commanders.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:47): “And these two comrades, Umarov and Udugov, they studied all of Basayev’s ailments and by sprinkling salt on his sore spots, they drove this man into a stupor. But in the long run, they are playing into the hands of the Russians, they are actively working for the enemy.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:51-52): Akhmadov comment: “Gelayev’s entry into Georgia was not approved by Maskhadov. He felt that it was a provocative move and possibly Gelayev, himself, did not fully understand the possibly consequences. Gelayev’s presence with his fighters in Georgia could give the Russians an excuse to invade, and undertake actions to undermine Georgian independence. He also felt that the presence of the Chechens could turn the Georgians against the Chechens. “I understood Maskhadov’s concern because it was a serious error when a commander of Gelayev’s rank independently and without authorization enters a neutral country which was important to us and for the several thousand of our refugees there. Maskhadov subsequently issued a decree depriving Gelayev of his rank and his decorations, branding him a deserter.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:52) Akhmadov says he met Gelayev in Georgia, and that the latter insisted that he would return. Gelayev said his men were out of touch with other units, driven towards Georgia by clashes, and suffering from hunger. Gelayev stayed until 2002.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:53) Akhmadov notes he was caught by surprise when he was asked about Taliban recognition, and angry with Maskhadov when he spoke with him because Akhmadov “considered this recognition was stupid, even destructive.” Claims Maskhadov’s critics interpreted Akhmadov’s response to recognition to be “cold and dismissive.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:55): Letter Five, 4 December 2000: Expressed scepticism that the UN, OSCE, PACE, US or the West in general would help Chechnya. “they can use Chechnya as a tool to blackmail Russia, put pressure on it, with the aim of pulling off their own interests. Nothing more than that. Either Russia makes concessions, or in case of a totally negative reaction they [the United States and West] all shut up, especially when Russia makes a concession.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:55): Depicts human rights organizations as only capable of making noise and lacking in influence.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:56): “We should expect the worst: that we are a small nation, our state has not been recognized, we were presented to the world as barbarians, terrorists. We contributed to that impression.” Claims no country is interested in worsening relations with Russia.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:56): Describes the Russian army as “not an army but a hungry horde. Literally, like prisoners released on probation.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:57): “our hope is that this army of theirs is decaying. There are inside contradictions, inside disagreements. They don’t obey each other. They have no control over each other. There is corruption, the generals with Kadyrov sell trainloads of oil.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:58): “You should get into your head one thing, that the previous war and the current war are absolutely different. In the first war we had a stable rear. But now we have no rear. No rear. It has turned totally into a guerrilla war. Russians are everywhere and we are everywhere.” Claimed it was consequently impossible to keep prisoners.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:59): Again describes Gelayev as a “stooge”. “Three tasks have been accomplished: Their soldiers dispatched away from here. A reason was created to implement a visa system between Russia and Georgia. And, accordingly, raise the level of gangsterism and crime in Georgia. And the person managing this is our famous commander. He sold himself ‘together with his pants’ [a Chechen expression meaning ’sold himself lock, stock, and barrel].”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:60): Calls on Akhmadov and Zakayev to go to Pankisi and persuade the fighters to leave Gelayev.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:60): Complains of lack of money from Turkey.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:65): Letter Six, 18 December 2000: Calls for OSCE to visit so that accompanying journalists can “make public the brutality that the Russians engage in.” However, acknowledges “there’s a danger that the Russians can carry out some provocation against them by finding some fool from our ranks.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:66-67): Accuses Russia of staging provocations and blaming them on the Chechens. Argues that his forces have “complete control, interaction, discipline that is getting better every day,” and that they enjoy popular support. By contrast, “For them [the public] everything that is Russian is barbarism. Everyone who serves Russia, who are led by the nose by Russia, are considered scum. They curse this Kadyrov.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:68): Views Putin as vulnerable to international pressure and afraid of sanctions. Expresses hope at Bush’s election, claims Russia would have preferred Gore.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:69): “Now you’re saying that, we shouldn’t tell anything to Gelayev [a footnote says Akhmadov requested Maskhadov not punish Gelayev to harshly for fear of driving a wedge between him and radical commanders]. He, so to speak, says he respects the chain of command. But what he has done, he’s done! What else worse than that can he do? That’s it, he’s fulfilled his mission! He gave away Grozny. He turned 600-800 of our most desperate fighters into corpses in the village of Saadi-Kotar.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:69-70): “Because of these groups that he transferred to Georgia, the Russians definitely have a pretext they have been looking for. The fact that they [the groups] got over there, then, the fact that it became possible to withdraw from here, Chechenya, completely exposed the south-eastern front. Due to this, it became possible to transfer Shamanov’s army from there [from the south-western sector] to Nojay-Yurt.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:70): Claims they have “more than enough fighters.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:71): Calls on Akhmadov to go to Georgia and call on the government to be united against Russia, and the Chechen troops not to violate local laws or cause problems.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:75): Letter Seven, 24 December 2000: Again talks of Russian army being out of control, and general understanding “that they failed to achieve any result.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:78): “Don’t meet with Gelayev any more, don’t get close to him. You may say something like this: President Maskhadov issued an order by which he ousted him from the position of the commander of the western front, deprived him of the rank of division general and deprived him of the right to defend the Motherland.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:80): Tells Akhmadov he should persuade US that Putin is taking Russia back to the Soviet Union and it should impose economic sanctions.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:82): “Udugov could improve our information work, but he’s working for the Russians. Everything that he does, he does against us – openly, with enmity.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:83): Akhmadov comment: Notes original of letter 20 pages long.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:87-88): Letter Eight, 18 January 2001: Talks about concentration of federal forces and how mobility allows Chechen units to escape. Describes Russia of pursuing divide and rule policy within villages by establishing garrisons and local militias.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:89-90): Speaks about abduction of Dr Kenneth Gluck, head of Doctors Without Borders’ North Caucasus operation, calls on Akhmadov to make statements denying his involvement in it, claims that Dr Gluck had appeared in a British documentary and therefore might his abduction might have been stages as with Babitsky to secure a “complete information blackout.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:92): Again accuses Gelayev of working with the Russians to cause a provocation in Georgia. Forbids Akhmadov to meet with him.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:95-96): Akhmadov notes strange resolution of Dr Gluck case, who was freed after 26 days by the FSB, who found him in Nazran. “Many observers and newspapers judged that only the Russian special services could have grabbed Gluck in the first place, possibly using some local Chechens as technical help, and then released him.” Basayev claimed responsibility and apologised later, but Akhmadov claims that in conversations with Dr Gluck, the latter said he did not understand Basayev’s statement and believed he was held by pro-Russian Chechens.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:97): Letter Nine, 8 February 2001: Reiterates the need to keep foreign organisations like PACE informed of situation in Chechnya.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:99): Speaks about problems in the Istanbul office. “I am afraid that if these financial contributions come abruptly to an end, then the Khattabs and the Udugovs will get them through their own channels. Even today they are actively throwing money around here and are preparing a great evil even if the Russians get out of here.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:100): Claims his presence is a hindrance to Russia. “They would provide me with gold and an airplane and would not interfere with my departure to any country, but the fact that I remain stay here is disastrous to them. They would prefer to have a thousand Khattabs and as many mujahedeen standing behind him, if only I and those like me would leave.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:100-101): Criticises those who fled to Baku, arguing: “They are not needed there and they have nothing to do there, and they do nothing but spread gossip. If they had real courage, they would get back here one by one.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:103): Akhmadov comment: suggests Russia offered Malaysia, where Aslan’s son was living, as a destination.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:105): Letter Ten, 24 April 2001: Described Akhmadov meeting with State Department as “a bitter pill for our enemies to swallow. If this is a loss for them, then it’s a victory for us, God willing.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:106): On Basayev, Udugov, Umarov: “They do things – how should I put it? – sort of super naively, like kids, pretending that they don’t understand, and thus finally doing what the Russians want them to do. I have no doubts that they do it after consulting the Russians.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:106): Claims Basayev sent Gelayev a cassette, calling on him to return home under Basayev’s command because the legitimacy of the presidency ended in 1998.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:109-110): Upset at Human Rights Watch accusations of human rights violations. Accuses Russians of organizing VBIED attacks to discredit resistance. Calls on Akhmadov to respond.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:110-111): Claims to have sent envoys to Putin calling for an end to the war, claims Putin admits war should be stopped but said “negotiations are death for me.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:111): Claims he told Basayev and Gelayev that he was supposed to hold face-to-face talks with Putin in Nazran on 2 February 2000, and therefore the rebels needed to hold Groznyy till then to pressure him ahead of March elections. “Without an order, without anything, on the night of January 29 and 30, that is, two days before [meeting with Putin], our guys retreat from the city. I am saying it again, I make no secret of it: it is treason! One hundred percent, the fighters were withdrawn from there only with a single goal, and I am not speaking about the consequences, it was done to disrupt this meeting.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:113): Akhmadov comment: He claims he was completely in the dark about the supposed meeting with Putin, notes it came “at a time when the Russians were saying publicly they would never negotiate with terrorists.” Claims he has found no evidence of Basayev paying $100,000 for a safe corridor out of Groznyy.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:113-114): Akhmadov claims he finds it hard to believe Putin would negotiate with Maskhadov, suggests it could have been “merely an idea floated by someone in Putin’s entourage, a trial balloon that Maskhadov seized and invested with his hopes.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:114): Akhmadov notes meeting with State Department led to formal diplomatic note from Russia, but was ’purely informational and involved no obligations on either side.” Characterises John Beyrle, acting deputy assistant secretary of state for Russia and the Newly Independent States, as showing no interest in political situation in Chechnya, but interested in Khattab. Akhmadov answered that the question should be directed to the CIA, since “Khattab talked about receiving training in US-supported camps in Peshawar.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:115): Akhmadov claims State Department meeting lasted 59 minutes, officially said to last 45. Claims Beyrle kept looking at his watch to make sure it could be said it lasted less than an hour. Akhmadov said after it had lasted three hours, but meant it had started at 3pm, a mistake he corrected in a later RFE/RL interview.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:116): “During this period the Maskhadov audio letters come back again and again to the process of ‘Chechenization’ that the Russians were pursuing beginning in 2001. This was an effort to get the pro-Moscow Chechens to do the Russian dirty work and eventually head a rival government to our Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. This process was not very obvious at first, but Maskhadov was aware of its beginnings. We did not think this process would succeed because of the age-old antipathy to the Russians and our own customs and traditions. But we were wrong. Might made right. By 2005 and 2006, Chechenization finally brought forth its cynical fruits.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:117): Letter Eleven, 30 April 2001: Suggests organising refugees into camps to highlight their plight.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:119/263): A footnote notes that “In 1995 Basayev recommended me to join Maskhadov’s staff. Maskhadov seems, at times, to have suspected I was in collusion with Basayev during my tenure as foreign minister. That was absolutely incorrect. Basayev never tried to interfere in my diplomatic work.” [It is possible that relatively mild treatment of Basayev, in comparison to, for example, Gelayev, is affected by Maskhadov’s perceptions of the Akhmadov-Basayev relationship].

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:123): Letter Twelve, 2 May 2001: Alludes to CIA financing of radicals: “There are deep secrets, behind which stand countries over there, specifically large organizations that have huge financial capabilities.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:124): Speaks of need to contact those who lead the radicals, looks at US as the source of financing.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:125): “If we really manage to get financing here, we will be able to fight and raise our activity, and capture the city [Grozny] – we’ll be able to do everything. Everything can be bought. Most importantly, if it comes through a unified order, and not through Khattab or any other channel.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:125): “Everything is based on the fact that someone is leading them and not allowing them [the radicals] to obey the state order and throws money at them from all sides.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:126): Akhmadov comment: “I think it [this letter] displays quite well the stereotypes that we former Soviet citizens held regarding the United States during the Cold War.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:126-127): Notes that the letter demonstrates that internal conflicts were continuing. “He had a difficult challenge: to pursue the war he had to make common cause with the radicals. How far could he go? Did he approve of suicide missions or attacks on civilian targets? It seems to me he was against such actions but he was boxed in. To unify the resistance, he had to appear to side with the radicals on the theory that when he achieved full control he would then be able to supervise the situation more closely and avoid such incidents.|

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:129): Letter Thirteen, 20 July 2001.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:130): “during the war it is very important what kind of diplomacy we develop. In the political sphere, in the informational sphere. We have to beat this enemy not just in the field, but everywhere. That is how victory was won in the war of 1994-1996.” Speaks of the need to continue talking in spite of the fact that they are “butchers, killers of your people.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:131): Expresses lack of faith in Council of Europe, PACE. However, refuses to sign decree temporarily terminating contacts with PACE. “I always say that we are ready for negotiations without preliminary conditions. I seldom speak about full independence, I always speak about security guarantees for my people, about international guarantees, and so on.” Describes people as exhausted.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:132): Criticises representatives to PACE who fail to agree a common position, but disagree with each other and embarrass Chechnya. “Since we don’t have better people, we say that our comrades work there – but it’s disgraceful what they do. They do not fulfill what they were instructed to do, don’t work with the deputies.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:134): Claims Berezovskiy is interested in keeping state of anarchy in Chechnya, blames him for kidnappings, stealing oil, preparing war in Dagestan.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:135-136): However, does not reject contact with Berezovskiy because of his influence.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:137): Akhmadov comment: Says his proposal to cease contacts with PACE came from its efforts to convene a working group to develop a new constitution for Chechnya that would make it a constituent part of Russian Federation.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:141): Letter Fourteen, 10 August 2001: Reiterates need to cooperate with PACE. “those who win wars are those who win through diplomacy.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:142): On Berezovskiy: “The person who is not afraid to deal with him, even slightly, should be an adventurer of the highest order. In the long run, he is the one who before this war had been destabilizing the situation here for three years with assistance of these Udugovs, with these Basayevs. He was totally their leader.” Goes on to describe him as an outcast.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:143): Argues that Chechen and Berezovskiy’s interests coincide and they could use the latter’s desire to humiliate Putin, but maintains they fear and do not trust him. Says Berezovskiy should be clear on what he wants, only deal directly with Maskhadov.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:144): Asks Akhmadov: “You are not a radical, you aren’t a fundamentalist nor an extremist, but how did you find yourself in the same team with people with whom, well, you have absolutely different convictions, absolutely different attitudes, well, you are like heaven and earth.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:145): “these Taliban recognized us. You know my reaction to it was rather good. For example, if you want to know the truth, I was glad when it happened. Yes, as long as it got in the Russians’ way, why should we care. Recognized means recognized.” Complains that people use Akhmadov’s comments on Taliban recognition to attack Maskhadov.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:146): Akhmadov comment: “This audio letter dramatically illustrates the divide that was growing between Maskhadov, who favored a Western-style, secular government for an independent Chechnya, and radical Chechen leaders like Basayev and Yandarbiyev who insisted ever more strongly that in the future Chechnya should be organized as an Islamic state ruled by Sharia law.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:146-147): Akhmadov describes Maskhadov’s representation of his opinion as “mischaracterized.” Denies contacts with Maskhadov’s opponents. “This problem showed the difficulty of working without constant and systematic communications in such a fast-developing situation.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:147-148): Argues Maskhadov misunderstood proposals for an unofficial meeting between Russian deputies and Chechen officials to be an official Russian proposal preparing the way for genuine negotiations, and therefore highly significant. Some deputies withdrew following official pressure after news of the talks leaked. Resolving misunderstanding complicated by communication issues and fears security services were monitoring calls.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:149): Letter Fifteen, 30 August-8 September 2011: Talks about his earlier efforts to maintain unity. “In the long run I understood one thing. If the team is not united, you cannot build a state. Vallakhi [I swear to Allah]! We could not build it because we tried to be ethical with these useless people, tried to treat them kindly, tried to make people out of them.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:150): “this is the most fundamental issue today – to make Russia stop the war and sit down at the negotiating table on equal terms.” Characterises talks as more important than what will be discussed or results.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:151): Characterised negotiations as “political death” for Putin.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:154): Again accuses Gelayev of selling out to Russia and preparing a provocation.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:159): Letter Sixteen, 28 October 2001 (first post-9/11 letter): Characterises Udugov as a puppet.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:160): Claims Russians kidnapping and ransoming the relatives of Chechen commanders, unwilling to make exchanges and demanding ever-increasing sums.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:161): Speaks of need to “focus on Udugov. After the end of that war [1994-1996], he was the leading man. It was his idea – the Congress of Chechnya and Dagestan, that is, the provocations that needed to be done against Dagestan, plans to seize it, liberation of the Caucasus and what not. Oman, Islam, extremism, terrorism – all that stuff was his idea; he was the first to start it.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:162): Basayev described as “a kind of pawn. He is a shepherd, or rather a ram, put ahead of the flock by the shepherd.” Opines that “the most important thing for us is to announce the name of the one who started it all. The ideological inspirer of this extremism, of provocations in Dagestan, and so on and so forth, is Uduov.” Claims Berezovskiy financed Udugov’s media operations. Says it is important to accuse him of not only being the ideological inspiration of extremism, but of working with Russian security services.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:163): Says necessary to distance Udugov from state, deny any connection to him, and issue international arrest warrant for him.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:163): Claims Russians almost caught him, locking on to his phone call.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:164-165): Akhmadov comment: Claims he held several phone conversations with Maskhadov after 9/11, and that Maskhadov was “extremely interested in the situation in the United States and how it might affect US policy.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:166): “Maskhadov was always trying to unite all the wings of the Chechen resistance to form a united front against the great force arrayed against us. He was trying to dampen the sharp edges among us through compromise. But every time that he succeeded in uniting our forces, there would be some terrible terrorist event, like the Dubrovka/Nord Ost episode in 2002 or the Beslan school tragedy in 2004, which would open up the split again and drive us into another dead end. When we had a semblance of unity, it was imperative that Maskhadov did not interfere with Udugov, or the radical wing of the resistance.” Describes the outburst against Udugov in the letter as unique.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:167): Letter Seventeen, 8 November 2001: Complains of lack of news from Akhmadov and latter’s failure to comply with order to send twice-weekly cassette via Baku. “there is no other explanation for it but absence of elementary discipline or respect.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:169): Claims Vakha Arsanov removed as vice-president and successor and a new individual appointed, but decree not made public.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:171): Claims that he met with all the emirs of jama’ats and reached agreement, and that now Akhmadov should say “everyone in Chechen Republic of Ichkeria obeys Maskhadov.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:174): Akhmadov comment: “I suspect that Saidullayev was a compromise figure. Maskhadov needed to name a person who would continue to carry out his policy but who might still be able to develop reasonable relations with his internal opponents. That imperative clearly excluded Khanbiev, Zakaev, myself, and a number of other officials.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:174): “We believed that the bonds among Chechens were unusually strong, that our society was indivisible, and would remain united against the Russian invaders whatever happened. Unfortunately, we were wrong. We underestimate how tired our people were of war; how much they recognized that the Russians possessed superior force and in the long term could dominate.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:175): Letter Eighteen, 27 November 2001.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:176): Claims Russia is targeting his communications, launching air strikes within 10-15 minutes of a phone call. Also says they are targeting relatives of his entourage.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:182): Expresses opinion that the US “won’t leave the Caucasus to the Russians, they’ll kick them out of here. Therefore, we should carry on an open conversation with them, and speak straight to the point.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:185): “Looking back more than a decade later, I would have to say that Maskhadov did not fully appreciate the hardening of the Russian position. But who did? The years 2002 and 2003 saw considerable efforts by influential individuals, Russian, Chechen, Americans to encourage political negotiations between the warring sides. But none of these took hold.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:187): Letter Nineteen, 5 December 2001: “it seemed to the Russians that this [9/11 attack] really untied their hands, even with some degree of malicious joy in their behavior, when that situation there exploded. ‘We told you so!’”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:188): Claims Chechens laugh at reports of Chechens in Taliban ranks.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:190): “Today, not even a single Wahhabi takes the Basayevs or the Udugovs seriously, to say nothing of the others.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:192): Talks of increasing pressure on those in Azerbaijan, “those who live quietly there.” Describes a base in Azerbaijan as vital.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:193): Akhmadov comment: “I never saw any proof that Chechens from Chechnya (I am not speaking of expatriate Chechens from Jordan or Syria) had joined the Taliban.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:194): “To us, Azerbaijan was a crucial waystation. Baku was an important courier point for us and the Russians knew this. It was a key exit to the Western world where we could obtain visas for onward travel.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:195): Letter Twenty, 29 January-22 February 2002: Speaks of diplomatic progress, praising work of Akhmadov in UK and France, Zakayev in Strasbourg, Said-Khasan Abumuslimov in Germany.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:195-196): Accuses security services of violating “all our customs and traditions” during sweeps.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:197): Described an initiative by Lord Judd and Rogozin on a new constitution as “very dangerous.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:205): Letter Twenty One, 4 February 2002. Discusses at length disagreement over creation of a interdepartmental commission.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:209): “the Western states remember us when they need us, but when they do not need us, they forget about us, and afterward go off to a ranch, meet, and hug, and again blackmail, that is, again make some puppets out of us.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:212): Akhmadov comment: Clarifies that the interdepartmental commission refers to an interagency commission of the State Defense Committee, first proposed in autumn 2001, for gathering reports from all representatives abroad and debating them.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:213-214): Akhmadov admits to not disclosing certain contacts with US officials, such as Madeleine Albright, Frank Carlucci (former defense secretary) and Richard Perle for fear Russians would intercept tapes or Maskhadov, not understanding diplomatic “niceties,” would tell fighters important details.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:214): Describes Nazran official supposedly to head the interagency commission as a “weak link in this system” and young and naïve. Says he and Zakayev independently both viewed the idea negatively, but Maskhadov presumed some level of collusion.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:215): Letter Twenty-Two, 18 April 2002: Instructs Akhmadov to discuss things only directly with him, rather than with others.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:215-216): Suggests Akhmadov divorced from the realities on the ground, speaks of the need “to find the middle ground between what is there and here.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:224): “In another move to pacify his critics, Maskhadov declared full Sharia law in February 1999. This was followed by several public executions that inevitably caused highly negative reactions in the West, which I had difficulty explaining to our hoped-for supporters. Maskhadov calculated that if he implemented some of his opposition’s proposals, he could undercut their standing and demonstrate that they were simply trying to amass political power at his expense.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:225): Talks about the disagreements that developed between himself, Maskhadov and Zakayev over political reform and the creation of the Interagency Commission.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:227): Letter Twenty Three, 30 January 2003: Acknowledges problems faced by Akhmadov, says: “everyone has them. In some places representative offices are closed, in some places there are people who have no chance to move around, there are even people who were arrested and put on trial at the international level. This is a difficult, cruel, dirty war.” Nevertheless complains that he has not heard anything from Akhmadov for eight months.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:229): “no matter [how] long the war is, it has a beginning and an end, and this war will have an end. Whether Russians want or don’t want an end, whether the West intervenes or does not, the end will come. It cannot go on forever. It is obvious to us.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:229-230): Says he received a letter signed by some ministers, deputies and commanders calling for an end to the war and concessions to Russia. Asks what concessions he can make, arguing that if Russia retains the right to regulate constitutional order and conduct antiterrorist operations, “then what are we doing, what are we striving for?”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:230): Rejects idea of a “Kosovo-like variant,” saying it might be a step away from Russia and forward in the international sense, but “again we don’t win any freedom. Maybe, if suddenly we become very compliant, benevolent, and obedient, maybe we will get a carrot. But if suddenly we become a little obstinate, there is a stick – this is what Western democracy is like!”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:231-232): Argues that there are four options: constitutional concessions, a Bosnia-like scenario, “pure force,” and reaching an agreement with Russia without international mediation. “I am even ready to meet with that idiot of theirs [Putin] face to face without any mediators and sign a treaty or an agreement in which the relations between the two countries will be well-defined.” Says it doesn’t matter whether there are mediators: “Only we can make Russia fulfill obligations that she took – by our policies, our understanding, our intellect, our persistence. If they force war upon us, by organized resistance.” However, Chechnya not being part of Russia is described as a “fundamental issue.” Willing to concede Russian interests, common defence and economic policies, common customs and currency, coordinated foreign policy, but not independence. “We make concessions in absolutely everything, but the only thing is, we will not be under their laws. We do not grant them the right to make this hell here. This is the fourth variant.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:232): Argues no one will take them seriously if they do not have an organised resistance and the ability to use force. Claims that it took three years, but now the resistance is united.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:232): “If you start political maneuvering, letting the West know that such-and-such an approach is possible, and telling Russia another approach is possible, they [the radicals] immediately break up our unity. And if unity is broken, there is no way to fight in an organized way.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:233): “politics at large in this world, as soon as you begin to get the hang of it, it is a nightmare. A real nightmare. Vallakhi! Everything that is done by everyone, everywhere, is hypocrisy. Hypocrisy. There are no rights anywhere, and it is unlikely that they will ever be [sic]. There are interests, that’s it! Interests of states, interests of parties, leadership, and so on.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:235): Akhmadov comment: Says he was offended by Maskhadov’s criticisms, which he argued ignored the difficult political environment around the Iraq war and Akhmadov’s undetermined legal status.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:235): Says there were at least six peace plans proposed in 2001-2003, all rejected by Russia. Argues the Dubrovka attack “left the search for peace largely discredited.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:236-239): Lists six plans as: • Boris Nemtsov’s 14 February 2001 recommendations that Chechnya become a special federal district headed by a Russian governor-general with control over financial, political and military power. If the governor-general failed to stabilise the situation Chechnya would be split into two along the Baku-Rostov highway, with the northern flatlands joined to Stavropol and the south having no federal forces. • Yevgeniy Primakov’s 14 February 2001 suggestion that Chechen fighters and civilians be separated; negotiations be conducted with individual commanders; fighters to declare within 72 hours willingness to surrender arms and enter into negotiations; localise the conflict; grant Chechnya special status; soliciting Western support for the struggle against terrorism. “I regarded these more as recommendations for a more effective pacification of Chechnya than a real plan for peace.” • Ruslan Khasbulatov’s 2002 proposal to grant Chechnya special status, considerable autonomy, but common currency and still within Russia. Chechnya would be allowed to conduct foreign policy so long as it respected Russia’s interests. Complete demilitarization on both sides to be pursued. UN, OSCE and Council of Europe to guarantee plan. Akhmadov notes lack of media coverage of proposals, suggests they were “under instructions to give it no publicity.” • Chechen businessman Khozh-Akhmed Nukhayev’s 28 June 2002 Eurasian Plan. Advocated splitting Chechnya into northern flatlands and southern mountains. Former to remain part of Russia, latter to be self-governing territory with “promises of non-interference by Russia and yet would not be considered a part of the international community. I considered the plan utopian at best and President Maskhadov violently denounced it.” • American Committee for Peace in Chechnya proposal, written by Zbigniev Brzezinski and published in Washington Post on 21 June 2002. Would allow Russian troops to control southern border, and would recognise Russian territorial integrity. A referendum on a new constitution based on agreement with Tatarstan would be used. Extremist groups to be ejected from country if they rejected constitution. International community to aid reconstruction. • Akhmadov’s plan, approved by Maskhadov, announced on 18 March 2003. Chechnya to be UN protectorate for 10-15 years, following model of Kosovo and East Timor. Maskhadov would resign, Russian military withdraw, armed Chechen units disarm. Peacekeepers to maintain order. Claims plan enjoyed Western support, including 145 deputies of European Parliament, but ignored by Russia.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:239): On inability to reach agreement: “The difficult problems were complicated by feelings of revenge among the Russians after losing the first war, not to speak of the desire for vengeance by Chechens who had suffered terrible brutalities, and out memories of the Great Deportation of 1944.” Viewed agreement on ceasefire, disarming Chechen groups, withdrawing Russian military, prisoner exchange, reconstruction, and international oversight as possible, but intransigence on issue of whether Chechnya should remain part of Russia or be independent.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:240): “I believe the desire for independence has been pushed underground only temporarily. Chechens have long memories. Indeed, Chechen families honor family history for at least seven generations. An unpunished crime six generations ago must still be punished today. I will not be surprised if, say, in 50 years the demand for Chechen independence rises again.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:241): Letter Twenty-Four (and final), 30 March 2003: Criticised Akhmadov’s lack of correspondence, described him as an “undisciplined minister.” Says he could contact him through his son, Anzor. “But today there is a terrible, cruel, hard, war going on here and today I have no chance to separate you all into the good and the bad. Therefore, you behave as suits yourselves, without exerting yourselves. I have no clue what the situation is like in your area. Last time you sent a document with a variant that you suggested, that is the variant of ‘Conditional Independence.’ But what comes next, what you have done, what you have succeeded in, what you are planning to do, I know absolutely nothing about that.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:242): “You are a minister who is unable to maintain any kind of discipline. You are a man who is absolutely unaware of what is going on here. You have no clue.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:242-243): Reiterates his view that armed resistance is key to being heard, and to not being forgotten by West.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:244): Calls for creation of an international military tribunal as a means to pressure Russia.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:246): Akhmadov comment: Offers an understanding view of Maskhadov’s criticisms, saying “you must keep in mind the difficult circumstances on the ground that were leading him to a state of quiet desperation. […] had we been able to keep up constant and normal communications many of our misunderstandings would never have occurred.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:247): says Maskhadov “was constantly looking over his should at his radical commanders who had doubts about any shift toward the West and he did not want to drive in a new wedge that would threaten military unity.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:248-249): Speaks of his personal difficulties, since his passport expired in 2002 but, as foreign minister, he was reluctant to seek political asylum.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:250): “Maskhadov’s death was the final event Moscow needed to cap their policy of Chechenization.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:251): Letter Twenty Five, a letter by Maskhadov to European High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solano, 25 February 2005: Marks tenth anniversary of start of first war, huge losses suffered by Chechen population.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:251-252): Speaks of Moscow’s failure to acknowledge any peace proposals.

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:252-253): Says he had always condemned terrorism by Chechen resistance, but argues “this terrorism has nothing to do with international fundamental terrorism. It is the action of desperate people, most of whom have lost loved ones in atrocious circumstances and believe they can respond to the aggressor and occupier by using the same methods. This is not my point of view, nor will it ever be. In fact, I have been doing everything within my power to keep actions of the Chechen resistance within the internationally recognized rules of war. When I fail to prevent terrorism, I fail only in the circumstances where no one could have succeeded. The terrorism at work in Chechnya, whether it is the action of the occupying forces or of isolated elements of he resistance, is born and prospers out of war, abject abuse, and the daily violation of the most fundamental rights.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:255): Akhmadov comment on 2005 unilateral ceasefire, which “appeared to hold.” “He could not have done this had he not cultivated relations with his fiercest internal opponents and created a united military command.”

Akhmadov and Daniloff (2013:255): “With Maskhadov’s death on March 8, 2005, the movement for a secular, democratic Chechnya was condemned to die.”