Abrahms, Beauchamp and Mroszczyk (2017) ‘What Terrorist Leaders Want.’
Citation: Abrahms, Max, Beauchamp, Nicholas and Mroszczyk, Joseph (2017) ‘What Terrorist Leaders Want: A Content Analysis of Terrorist Propaganda Videos,’ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 40:11, pp. 899-916.
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Abstract: In recent years, a growing body of empirical research suggests that indiscriminate violence against civilian targets tends to carry substantial political risks compared to more selective violence against military targets. To better understand why terrorist groups sometimes attack politically suboptimal targets, scholars are increasingly adopting a principal-agent framework where the leaders of terrorist groups are understood as principals and lower level members as agents. According to this framework, terrorist leaders are thought to behave as essentially rational political actors, whereas lower level members are believed to harbor stronger non-political incentives for harming civilians, often in defiance of leadership preferences. We test this proposition with an original content analysis of terrorist propaganda videos. Consistent with the principal–agent framework, our analysis demonstrates statistically that terrorist leaders tend to favor significantly less indiscriminate violence than their operatives actually commit, providing unprecedented insight into the incentive structure of terrorist leaders relative to the rank-and-file.
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Abrahms, Beauchamp and Mroszczyk (2017): establish a clear distinction between leader and rank-and-file preferences. Bases this on growing literature that adopts an organisational theory approach, with leaders seen as rational actors but rank-and-file having separate motivations, creating a principal-agent problem.
Abrahms, Beauchamp and Mroszczyk (2017:900): “terrorist propaganda videos do not highlight attacks that are representative of their group’s actual targeting behavior. On the contrary, propaganda videos are significantly more likely to showcase attacks that steer clear of civilians compared to the actual targeting choices of operatives.”
Abrahms, Beauchamp and Mroszczyk (2017:902): “The principal–agent framework predicts a recurrent disconnect between the preferences of leaders and the behavior of subordinates.”
Abrahms, Beauchamp and Mroszczyk (2017:904): Acknowledge that leaders may not be entirely honest in their statements. However, argue that there is evidence of sincerity in objecting to targeting civilians, noting similar calls for restraint in captured private correspondence; use of “costly signalling,” such as punishing subordinates who engage in such violence; and lack of civilian targeting in cases where leadership publicly opposes it and is strong enough to impose its preferences [though logic may be circular here, because the correlation between preferences and behaviours might be the proof of leadership strength].
Abrahms, Beauchamp and Mroszczyk (2017): Call for empirical testing of why rank-and-file members exhibit less restraint than leaders.